Dietmar Studemann, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic of Germany to Ukraine, has held this post for almost six years. Even though his diplomatic mission will end soon, he does not intend to say goodbye to Kyiv. On July 1 he was appointed advisor to the Ukrainian president. Mr. Studemann ranks with the most prestigious representatives of the diplomatic corps. He is sometimes accused of excessive Russophilism, having studied in Leningrad and worked in the Moscow embassy for a long time. It is, however, safe to assume that his work in Ukraine has also made a considerable impression on the German diplomat.
How does Germany view the prospects of Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the EU? What do German businessmen want to hear from the new coalition government? These and other issues are broached in the following interview with Ambassador STUDEMANN.
You worked during the presidencies of Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yushchenko. Where do you see the difference in the political climate?
Studemann: The Orange Revolution drew the line in a sense. This does not concern the political leadership as much as the people, who didn’t want the old system. But to say simply, “That’s it, the old system is ending,” is not enough to put an end to its existence. Some sort of legacy of this system remains. Everyone knows that the political system must be perfect; the president is also aware of this. He demanded that the judiciary and the “third power” be transferred to democratic principles. Ukraine needs genuine popular parties, just like this has been achieved in Western Europe, parties that rely on programs, traditions, and experience.
“But all this will come with time. Of course, the interests of certain individuals or social circles play a role. The relationships between the economy and politics must be regulated. Our economy is in the hands of private entrepreneurs, who work in market conditions. The state provides general political and economic framework conditions.
“It is hard to expect Ukraine’s new political leadership to be able to change the political system in one year. We are convinced that the new government has enough potential to carry out this task. Above all, this requires transparency and control over political actions. In addition, morality is one of the important factors of political actions. After all, political actions are implemented for the general benefit of the people. There have always existed special interests within a system where those in power and control over them are balanced. There must be conditions for achieving the people’s common good.
In a recent interview with The Day you said that the German model of a “great coalition” is impossible in Ukraine. Does this mean that you do not believe in a coalition, for example, between Our Ukraine and the Party of Regions? Where do you see the difference between the so-called Orange forces and the “regionals”?
Studemann: The coalition is a matter that concerns Ukraine and its electorate. All the parties in the Ukrainian parliament are the result of democratic elections, so any coalition and government are legitimate. There are differences between these parties in principle. In my country a large coalition was formed because a general compromise was achieved between the party platforms. This relates to problems that voters who were electing one party or another wanted to solve.
“As for Ukraine, the platforms of these parties are largely ambiguous and lack clear contours. This means that platforms alone did not play the decisive role in forming the coalition but the question of who would share power with whom. The more these platforms are placed in the forefront to solve voters’ problems, the closer you will approach our concept of coalition.
Will the Orange coalition last long? What can cement this coalition?
Studemann: I cannot say. This is the decision of the Ukrainian electorate and those representatives who were elected. If a compromise can be achieved during the formation of this coalition with regard to programmatic principles aimed at meeting the interests of the people, then the issue of appointments to posts should not result in the coalition’s failure. During negotiations in my country, the stronger side, the one that obtained the majority of votes, has the right to nominate the head of government. However, the decisive factor is achieving programmatic compromises. After all, the voters cast their ballots for programs they believed would solve their problems.
Are German businessmen and politicians afraid that Yulia Tymoshenko as the head of government will be unpredictable?
Studemann: I am not a Ukrainian, but I must add that the head of government does not act as an autocrat but should coordinate his/her actions with the political leadership. This person is part of the political system, parties, factions, and coalition government. Anyway, that’s how things are done in my country. For example, Mrs. Merkel’s candidacy does not seem to be the ideal choice to some members of the Social Democratic Party. Proof of this is the results of our elections. However, we have a government, and its members depend on their parties. As for our great coalition led by Mrs. Menkel, it is quite balanced and functions optimally.
In fact, the prime minister does not solve all issues single-handedly. Questions are resolved by the Cabinet of Ministers. In your country the president is vested with considerable executive functions. As a result of changes to your legislation, parliament has also received additional opportunities to solve problems connected with investments. I think that it is rather important for Ukraine to optimize its political system in a manner that would place responsibility in several pairs of hands, not just one. I believe that this has never happened. It is also important to achieve a balance of compromises for the benefit of the people. It is important for the government and the opposition to maintain constructive relations, without taking destructive stands against each other.
Many foreign businessmen have said that they suffered losses because the free economic zones were closed. Has the attitude to foreign investors changed since Yuriy Yekhanurov became prime minister? Has the investment climate improved in Ukraine?
Studemann: The same problems exist. The point is not whether such free economic zones exist but the consequences of closing such zones. Questions about the creation of adequate investment conditions thus emerge.
What would foreign investors like to hear from the new government? Are assurances about rule of law in Ukraine enough to attract foreign investors?
Studemann: Of course, rule of law and security are substantial factors. It is also necessary to implement other criteria, e.g., criteria that operate for both foreign and domestic investors. What is needed here is modern administrative management capable of removing bureaucratic barriers, all those hundreds of certificates and official seals. What is required is a system that would allow business to travel along an obstacle-free road, because any signature, any seal, any license are grounds for corruption. This is a rather tangible obstacle.
You must have heard that certain politicians are trying to implement the idea of federalizing Ukraine. These politicians refer to Germany’s experience. Do you think Ukraine has any prerequisites for turning this unitary state into a federal republic? Some politicians say that the large number of Russian-speaking citizens is one such precondition.
Studemann: Germany is a federal state. Our federalism is based on deeply-rooted historical and other preconditions. Therefore, a federal structure cannot be drafted on a desk. In principle, it can only result from progress. Ukraine must make its own decision on whether it has traversed the road of progress. In general, I don’t think that language is a criterion. In Germany everyone speaks two languages, literary German and their own dialect. These dialects differ so much that Germans who live in the north cannot understand Bavarians, and the other way around. It is quite important for them to have a common identity.
What do you think about certain cities in Ukraine that have proclaimed Russian as their regional language, with these local communities referring to the European regional language charter?
Studemann: Settling the language problem depends on you. As for the European Charter and Ukraine, these are two different issues. The Ukrainian government does not ban the use of the Russian language, so I don’t think this is a topic that the European Charter can deal with. You will have to make your own decision on your official language. It is you who will regulate the functioning of minority languages, as long as you do not suppress and ban these languages.
“From what I can see after having spent five years in Ukraine, no one is suppressing the Russian language here. People are free to use whatever language they prefer on a daily basis. It is clear that the Ukrainian language must be protected and that its development must be helped from the historical standpoint. The Russian language has a meaning measured in both human and historical dimensions. Anyway, the final say on the matter rests with Ukraine. This issue can be regulated on the national level. Look at Switzerland, a country that has four official languages.
Mr. Ambassador, what are your plans after completing your tenure in Ukraine? We have heard that you are already an official adviser to the president of Ukraine.
Studemann: I will remain the German Ambassador until June 30, 2006-this will be my only post. Let’s discuss further events after this date. I will become the president’s adviser only after my retirement as ambassador.
Who will succeed you as ambassador to Ukraine?
Studemann: There is already a replacement, and it will be possible to establish contact with him rather quickly. Of course, it is fully understood that the replacement will want to be the one to introduce himself. I cannot identify him until his name is officially announced. I think this question will be resolved in one month.
When will Chancellor Merkel’s visit to Ukraine take place?
Studemann: There is an agreement between our sides about holding a summit this year. Last year President Yushchenko was in Germany to attend intergovernmental consultations. It is my position that with a stable political situation and a government on your side, such government consultations will take place in Ukraine this year. As for a concrete date, I think this will happen in the second half of the year. Here it is important to bear in mind the schedules of the chancellor, the president, and the prime minister.
The construction of the so-called northern pipeline is attracting sharp criticism from certain European countries. Poland’s Defense Minister Radek Sikorski recently compared it to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Was Germany’s decision to start building the pipeline justified without consulting its neighbors?
Studemann: If Minister Sikorski believes that such historical comparisons are necessary to describe this situation, that’s his prerogative. Personally, I believe that this is not entirely wise and does not correspond to the current political and economic circumstances. I would like to remind you that on our federal chancellor’s initiative, after talks with Poland’s political leadership, an understanding was reached about forming a working group to deal with the political aspect of building this gas pipeline. From this it clearly follows that we are seriously considering Poland’s political arguments and that we would like to resolve this issue with the Polish side.
“On the other hand, one cannot ignore the fact that the project has a commercial aspect. In my opinion, in such projects the most important thing for the consumer is to achieve the greatest possible diversification of energy supply sources. Therefore, I would like to tell all those who are criticizing that this is not about excluding anyone but about ensuring our own energy supply needs. At the same time Poland and Ukraine will always remain our partners, especially as energy transit carriers.
The German — and the European — position is that all parties concerned, the suppliers, the transitory agents, and the consumers — should sit down at the negotiating table. This is the only opportunity to reach any kind of solution to this issue. None of the parties can solve this problem single-handedly. Right now there is no alternative but for all the parties to combine their efforts to resolve the problem of energy supplies. It is perfectly understandable that market economy issues will play a role here. This is true of all participants, Russia in particular.
I would also like to mention a chance that was passed up at one time, the trilateral agreement on energy supplies, which was signed by Ukraine, Russia, and Germany in St. Petersburg. Political statements made by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Leonid Kuchma, as well as by Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany, are still regarded as a strategic decision.
Can the plan to create this trilateral consortium be revived?
Studemann: I know that the German side is still interested in this project, especially in its realization. As regards Ukraine and Russia, there is nothing I can say.
On what terms and conditions could this project be revived?
Studemann: This could be achieved on any basis, but the situation has now changed somewhat. We want to achieve a transparent solution that is oriented on a long-term solution to this problem, so that we could discuss the safety and stability of energy supplies.
Why do you think the EU failed to support Poland’s initiative concerning the establishment of the so-called energetic NATO, where issues relating to the diversification of energy sources and suppliers could be solved?
Studemann: I am convinced there is no particular sense in forming an alliance with energy producers and suppliers on the one hand and consumers, on the other. Perhaps in this sense the EU’s policy should be more clearly formulated, yet the principles of this policy envisage concerted action in achieving stability, predictability, and diversification of energy sources, as well as a balanced distribution of risks between supplier, transit country, and consumer. Russia will always have a seat at this table. Other producers of energy carriers will also be invited, just as cooperative relations will continue being developed. This is the only way we will be able to achieve predictability and stability. All this will make exploiting energy supplies as a political tool impossible.
What role could Ukraine play in such a joint European energy supply policy?
Studemann: Ukraine, as a classic transit country is discharging an important function; energy supplies are being provided from east to west across its territory. Ukraine is more than a transit country; it is also an energy-consuming country. It can eventually become an energy producer. For this reason Ukraine should be interested in occupying a seat at this table.
Will Germany support Ukraine if Kyiv insists during the negotiations in Moscow on revising the gas agreement that was signed under pressure at the beginning of the year? We know that the United States said it would support Ukraine in this matter.
Studemann: I don’t know what the Americans said. I think this is a question for Ukraine and Russia to resolve, since we aren’t sure about the identity of many participants. As energy consumers, we are interested in having Ukrainian-Russian relations settled and formalized in the most optimal manner. These relations must be transparent and geared to last for a long while. Developing these relations must answer German and European interests. Therefore, we are interested in seeing a wise settlement of the Ukrainian-Russian gas issue.
Does Berlin share Washington’s optimism about Ukraine’s transition to the NATO Membership Action Plan this autumn and the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO in 2008?
Studemann: We are reluctant to discuss any dates. It is important for Ukraine to observe all the required conditions. If most of the NATO countries are convinced that Ukraine should join the membership plan, we will never object, of course. Germany is interested in securing stability, predictability, and stronger democratic principles in the region where Ukraine is situated. This country is quite an important factor in the region, so we will support efforts aimed at achieving this stability and predictability. You have the potential. You proved it during the recent elections. As for the political aspects relating to the military and defense spheres, there is also potential and you have it. The thing is to put it to the best use and within a realistic timeframe.
Is it possible that Russia, as a major trading partner of Germany, can influence Germany’s policies with the goal of slowing down Ukraine’s admission to NATO? Does this Russian factor really exist?
Studemann: No. Russia does not determine our policy. Germany does. But there is no denying the Russian factor. This is something Ukraine, NATO, and Russia have to work out.
Do you agree with those Ukrainian diplomats who claim that Ukrainian-Russian relations will improve only after Ukraine is admitted to NATO?
Studemann: In principle, Russia should be interested in more stable and transparent relations with Ukraine. Russia should be interested in keeping her southern flank stable. I understand that shedding stereotypes is very difficult, but we must learn to perceive the existing situation the way it is, in the absence of special spheres of influence. As long as people and states exist, personal interests will also exist. The task is to balance these interests in a normal way, so they can be formulated in the most optimal manner. NATO is not an organization aimed against any country. On the contrary, it is possible to assume that the boundary line of Russian-NATO relations is drawing closer. Therefore, Ukraine’s future admission to NATO cannot be something that is directed against Russia.
Angela Merkel said recently that the European Union will not be able to “cope” with accepting new members. Does this mean that Ukraine has no prospects?
Studemann: Ukraine still has European prospects; no one has tried to block them. Mrs. Merkel is actively campaigning for the European Union to remain active and effective in its present composition. If this task is achieved, the EU will remain attractive to Ukraine as well. Therefore, we expect an understanding attitude to EU problems from Ukraine.
“On the other hand, intense cooperation and prospects point to Ukraine’s better future as a member of Europe; we see these prospects and are trying to work to this end. Therefore, we always say, “Our doors are open.” To walk through these doors, one must step over a relatively low threshold. It would be much wiser if we concentrated our attention on this threshold, rather than the open doors. Therefore, the question of applying for EU membership is Ukraine’s prerogative.
“In addition, certain conditions must be observed. I don’t think that Ukraine should be worried about failing to join the EU. The road has been shown. The next step will be setting up a free trade area. To do so, Ukraine must first become a member of the WTO. If this is achieved, if an effective free trade area emerges, then it will be possible to accentuate our attention on the association’s relations. And once Ukraine and its EU partners successfully traverse the road and will be standing in front of these doors, I can easily imagine that it will enter through these doors.
