Dmitri TRENIN, the deputy director and head of the scholarly council of the Carnegie Moscow Center, is one of Russia’s leading international experts. Since 1978 he has focused on international relations, first as a liaison officer of the Soviet military contingent in Potsdam and later as research fellow at the NATO Military College in Rome. He has also worked as a senior research fellow at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Europe Institute.
Dmitri Trenin has an excellent understanding of how foreign policies are formulated in the Kremlin, Washington, and Brussels. Proof of this is found in his many publications on relations between Russia and the US and Russia and Europe. One of them, entitled “Russia Exiting Western Orbit,” was published in the prestigious US journal Foreign Affairs prior to the Russia-G8 summit in St. Petersburg. This year his book Integration and Identity: Russia as the New West was published in Russia.
This Russian expert has an interesting view of contemporary imperialistic policies. Should Moscow compete with Washington for world influence? What kind of relations should Ukraine maintain with Russia? Will Moscow continue influencing Kyiv’s policies? What are the conditions under which Ukraine can enter NATO? Will this result in Ukraine’s breakup? These and other issues are raised in The Day’s interview with Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center.
The director of the Brookings Institute declared recently that imperialism is dead and that countries should not be allowed to influence each other. Is this possible in our world?
D.T.: It is true that the US is showing an increasing interest in imperialistic issues and other countries’ experience. We are having a serious discussion about the role of the US in the world today. I would say that the period of traditional classical imperialism is over. If this is what Strobe Talbot has in mind, then there is nothing whatsoever to discuss. Another question is that countries influence each other, and they do so disproportionately. That is why there are countries that not only have influence but can dominate the international arena or in some region. But this is not classical imperialism, rather a reality we have to deal with.
If we speak about Russia’s ambitions, should this country bother achieving parity with the US, considering that this effort would require a lot of money and other means?
D.T.: I believe that, by and large, Russia’s efforts to achieve equality with the United States create more minuses than pluses. We can try to equal the United States in a number of industries, which would be useful for Russia. However, the desire to compete with the United States in terms of political influence, military strength, and so on, cannot be productive and positive for the Russian Federation or any other country. I believe this is an obviously dead-end and losing proposition.
Russia has invented the concept of sovereign democracy. Why doesn’t it want to accept general international or general European values?
D.T.: Sovereign democracy is the slogan of the current political leadership of Russia, which has two foundations. The word “sovereign” means that Russia does not want to be a part of what is generally perceived in Russia as the American empire. Democracy is a message being sent by the Russian government within and outside Russia, that Russia wants to build a democratic system, a society based on those values that you have mentioned. But this will take quite a while. Russia is heading in the same direction as all of Europe, but with a certain delay. In a recent interview Surkov, the author of the concept “sovereign democracy,” states that the substance of the concept of democracy and set of values has always changed and continue to change. He says that each country is at its particular state of historical progress. Russia is no refuge for angels, to put it mildly, but it is moving in the same direction as the other civilized world. This is the meaning of Surkov’s concept.
Do you think that a united Europe will opt for exerting its influence on the US level and become an equal participant? Will Europe’s soft-force approach surpass the US’s hard-force?
D.T.: I think the problem is not the correlation of soft and hard-force approaches but whether Europe is capable of becoming the sole actor in the international arena. There are great doubts about this and they are mounting. At the same time, if Europe (the European Union) proves capable of acting as a sole, internally grouped actor, then nothing can prevent Europe from playing a role in the international arena, which would be comparable to that of the US. But everything depends on the Europeans, who have the requisite resources for this.
Time will show whether these European countries will have enough political will and be able to achieve consensus; whether they will be able to produce the right leaders capable of launching Europe into this orbit. But I would stress that Europe has achieved fantastic successes in the last few decades. In the 1980s, few believed that Europe could achieve what it has today. In my opinion, Euroskepticism may result in wrong conclusions relating to Europe’s prospects.
Some experts claim that this European project will be completed after Ukraine becomes a member.
D.T.: First of all, this is the business of the Ukrainian people and its elite. If Ukraine wants to become not only a European state, which it is today, but also a modern European society, then the question of Ukraine’s EU membership will be resolved.
In one of your speeches you stated that Ukraine’s entry into NATO would lead to a breakup of the country. Do you think the situation has been changed by the Universal signed by Ukraine’s leading political parties?
D.T.: I was truly worried by the possibility of Ukraine’s breakup. My assumption was that an attempt to include Ukraine in NATO would cause serious differences within your country. Right now these real political differences among various official groups have been somewhat assuaged. The Universal may become a platform for broad cooperation as well as competition, but nevertheless with an emphasis on the delimitation of spheres of interests of the main political forces. I also include Mrs. Tymoshenko here. I believe that in the present balance of forces she stands a good chance of replacing Mr. Yushchenko in the next presidential elections in Ukraine. All this points to serious changes in the Ukrainian foreign policy tactic, which will take a more cautious and circumspect course in the same Euro-Atlantic and European direction, but at a rate that will prevent avert the breakup of Ukraine and a deterioration of relations with Russia. Established goals will thus be reached without causing destructive consequences that might occur if Ukraine sprinted toward the West. A successful Ukraine that has built modern civic institutions and an effective economy that will conduct transparent modern foreign policies would be very good news for Russia.
Will Russia continue opposing Ukraine’s entry into NATO?
D.T.: I believe that the main problem is not in Russia. The problem is achieving consensus in Ukraine. If such a consensus is achieved among Ukrainians, Russia will not do anything. From what I know, unlike Poland and the Baltic states, Ukraine must not join NATO because it fears Russia. Of course, there are people in Ukraine who have the same attitude to Russia as, for example, in Poland and the Baltic states. But the majority of Ukrainians have a different attitude toward Russia. Therefore, I believe that, if Ukraine joins NATO, it won’t be out of fear of a clear or potential threat. That is why Ukraine’s membership in NATO will be qualitatively different from Poland’s. Once again we assume that in this case Russia will not be gnawing at the bit and making sudden movements. If Russia starts creating tensions for itself and viewing Ukraine’s membership as a geopolitical or strategic catastrophe, and if it starts turning its defense shield against Ukraine, then we will be approaching the Polish or Baltic situation.
In what does Russia perceive the NATO threat? After all, it cooperates even more actively with this alliance than Ukraine. How does Russia see Ukraine’s NATO membership as a threat?
D.T.: I would say that what we have here is a very deep-rooted view that, like in the past, NATO is Russia’s potential opponent, no matter what, and that NATO expansion is a manifestation of intentions to seize those territories that Russia lost and tie them tightly to the West, thereby isolating Russia from Europe, cardinally reducing its influence on European matters, and creating a platform for a possible deployment of US troops. These perceptions cannot be overcome. We have to wait for new generations to appear. This is a stand that political analysis alone will not dispel; it also requires psychology.
But in principle Russia could join NATO and thus eliminate all its anxieties.
D.T.: I think that the train has left the station — at least the one we could have boarded in principle. Another train could arrive, but Russia’s membership depends not only on Russia but primarily (and not exclusively) on the US. At the moment I can see no possibility for Russia to join NATO, not from the Russian, American, or European points of view. If Russia joined NATO, it would have to acknowledge the Americans’ world leadership. At one point this seemed to be a possibility, but now it is impossible. The word “sovereign” means the rejection of acknowledging American superiority over Russia. Therefore, the situation is unfavorable for this.
Do you think that the emergence of the new government in Ukraine means that Ukraine and Russia will be able to coordinate their entry into the WTO?
D.T.: I think there is a chance that Ukraine and Russia could join the WTO at the same time. But if this doesn’t happen, then Ukraine will join earlier, and Russia’s membership could be delayed for an indeterminate period. I don’t think this would benefit world trade.
It has always been thought that Russia is interested in keeping Ukraine in its sphere of influence. Will this policy be maintained now that Viktor Yanukovych is in power? Will Russia try to draw Ukraine closer into its embrace?
D.T.: I think that Russia’s policy is learning from its mistakes and failures. Russia must realize one thing right now: Ukraine cannot have a pro-Russian politician as such. There may be a politician who will play the Russian or Moscow card. In terms of logic, a pro-Russian politician in Ukraine would have to guide your country into Moscow’s sphere of influence and dominance, which I consider impossible because Ukraine, as a state, rejects the idea of the reunification of the Eastern Slavs under the auspices of Moscow. Ukraine has two roads: one leading to European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and the other one-centrist, between Russia and Europe. I believe that Ukrainian policy will move sooner in the direction of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, although this will sometimes be a difficult process. Nevertheless, this vector will be decisive. Ukraine will also try to maintain normal, neighborly relations with Russia to its own best advantage. However, of its two partners Ukraine will integrate with one and cooperate with the other. It will integrate with Europe and the West in the broader sense, and it will cooperate with Russia.
Russia can and must accept this reality; it must cooperate with Ukraine by proceeding from these parameters, which will not inflict harm on Russia’s most important national interests. Ukraine has never been nor will it ever be any threat to Russia’s security. Russia and Russian businessmen can and will work in Ukraine because your country remains Russia’s close neighbor in every aspect, including humanitarian, cultural, and historical ones. I hope that Russia’s policy toward Ukraine becomes more up to date. Despite all the criticisms of Russia’s policies vis-a-vis Ukraine, I would stress that we cannot underestimate the fact that Russia agreed to Ukraine’s independence and its current frontiers. Parting with Ukraine as a component of its state was very difficult and painful. Yet Russia’s political class and Russian society, despite the attitude to them in general or their individual representatives, have learned to accept this fact, which would have been totally inconceivable 20 years ago: the existence of an independent Ukrainian state following its own Western-oriented course. That is why this is not an automatic thing. We know how difficult it was for some countries to leave their empires. In the meantime, knock on wood, there are remarkably favorable conditions in Russia vis-a-vis Ukraine.
