I think it is hard to overestimate the symbolic meaning of the Dnipropetrovsk summit, especially the fact that the Ukrainian and Russian presidents met at a time of such political turmoil in Ukraine, the media hysteria in Russia connected especially with NTV saga, and mounting world tensions.
What, then, is the new Ukrainian- Russian rapprochement all about? Is there reason to assume that the countries are embarking political integration a la Belarus? Or perhaps it is all yet another Kyiv maneuver to get the West to take a fresh interest now that they are folding up their aid programs. Or perhaps the summit was meant to distract public attention from the crisis of Ukraine’s Establishment.
Concerning the Belarusian option, the Ukrainian political elite has affirmed its current status as a sovereign state. In fact, Ukrainian dignitaries discuss mainly economic issues even in the almost virtual reality Commonwealth of Independent States.
I would recommend those believing that economic association inevitably leads to a political one to take a closer look at what is happening in Europe. The latter’s political integration is constant pushed into the background; instead, the member states are attempting to rid themselves of certain socially burdensome functions, giving super-state institutions the baby to hold. It is a process of revising the role of nation-states in the interdependent postindustrial world. In Ukraine and Russia, this process is not likely to take place even in the distant future, because the modern notion of nation- state remains embryonic here.
Returning to Belarus, the sharp criticism of the Lukashenka regime by both the Ukrainian Right and the international community seems quite justified and reasonable. Still, should one regard the customs union idea voiced by a pragmatic patriot as completely insane, especially considering all the antics of the customs authorities? It should be noted that the situation on the Ukrainian-Russian border is improving.
The dangerous game being played by the leadership of Yeltsin’s Russia, their mentality overburdened with stereotypes, with the Lukashenka regime has resulted in Belarus industrial goods dominating the Russian market, ranging from Or С l to Vladivostok. The odious Belarus daddy turned out a better defender of his national interests that our as odious Europhiles. Putin’s Russia is trying to distance itself politically from Belarus and in some polite manner to dispel American illusions. This would seem not a bad chance for Ukraine. It is no secret that the architects of post-Soviet politics are competing for Russia’s huge market, just as the Central European countries are fighting for Western investment, while Russia is trying so hard to get a leading position among the world exporters of energy resources.
As for the Ukrainian leadership flirting with the West, I think that the current shift in Ukrainian foreign policy priorities is quite justified. We are supposed to be undermining Western market stability with our less expensive and superior quality sunflower seeds and irritate the European community with our aircraft construction and nuclear physics. Of course, we have problems with our democracy, but practically the same is true of Turkey, yet IMF overnight decided to give it four billion dollars [!].
The key thesis of Ukrainian foreign policy should long have been the national interest, rather than a mythical Western orientation or even more nonsensical pro-Eastern approach. The “eastern” markets and laws appear to propose better conditions for Ukrainian businessmen and farmers — meaning higher living standards and better protection of civil rights. It means that our national interests should be directed there, not where they want to isolate us and feel free to teach us about humanitarian interventions, while neutralizing our exports by means of European agreements.
About Kyiv’s red herring in the context of the domestic political situation, perhaps it is all true, but only partially. After all, the Russian leader’s official statements refer Kyiv events to the competence of the sovereign Ukrainian state. In addition, the Kuchma-Putin relationship is a far cry from what it was with Yeltsin. There is hardly any symbolism left in Ukrainian-Russian contacts. With Putin in power, our relations with Russia are becoming a truly pragmatic, effective, civilized, and an equal enough dialogue.
In my opinion, the Dnipropetrovsk summit is a special and fundamental achievement of Ukrainian diplomacy. Is a single energy space not a godsend to those in charge of Ukraine’s energy sector? We can ignore the rhetoric about dependence. National interests are what really matters and this is the rhetoric of interdependence. Does coordination of military-industrial policy not mean neutralizing the most formidable rival on the world weapons markets, dividing the spheres of influence and profits among the world’s top ten arms dealers? Ukrainian national interests are best served by civilized, partnership, and mutual advantageous Kyiv-Moscow relations.
Undoubtedly, Kyiv would like to have the same kind of relationships with Washington, Brussels, and Berlin. Yet while Moscow is really prepared for a dialogue, after being disillusioned about energy resource exports via Belarus, considered a black sheep in the outside world, or via the Baltic states, still wearing their ethnic short pants, Washington is still trying to impose on Kyiv a relationship symbolized by the seventy million worth of outdated agricultural technologies Ukraine got in place of a $4 billion contract with Iran.
It is time to relegate ethnic and historical stereotypes to Ukraine’s archives. We live in a cruelly asymmetrical and interdependent world: cruel, unstable, and unforgiving of mistakes, a world much more complicated and controversial than the old East-West balance of forces. That balance no longer exists, just as there is no East and West the way we used to understand the notions. What is left is a postindustrial center and a semi-industrial province. To get to that center, Ukraine should not pass up opportunities such as those proposed by economic cooperation with Russia.
