Until recently, Kazakhstan was considered a fairly stable state compared to its neighbors. Kyrgyzstan has seen a few presidents ousted, while Uzbekistan and Tajikistan suffer from constant Islamist attacks and rather strong social tensions.
The myth of a stable Kazakhstan was maintained primarily by the governments of that country and Russia. And now, it is no more. Recent developments in Aktobe (formerly Aktyubinsk) draw the line under the past and opened the door to a rather unstable future.
Moreover, the myth of stability was very much at odds with reality even before. For example, the government flew commandos to Zhanaozen (formerly Novy Uzen) in December 2011 who shot dead protesting oil workers there.
Current events in Aktobe do not mark the first crisis there. The city witnessed the nation’s first terrorist attack involving a suicide bomber in 2011. The attack was carried out by 25-year-old Rakhimzhan Makhatov. As reported then by the investigators, he did it “in order to evade responsibility for the crimes committed as a member of an organized criminal group.” That same year, terrorist incidents occurred in the cities of Atyrau and Taraz.
Although the authorities labeled the latest violence a terrorist attack, it was actually something much more difficult and more dangerous for them. If one looks into the chronology of events, it was totally unlike a terrorist attack. No terrorists act that way. When the attackers seized a minibus, they simply forced its passengers out without causing them any harm. We are dealing with a real military operation, which was quite elaborate and had pre-determined avenues of retreat.
It is already clear that the government and its security services were not prepared for such developments and just did not understand for a time what was really happening. If not for the commanders of the National Guard’s unit that came under attack, who prevented the seizure of weapons in the barracks, the events could have grown into something far bigger.
One should not take seriously the statements of Kazakhstani officials, including President Nursultan Nazarbayev himself, who have claimed external involvement and the like. This belongs to the arsenal of Russian propaganda. What is happening should be considered in two planes: internal and external.
Let us start with the former.
Firstly. The influence of Islamism in Kazakhstan is rather weak, though gradually increasing, especially among young people. Islamism is increasingly penetrating the northern and western parts of the country. One should note that Aktobe is located only 200 kilometers from the Russian border, and its 400,000 population is 16 percent ethnic Russian.
Secondly. Kazakhstani society remains largely tribal in nature. Relations between zhuz (hordes) of south, north, and west with the center sometimes get quite strained. The spontaneous wage protest of Zhanaozen oil workers was driven behind the scenes by leaders of the Junior Zhuz of western Kazakhstan, headed by former head of the Presidential Administration Aslan Musin, who was later exiled as the ambassador to a Balkan country. It was they who fueled the protests that had begun to subside, and ultimately brought about clashes with commandos. Since then, the situation has only worsened. The elite conflict is entering a new stage due to a quite natural reason.
Thirdly. President Nazarbayev is the longest-serving post-Soviet leader. He is already 75, and everyone understands that transition of power is inexorably approaching. He has no heir apparent and people are afraid to even discuss this issue. However, it is precisely the lack of an heir apparent that provokes and maintains conflicts not only between the tribes, but also between influence groups around the aging Elbasy (leader of the nation).
Not surprisingly, some tribe decided to test by the force of arms the power vertical’s strength and its ability to respond to pretty violent attacks. If, to use military terminology, it was a reconnaissance in force, its results are not very comforting for the government. If the attackers belonged to a real military organization, and we have no reason to doubt it so far, their mistakes will be taken into account and it will be much more serious next time. Will the government be ready for it just as it is approaching its loss of balance, we can only guess.
Now to the international aspect.
Just before the events in Aktobe, the government reported it had uncovered a plot that allegedly aimed to bring about a coup and seizure of power. All that seemed rather strange, since the man accused of preparing the coup was Shymkent-based businessman Takhtar Tuleshov. How he was even able to do it, is a riddle worthy of the Sphinx, because he was arrested in January 2016. Just as strangely, Tuleshov supports Russian and Cossack organizations and has strong ties with Moscow politicians. He recently published a book about Putin which is full of admiration.
How a Shymkent-based figure can be even able to bring about a coup in Astana, 1,500 kilometers distant from the city on the border with Uzbekistan, is very difficult to understand if one stays within the bounds of the common sense and simple everyday logic. But the government urgently needed internal enemies, and so they used someone who was on hand. They knew the Kremlin would understand it and offer no objection. The government of Russia is used to betraying its supporters, in Turkmenistan just as in Ukraine, and now in Kazakhstan. Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that it was an internal affair of Kazakhstan, so Tuleshov cannot count on the help from his Moscow friends, no matter how many books about Putin they publish.
The events in Kazakhstan should have been a wake-up call for the Russian president. The 7,000-kilometer-long Kazakhstan-Russian border is effectively not controlled. It was not a coincidence that Speaker of the Federation Council Valentina Matviyenko declared a few days ago that Russia would protect compatriots everywhere. And Kazakhstan is the first target.
The problem is strategic in nature. For Russia, Central Asia is at least as important as Ukraine and Belarus are, or even more important in some ways. Expansion of the arc of instability to these countries can fuel the separatist sentiment east of the Urals. While it is weak so far, it is but a small consolation. People in Chita and Khabarovsk remember the Far Eastern Republic.
The tense situation in Russia’s Kazakhstan “underbelly” forces the Kremlin to focus its resources on this area. Its available forces are not enough to cover both west and east. They will have to make a very difficult choice, which will force the imperial machine through a major test.
