The Constitutional Court’s decision distancing it from the Verkhovna Rada goings-on and referring the case to the Prosecutor’s Office automatically acquitted the majority of all charges of unconstitutional acts but left open the issue of whether or not these people have violated any procedural rules. In any case, this point is being pressed by opposition and is not refuted by opposition spokesmen (e.g., Coordinator Leonid Kravchuk). Now, however, the issue is formulated differently. Have any of the majority members acted in a manner warranting criminal prosecution? It is safe to assume that the Prosecutor’s Office will take its time investigating the case and that the process will last long enough for all the interested parties to lose all interest in the outcome. The reverse could also be true. The issue may regain topicality, so as to give the long-since-relaxed majority a good shake at the right time. However, another point seems even more interesting. From the CC ruling (or its absence) it follows that, formally, two equally legitimate sittings of the Verkhovna Rada took place in Kyiv, January 21: one at the former Lenin Museum [currently the Ukraine House] and the other in the official Verkhovna Rada premises on Hrushevsky Street. Thus it is also possible to consider both sessions equally illegitimate, a subtle legal point that will long remain a pain in the majority’s side, while encouraging the minority to cherish vain hopes. Most importantly, this hitch leaves vast room for maneuver on the part of all those (if any) wishing to change the current parliamentary alignment of forces.
All doubts were dispersed by Ihor Bakai, one of the newly admitted members who resigned as Naftohaz Ukrayiny chairman of the board, shutting the door with a loud bang after a brief yet dramatically significant encounter energetic Vice Premier Yuliya Tymoshenko. The bomb, mysteriously predicted by Serhiy Soboliev, exploded Friday, on the battlefield where different factions measured their mettle. The effect was tremendous. Ihor Bakai had long been considered one of Volkov’s men, with all the attendant inferences. Ukraine’s most influential gas-and-oil tycoon had at one time been definitely involved with the formation of the Rebirth of the Regions fraction. Some sources insist he was among the strategic investors of the Social Protection Fund. For reasons still to be ascertained, Ihor Bakai decided to show he was above all a self-made man and could act on his own. Apparently, the time had come for him to put the trader’s and ranking official’s experience of recent years to good use.
Only a lazy analyst would fail to notice that after the special elections the Rebirth of the Regions would be reinforced by 4-5 members, helped on their way up by their own “revived” Democratic Union. Without doubt, Ihor Bakai topped the list, although some said he was in a position to put together a faction of his own, considering his funds and personal ambitions. Most, however, thought this unlikely, even if he could shape a team of 15, made up of lawmaker no longer needed or had parted company with their original alliances. There are enough petty insignificant factions in Parliament, and no one saw any point in the emergence of a Region satellite. Now joining the Reforms Congress made sense, as the faction adheres to its national-patriotic and non-oligarchic image. A very risky move threatening total collapse. In any case, the bomb had been planted and timely set off.
Ihor Bakai could not have possibly come by himself, for this would be highly improper. His key position on a long- since-formed team intrinsically governed by Viktor Pynzenyk had to be justified by weighty arguments. A mass entry would be the weightiest, and Ihor Bakai did just that. He is said to have promised to bring at least 15 like-minded people with him. The first batch is expected to include veteran lawmakers Oleksandr Abdulin, Valery Akopian, along with freshmen Ivan Saliy and Pavlo Riabykin — all from among Oleksandr Volkov’s entourage. And not armchair but battle-hardened politicians. Thus there is every reason to expect the Reforms and Order faction to double or more. Their bloc with the fraternal Rukh Popular Movement of Ukraine (or maybe the faction as such) is to emerge as numerically the second strongest after the Reds, stepping ahead of Labor Ukraine [Trudova Ukrayina] which received only one member after the special elections (two at best if Serhiy Tyhypko does not change his mind), let alone all the other options. Regional Rebirth will simultaneously weaken by the same degree. Oleksandr Volkov is, of course, alarmed by the prospect, although the faction does not seem inclined to overly dramatize the situation. They say that Bakai’s conduct is quite logical and will benefit both the Regionalists and the majority. They further believe that the whole process should be regarded at an altogether different angle. They claim it serves to extend Regional Revivalists influence to other majority factions. Until the key personae offer comments on what is actually happening this interpretation is as good as any. If so, the Reforms can be considered a full-fledged vassal of the senior faction. In addition, the line- crossing lawmakers are still with the majority. They are still reinforcing the Right-Center camp. The big problem remains, however, that this majority is not like-minded. It is structured in accordance with certain interests being supported by certain groups. Some will win and the others will lose. Likewise, Ms. Tymoshenko has every reason to worry. Ihor Bakai is not one to forget old grudges. In Parliament, he will feel more comfortable than Yuliya Tymoshenko does in the Cabinet. There is little doubt that he will make every effort to snatch away from the Vice Premier one of her major supports, Yuri Kostenko’s Rukh faction or at least a part of it. And he can do it; the circumstances couldn’t be more propitious. Many of the party people feel pragmatically affectionate about Bakai and those supporting an alliance with Udovenko are becoming active.
The Reform Congress is suddenly getting to be one of the numerically strongest factions in Verkhovna Rada. Suddenly for all except the faction’s leadership. There is evidence pointing to Bakai & Co. having deliberated the faction’s reinforcement in a very narrow circle two months ago. Yet all such negotiations, if any, must have been kept secret, so much so that most legislators remained in the dark until the additions to the group’s membership were actually declared. Even those most in the know shrugged when asked about possible changes in the membership of groups and factions after the coming of new People’s Deputies, offering a standard forecast originally voiced by political analyst Mykola Tomenko, to the effect that the ten new lawmakers would be distributed among the factions. True, some of the Reform people were smiling enigmatically, saying everything would become clear shortly. And all this while the tiresome talks were in progress.
From the outset Ihor Bakai has been faced with a single cardinal requirement. He was not to claim any important posts, within the faction or party. Accepting it was no problem, but observing it was a problem, a big one. The entire Ukrainian political experience shows that “romantics” and “pragmatists” find it very hard to coexist within the same political framework. Sooner or later any such tandems fall apart and collapse with a bang. True, there is the Reforms and Order’s rating as an exception, for its romantics turn out to be highly pragmatic. In view of the next elections, Ihor Bakai, with his vast capabilities, is more than a good bargain for the “young reformers.” Yet this move leaves much to be desired in terms of political image. By doing so, Reform Congress loses its hitherto singular non-oligarchic status. The same applies to the party which made it through the last elections supported by a handful of the decaying intelligentsia, but mostly due to its non-oligarchic kudos. The point is not whether oligarchs have had actually anything to do with these people, but that Bakai cuts an overly conspicuous figure remaining in the limelight, even overseas. People in the West still cannot bring themselves to believe that there are good and bad oligarchs in Ukraine. To them, they are all the same. Bad.
Another aspect is the possibility of Viktor Pynzenyk returning to public service, thus further enhancing his party’s prestige. The issue seems to have long been resolved in principle and the debate is focused on the castling pattern. Mr. Pynzenyk is not likely to accept a position lower than that of Vice Premier, the more so that the President has long pressured for augmenting the government with a post of Vice Premier for the economic reform. This makes one wonder about First Vice Premier Yuri Yekhanurov’s position. He could be demoted to Minister of the Economy. Likewise, Yuliya Tymoshenko could be deprived of her vice premiership. In fact, she claims she would not mind heading the Fuel and Power Industry Ministry. Ihor Bakai, for his part, might well insist on reinstating Ihor Didenko at Naftohaz Ukrayiny, in view of his improper dismissal, thus restoring the balance tipped in Ms. Tymoshenko’s favor. In a word, talks are in progress and arrangements are being made. Announcement of the final decision has been promised to be made tomorrow, although formal appointments and transfers are not likely to be made before the end of the Verkhovna Rada session, after hearing the Cabinet’s progress report for the first half of the year and after the People’s Deputies take off on their well-earned vacations during the recess. In fact, the Cabinet could have a new membership at the government meeting on July 20.
AT PRESS TIME
While The Day was advised by the Reform Congress press center on Ihor Bakai’s consent to join the faction, no formal announcements concerning any changes in the faction’s membership have yet been made in Parliament.
