That the Kinakh government is on its last legs has been of late the pet subject of rumors in Ukrainian political circles. Now the process has shifted from the realm of rumor to that of real politics. The president’s permanent representative in Verkhovna Rada Oleksandr Zadorozhny said last Friday that the head of state had been offered four majority candidatures. Asked when a premier candidate will be proposed, Mr. Zadorozhny said it depended on his boss. According to him, President Kuchma can be satisfied with the proposed candidates, but he can also ask the majority to nominate a single candidate for the office of prime minister.
It is quite logical in this situation that the names of the prospective holders of the premier’s portfolio presented to the president should already be in the air. Interfax quotes an unnamed source as saying that these are current Premier Anatoly Kinakh, First Vice Premier Oleh Dubyna, Donetsk Oblast Administration Director Viktor Yanukovych, and State Tax Administration Director Mykola Azarov. The source said nothing about Serhiy Tyhypko (the same players also featured in the previous fits of government shakiness).
As we see, there are very few in the majority, Ukrainian style, ready to assume personal — not somebody else’s — responsibility in this country. Most probably, stability is considered a far greater value, for a government of Ukraine has a twelve-eighteen-month lease on life, while a parliament deputy’s mandate lasts for four years. Yet, the Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (UUIE), from which this country’s prime minister and president both came, holds itself partially responsible for feeble support of the government. The union’s board assembled last Friday in Kyiv to offer comprehensive support to the premier who is also UUIE president and call upon the UUIE honorary president (President Kuchma, also a former president of the organization) “not to allow isolated socioeconomic conflicts to grow into a broad political confrontation.” Board members pointed out that the current cabinet lineup is already a coalition in no need of reshuffling and regretted that the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs had failed to achieve what it wanted in the elections. Conversely, they were delighted to have formed (together with Labor Ukraine) a big fraction of the parliamentary majority.
In general, the current cast of premier candidates has some old causes and long-lasting consequences. First, there being several candidates from the majority means that the latter is unstable. This in turn results from the leadership’s strategic mistake during the parliamentary elections. It will be recalled that the original plans called for a strong majority based on two powerful blocs, Our Ukraine and For a United Ukraine. It is now sort of bad taste to remember what happened to the election list, the desired result, and the parliamentary destiny of United Ukraine. All the vested interests made their way to parliament and began to solve their own problems. Feeling hurt by the behavior of government in the elections, Our Ukraine has drastically raised its power claims in the dialog.
What is the sense of changing the government now? Whatever one thinks of Mr. Kinakh, there are no special economic reasons for its removal, and it is a serious risk to change the government now. On the other hand, with presidential elections only a motion away, the leading politico-financial groupings are naturally trying to increase their influence on the government because the cabinet, in spite of all speculations, still remains the instrument of controlling the profitable sectors of the nation’s market, rather than that of the political responsibility of a party or bloc. Moreover, it is a good launch pad if not for the 2004 elections then for at least the leading roles in the big carving up that the presidential elections in Ukraine might bring. The latter is sure to occur if those in power fail to draw lessons from the March parliamentary elections.
In general, the risks of the current situations are all too apparent: either the majority will decide on one candidate and enlist the president’s support or the parliament’s paralysis will drag on, and the transfer of power in 2004 will be controlled from outside Kyiv. At least as far as the choice of the electoral menu is concerned, the voice of the Ukrainian elite will be weak.
