The road of independent Ukraine has never been easy, but what matters most is that it has always been peaceful. Tolerance, interethnic accord, and the state’s continuing policy of keeping peace within this country and out are Ukraine’s greatest accomplishments, which have earned it recognition of the international community. Yet there are many who are eager to disrupt this still fragile equilibrium to reap political dividends. Such aspirations become more pronounced at times when the country’s fate is about to be determined for several years to come, in particular with the approach of elections.
AT A BREAKING POINT
There is every reason to phrase the question as follows: thanks to whom was power divided peacefully in 1991? In my view, this was a result of a wise compromise among political players, the Communists and National Communists on the one hand and National Patriots on the other. Because the National Communists understood the situation in the then Soviet Union, which had already become explosive, and the breakdown of the system was inevitable, we found middle ground, gaining our long-sought independence and leaving the National Communists in power. We have managed to maintain this equilibrium in the country since 1991. Owing to our ability to reach a compromise and solve problems by means of coordinating the interests of all political players, Ukraine entered the world as a country capable of overcoming its growing pains peacefully. This is in fact our greatest achievement, especially against the background of such global threats as terrorism, wars, interethnic conflicts, and so forth.
What underlies harmony in society? Political and economic stability and democratic development are what I consider the three key factors. But do they work spontaneously? Absolutely not. For example, the collapse of Yugoslavia was precipitated not by economic problems, but above all by interethnic, interfaith, and territorial problems, which means that these three factors of stability might not function if the state pursues an unwise policy. Are they currently at work in Ukraine? To be frank, Ukraine’s progress in none of the three directions can safely be called irreversible.
We have political stability, but complete peace is a long way off. What is now happening with the political reform? The debate on this issue has become so heated that while, thankfully, there is yet no conflict in society, there already is a conflict in Verkhovna Rada. Meanwhile, against the backdrop of the election campaign this conflict could escalate further. Every politician and official should bear this in mind.
As for economic stability, there is no denying that in the past three or four years we have amassed economic potential. And although our current potential is nearly 60% of what it was in 1990, the economy is expanding and not declining. It gives me pleasure to note that the Yanukovych government spares no effort in this respect. This is crucial, since there is a stereotype in society that it was the Yushchenko government alone that registered some progress. Granted, the Yushchenko government took great pains to cause a turnaround, but the groundwork for it had been laid by the cabinet of Valery Pustovoitenko. That is, several factors accumulated with time and translated into a process of development. Progress was also registered under Premier Anatoly Kinakh. Meanwhile, today this process is occurring on a greater scale, that is, it has become permanent in nature. I can say that the Yanukovych government is making strides in all spheres of socioeconomic development. Yet, we must face it, it is much too soon to say that we are all prosperous and happy. Poverty remains a problem. There are many untangled knots in agriculture, and, for that matter, in all spheres of economic life. Can one really say that all our social problems have been solved? Thus it is also premature to speak of economic stability.
ROCKING THE BOAT
Speaking of democratic development, we are yet to achieve the model of a democratic society with its rule of law, freedom of speech, institutions of civil society, public control over those in power, and so forth. There is the question of power and law, and power and individual, since too often we solve these extremely acute problems not in the national or social interests but in the interests of certain individuals or branches of power.
Allow me a brief historical digression.
1990. We amended the Constitution, vesting Verkhovna Rada with extensive powers. Meanwhile, we obviously forgot about the powers of the government. Our reasoning was to give all power to the deputies, while the cabinet was expected to follow directives.
1992. A proposal to appoint local presidential representatives was put forward, since as the head of state and chief executive I had no levers to wield the powers envisioned under the Constitution. Yet Verkhovna Rada rejected this proposal.
1993. A law was passed envisioning the election of oblast heads of the executive power. Leonid Kuchma was elected president in 1994 and introduced the institution of local state administrations, which in fact canceled the appointment by election of oblast heads of the executive power, a matter that is discussed even today.
1995. A Constitutional agreement supported by a situational majority vested the president with extensive powers, leaving the government without any powers. Instead, the premier was assigned a very interesting function of a coordinator (!) of the Cabinet of Ministers, much like the parliamentary majority coordinator now.
1996. The Constitution was adopted. The president was proclaimed the head of state, but not of the executive power. Meanwhile, the Cabinet of Ministers is named only a “supreme body” in the system of executive power.
Put simply, in the thirteen years of independence we have not vested the government with powers at the legislative level. All this time Verkhovna Rada has been engaged in a tug of war with the president, who has more powers. The government has remained on the sidelines. Likewise, today we are witnessing an unending struggle for power, in the midst of which the most essential things are overlooked. What is the bottom line of the political reform? It envisions the distribution of powers among the branches of power and the mechanism of such distribution. What does the question of where and for how long to elect the president have to do with this major problem? One can achieve in a year more than in two decades. And what about the question of whether to elect the president and Verkhovna Rada in the same year? What I am driving at is that quite often, when a major issue is at stake, we are not discussing the powers and functions, but look for ways to play up to someone or to pursue our own ends. This is irrelevant. That is why there is no end in sight to our reform, because the three main issues are not solved, those of ensuring the efficiency and transparency of power, and public control over those in power. We keep changing the principles of organization of the system of power, thereby destroying the system without creating a new one. And we forget the main thing: this is also a destabilizing factor.
It would seem that our political elite should understand this and do everything to prevent social discontent and conflicts. However, the elite, in particular the legal elite, which is versed in legal matters, readily approves of any proposals from the president or Verkhovna Rada, which are sometimes diametrically opposed. Under such conditions, those in power can propose just about anything, because they are certain that everything will come through. This means that the elite thinks not about how it can preserve the equilibrium in society, but how it can play up to those in power, thereby debasing both themselves and those in power. This is very dangerous.
PLAYING WITH MATCHES
What other pressing issues, aside from those mentioned above, trouble us all the time? For me these are the questions of faith and church, language, and interethnic relations.
In 1990, at the dawn of our independence (I was then Verkhovna Rada speaker), before passing economic laws we passed two fundamental laws, On Interethnic Relations and On the Freedom of Conscience and Inter-confessional Relations, because we were certain that these two fundamental social problems, if addressed the wrong way, would inevitably lead to conflicts. The international community commended Ukraine for this step. That same year I, in the capacity of Verkhovna Rada speaker, apologized in Babyn Yar before the Jewish community on behalf of all Ukrainians for all the unfortunate things that our relationship had seen. This surprised the world, since we were still under the Soviets when I said this. Not only in Moscow but also in Kyiv some said that I should not have done this. I did it, because I knew that the history of the Ukrainian-Jewish relationship is very long and complex. I also knew something else, namely that some find it useful to fan conflicts. Thus, as soon as it gained independence Ukraine had to declare its ethnic policy. We did this. I am certain that today we have no policy of anti- Semitism at the state level. Recall the tensions concerning the Volyn Tragedy from sixty years before. But we managed to prevent them from escalating further. Thus the interethnic policy of the state is informed and responsible. Yet there is no escaping conflicts at other levels, in daily life and in the mass media. As we know from experience, they become more pronounced with the approach of any major political campaigns. The recent upsurge happened in an election year.
In my view, the people who resort to such tactics are political incompetents or provocateurs. Such people either do not understand anything or understand too much and want to use this knowledge. To what end did Silski Visti [Village news] publish the materials leading to court action? Where did they obtain the facts and figures that allegedly 400,000 Schutzstaffel (SS) Jews have come to Ukraine? This is incomprehensible. Had not the authors realized that their publications would anger the public? How can one insist that court action resulting from these publications is unfounded? Now some are trying to prove that court action against Silski Visti is unjust. I regret that this newspaper, which is popular among the village population, has found itself in such a situation. I would not like the villagers to be deprived of the possibility to read Silski Visti. But how could the editors of the newspaper be so irresponsible? How could they not understand this? Now they should admit they were wrong, offer an apology, and promise that the perpetrators will be punished. That is, they should approach this in a civilized, wise, and informed manner, understanding that they live in a big multinational country, in which humiliating anyone is barbarous and is evidence of a primeval and savage vision of interethnic relations. Unfortunately, there are forces in Ukraine that wish to play on the existing problems, and there are such problems and they are smoldering. Recall the trouble in the Crimea with the Tatars’ land disputes. Skirmishes are not a long way off. The problems of this region are closely followed by the Russians and Turks. It lies at a crossroads of geopolitical and other interests. And we must solve these problems, especially the land disputes. The Tatars must in turn understand that the Crimea is not just Yalta and Sevastopol. Meanwhile, to expropriate land from someone to give it to others means provoking conflicts on the other side. It is just that these problems cannot be solved in such primitive ways.
Understandably, those called to protect social order — public organizations, law enforcement services, courts, and prosecutors — must adequately respond to attempts to fan conflicts. First, one must take preventive steps and, second, such attempts should not go unpunished so that those eager to play on hostile sentiments would remember the inevitability of punishment.
ROAD TO THE CHURCH
The conflict between Orthodox churches in Ukraine has been provoked deliberately. This is no accident. All of this was done at the time when I was the president with the sole purpose of antagonizing Orthodox believers in Ukraine. The synod and patriarchal church councils of the Kyiv Patriarchate were held in keeping with the laws in force, including church and confessional laws. Yet appeals followed immediately not to recognize the Ukrainian church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. Inter-confessional strife is commonplace in regions where there are not enough churches, where different confessions take turns attending services in a single church. All of this creates an explosive atmosphere, and we must understand this. As for the commendable idea of uniting the Orthodox churches in Ukraine, the state will not solve this issue; it can only foster its solution, while only the church can solve it. Now at all levels of power — all the way up to the highest level — statements are made to thunderous applause that Ukraine’s Orthodox churches must unite. But this will lead us nowhere. Such wishful thinking obscures real problems. Can the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate solve the issue of unification on its own? Of course not. They do not recognize the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and claim they cannot unite with an illegitimate church. But we also have another legitimate church as far as canonicity is concerned. Let them unite with it and thus prove their desire to unite. The Moscow Patriarchate does not in fact want this unification. This is obvious that it wants to strengthen its influence in Ukraine and have only its church here. I repeat, to talk of any unification under the present conditions means sweeping the problem under the carpet. This is incompetent from any perspective. Incidentally, the Moscow Orthodox Church was not recognized for 140 years. It is very important when a church gains recognition. but it is more important still when the faithful want to have their own church. Thus, we must clearly define our priorities and do everything to prevent interdenominational strife. And I am pleased to say that church hierarchs Filaret, Volodymyr, and Huzar are very wise men, who are doing precisely this.
Speaking of the language issue, in 1989, when I chaired the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the parliamentary Interethnic Relations Committee, the issue of languages in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was considered on a motion from the deputies and the parliamentary presidium presided over by Valentyna Shevchenko. Then the law On Language in the Ukrainian SSR was passed, which reads that Ukrainian is the official language. Now we have our Constitution, which clearly addresses this issue in Article 10. Yet occasionally, especially with the approach of elections, the issue of making Russian a second official language is broached. What for? I posed this question to some of the nation’s political leaders, who obviously view this as a way to win over voters. Thus, they fool voters with promises that they do not plan to fulfill, heat up this issue, garner votes, and forget all about it. We have our Constitution, which is clear on all issues, including the Russian language: “The state encourages its development, creates conditions and preconditions...” Currently, 42% of Ukraine’s schoolchildren attend Russian-language schools, even though Russians account for only 21-22% of Ukraine’s population. The Russian language prevails in book publishing, and there are numerous Russian-language media outlets. Where is the problem? Yet, for some this does not seem enough. They still want to heat up this issue. Thus, I appeal to the local authorities, especially the local deputies and leaders of political forces: to speculate on the language issue is a way to provoke interethnic strife.
If all of us — those in authority, parties, churches, and the media — simply understand these problems, I am certain Ukraine will continue on its road of peace and accord, and will set an example for others to follow.
