Watching and reading the nationalistically oriented Ukrainian media from sidelines, one might think that Ukraine knows no greater injustice than the historical condemnation of the OUN-UPA and its participants. The public is being fed the stereotypes of this alleged injustice with insistent regularity. And all this is being done under the worthy pretext of “polemic,” the latter being, however, represented by only one side. It is a one- way road, so to speak, leading to the exculpation and glorification of the OUN-UPA.
The Day “continued the theme” on October 2 with an article by its regular contributor Stanislav Kulchytsky who is still in charge of that task force of historians at the Government Commission to study the activities of OUN-UPA. This time his article was preceded by the serious warning that the OUN-UPA problem has become the “Gordian knot” that “nourishes separatism.” The heading makes it plain that the author addresses veterans.
This prompts one to recount the veterans’ view on at least the issues broached by Prof. Kulchytsky. Hopefully, The Day will abide by the norms of morals in polemics and find room for these views on its pages.
Suppose we start with what Kulchytsky wrote in conclusion, precisely the three paragraphs included in the editorial foreword of his Immortality edition distributed abroad and which were left out in the version meant for domestic use. Mildly speaking, the veterans are far from pleased by this book as a whole, and the lapse mentioned is one of many manifestations in that amplitude of oscillation of the editorial board and authors between the truth, half-truth, concealment, and hoax. The result was the omission of the text relating to the OUN-UPA, cited by Kulchytsky, which reads, “It has been unambiguously revealed by a huge mass of documentary and research literature, both domestic and foreign, including a special study carried out on the instruction of the now working Government Commission on this issue, that the OUN and its armed branches were in fact mercenaries of Nazi Germany fighting against countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and branded themselves as collaborators of Nazism.”
Meanwhile this is a synthesized expression of truth, and Stanislav Kulchytsky found nothing to counter it with except pretending to be surprised: Special study? And this study was actually the only one carried by the team of historians under his command. It was supplemented with collections of commentaries, indexes, the previous version of the historical findings, references, and other such accompanying and derivative documents. And all this was rooted in the study of OUN-UPA history (1920-56) made by A. Kentiy, even before the historians’ task force led by Kulchytsky was set up, and released in six issues according to its plan.
This issue is research on OUN-UPA history. However styled as a political contract aimed at exculpating the OUN- UPA, the very contents of the documentary and factual material it systematized in many respects reaffirms the essentially condemning assessment of those units, contained in literature dating from previous decades. We veterans had an opportunity to point this out at the round table of the first three issues of A. Kentiy’s study in June 1999. In particular, we noted the correctness of Kentiy’s statement that the Ukrainian nationalist movement, unlike the European antifascist resistance in the years of the Second World War, characteristically “formed exclusively on the basis of those Ukrainian political forces which at the beginning of the war had openly sided with Germany and its allies,” that its leaders in their plans “actually did not raise the matter of assisting the defeat of the fascist bloc in an armed struggle together with the United Nations,” that the OUN-UPA activities “were never aimed against German military facilities supplying the needs of troops on the Eastern Front.”
When referring to those magic paragraphs in the foreword to the book Immortality as untruth, Kulchytsky, however, omits reference to a multitude of sources. There is no coincidence about this omission. In the index issued by his task force, this corpus is shamelessly castrated, reduced mainly to Ukrainian-language and apologetic publications, ignoring Russian-language publications outside Ukraine and those in other languages — English, German, etc. Meanwhile, there is, for example, Christopher Simpson’s Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War (New York, 1988). It contains documents from the secret archives of the CIA, Pentagon, and Defense Department. This study alone turns upside down the whole apologetic structure being erected by Kulchytsky and his group. And this is only one of many English- language works. How can one establish the truth without looking up such sources?
Instead, Prof. Kulchytsky tries to recoup himself by resorting to speculation, claiming UPA does not figure in the Nuremberg Trial records. Does he not know the kind of testimonies given by Abwehr and Gestapo officers, about how the Nazi special services used OUN leaders as their agents? Does it not suffice that the international tribunal pronounced the SS (special police force), SD (security service) and Gestapo criminal organizations? And OUN with its armed units was in the service of those very organizations, meaning that it shares the criminal responsibility with them, without any exception, for committing acts qualified by international law as crimes against peace and humanity.
As we see, Kulchytsky displays a lack of professionalism in both interpreting the Nuremberg adjudication and the international legal definition of German fascism and its henchmen. Nevertheless, he made a special point of scorning “Melnyk’s Banderites,” an expression used in one of the veterans’ documents, calling it “unprofessional.” Yet this expression actually reveals the innermost essence of the role played by OUN in both its offshoots. Under the scenarios of its masters, the Melnyk leadership had to rally openly collaborationist elements, whereas that of Bandera was to rely on those inclined to fight the occupiers, so, having no alternative, it could otherwise join the Soviet partisans. Incidentally, the central leaderships of both OUN branches, since the prewar period and throughout the war, were quartered in Krakow, under the same roof at 26 Zelena Street, a short walk from the local Abwher headquarters. And SS Halychyna Division men, considered to support Melnyk, freely visited Bandera’s UPA units, and vice versa. Thus, Kulchytsky obviously deviates from the truth, portraying OUN’s Bandera branch as an independent force that could single-handedly form UPA and act against its “natural ally,” the German Nazis. In reality, all trends of Ukrainian nationalism, primarily the OUN and its leaders, and their combat units, were bound by the same Nazi rope.
That mentioned from Stanislav Kulchytsky’s article is a mere verbal entourage surrounding the main objective: “historical substantiation” of the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice’s draft law On Restoring Historical Justice in the Struggle of the Ukrainian State for Freedom and Independence in the Period from 1939 through the Mid-1950s. It is meant to lift all the chronological restrictions and legal reservations placed in the way of UPA combatants receiving the war veteran status by the law On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of their Social Protection of October 22, 1993. In a word, open all the moral, political, and legal gates to exculpate the OUN fighters, wherever and whatever they did. But on what grounds? Kulchytsky says because they wore armbands with the current national colors and the trident, which is now the national emblem, while serving foreign clandestine agencies.
Here is a characteristic portrait of a “patriot” of the kind so jealously upheld by his spiritual descendants. This portrait was documented before completing the liberation of Ukraine from the fascist aggressor, in a radiogram sent by the Kamyanka-Strumylova SS chief to the Governor General of Halychyna. Referring to the previous agreement between Hitler’s command and OUN leadership, the SS officer informs that he was afterward visited by the head of the OUN organization in the vicinity of Kamianka. His alias was Adler (Eagle), he was 26, wore the Iron Cross, 1st Class awarded him while at the SS Division “Death’s Head,” a badge indicating that had participated in infantry assaults, and the silver sign of a wound received in action. In the course of discussion, in which the local field commandant Oberst Meiler took part, specific decisions were made, concerning cooperation in terms of intelligence and tactic of struggle against the Bolshevik gangs. The UPA officer was issued munitions.
Christopher Simpson, mentioned above, generalized such testimonies in archival and literary sources, but made no discovery for us, yet since he reaffirmed our conclusions, he is worth being quoted as an unbiased author. Just as the Germans were being driven out of Ukraine in 1944, he writes, many OUN members, serving the Nazis in the local militia, police departments, and punitive detachments, fled with them. At least 40,000 other OUN guerrillas, however, retreated to the rocky Carpathian Mountains where they hid, waiting for the Red Army front to pass. After that they had new masters, the US special services. Precisely that group, stresses Simpson, captivated US security experts in the late 1940s as the nucleus of a rebellion in Ukraine. The OUN leaders regarded this as preparations for another war and treated their new bosses with as much servility as they had Hitler’s fascism. And did so until the last hope for a new war faded.
Could it be that the current OUN-UPA apologists are knocking on the wrong door, demanding “historical justice” from the Ukrainian state with regard to the relics of those units of 1939 through the mid-1950s? Yes, and they are definitely wrong. They were not among those who erected and protected for decades the grand structure of this state before its facade was decorated with symbols so close and dear to them but also defiled by them; their calls for building this state were nothing but mere verbiage concealing their being in the service of hostile forces, first German fascism and later American imperialism. Accordingly, their calls for “historical justice” toward them should be addressed to Germany, as the legal successor to Hitler’s Reich, and to the United States.
As for grievances addressing the Ukrainian state, the way the matter is formulated by the Ministry of Justice is a flagrant encroachment on historical truth as well as on the honor and dignity of the Ukrainian people. The chief legal department should know better than anyone else that assessing and reassessing history is by no means within the competence of the legislature. History is an entity that takes shape under the laws of its times and cannot be reversed.
Now about Stanislav Kulchytsky’s initial thesis that the “unsolved problem of OUN-UPA could become powerful nourishment for separatism.” His arguments come down to the assumption that the western territories have turned into a depressed region during the years of capitalist restoration, and that the state “cannot so far level, as in the totalitarian epoch, the objective difference in incomes,” so that one has to make concessions to the unoriginal followers of Bandera’s ideology wielding authority there in the OUN-UPA matter, thus to calm their separatist inclinations. That is the sort of deal we are offered. But is the unity of Ukraine here being priced too cheaply? Perhaps it would be best to change the restoration regime, because under capitalism the depressed regions are its invariable travel companions. Meanwhile, at the times blasphemously referred to by Kulchytsky as totalitarianism leveling the development of all regions was a principle of Soviet power and a strategic objective of socialism. As for the veterans, whom Kulchytsky tries to scare with the bogy of separatism, they regard the OUN-UPA apologist’s ploy outright blackmail.
Finally, about how much Kulchytsky’s scholarly specialty conforms to his passionately biased approach toward Ukraine’s political history. In fact, he is primarily an economist by training. The subject of his candidate’s thesis was “The Development of Railroad Transport in Ukraine before the Revolution” and that of his doctorate is “The Internal Resources of Socialist Industrialization in the USSR (1925-37).” Among his research papers that appeared in print the main one is called “The Economic Development of Soviet Ukraine.” However, beginning in 1991, as deputy director of the Ukrainian National Academy Institute of Ukrainian History, he has gone along with however the political wing was blowing in matters of the most sensitive nature, including the issue of OUN-UPA, taking a stand precisely opposite to the one he took when building his scholarly career. And he did so not without personal reasons, as he admits in his article. But is this reason enough to indiscriminately lash out at the entire Soviet period in the history of the Ukrainian people and history of socialism in Ukraine? Of course, not. And this, in turn, raises the matter of Stanislav Vladyslavovych’s ineptitude, considering his current post in historical scholarship. He himself should have understood this proceeding from the moral and ethical standards accepted in the civilized world.
Ph.D. in history,
director of the Veterans Center
for the Protection of Truth about the
Great Patriotic War for the Fatherland
The Past Cannot be Sifted Through One’s Own Sieve
The OUN-UPA issue is not the main thing. Galician separatism exists. There is no problem of separatism; there is just the topic of separatism. I honestly hope that the people of Halychyna will not let themselves be provoked. I think they have enough common sense to understand the government’s situation; the government is still unable to extend the privileges enjoyed by people on the payroll of structures that ruined lives and destinies in the western territories after World War II. Privileges is the least of the demands on the part of veterans whose uniform bears modern national insignia.
Dr. Khmil disagrees that the unsolved OUN-UPA problem can serve as a nutrient medium of separatism. Yet his colleague, Communist People’s Deputy Yury Solomatin, initiator of the revival and permanent leader of the Kyiv regional organization of CPU, also responded to my article in The Day. First in the Russian press and then in the newspaper Nezavisimost’ on August 6. He wrote in particular:
“Is Galician separatism a possibility in modern Ukraine? It actually exists. Leaflets have been shown in Verkhovna Rada, stating in black and white, “Proceeding from the situation that has developed, also from the historical state-building tradition, it is necessary to set up a Galician republic with its own parliament, government, and president capable of defending the interests of Galicia [Halychyna] and its people.”
I am grateful to Mr. Solomatin for informing us about the Right extremist intention to undermine the unity of the Ukrainian lands, also for being so frank in outlining his stand. He concluded the article as follows: “Just as the dog’s tail cannot wiggle the dog’s head, so Halychyna cannot impose its will on Mother-Ukraine that received it in her lap in 1939. Instead of dictating its Galician will so brazenly, it must pray for the people of Ukraine to forgive its sins!”
How can one use such language, addressing the people among whom one has lived for decades? What lawmakers we have!
It is true that the western regions are lagging behind economically. Incidentally, this lack of progress was inherited from the Soviet period, and no special economic growth has been registered in any region over the past decade. However, the point is not so much economic regression as the historical destiny of those ten million people on whom Soviet citizenship was imposed in 1939. In 1939-41, a million Galicians were deported or physically annihilated. Another 500,000 were subjected to various forms of repression by the Soviet authorities. It means that victims of such repression are found in almost every Galician family.
Under the circumstances, irresponsible statements by extremists from hostile camps and the problem of UPA veterans remaining unsolved are getting to be a social threat. This is something all genuinely concerned about the future of our state must reckon with. This is what I wrote about in my article that seems to have disturbed Prof. Khmil so much.
Now I will allow myself to broach subjects of lesser importance. Naturally, I feel offended by the tone of his letter. I can assure the reader that over long years of working together at the Institute of Ukrainian History Prof. Khmil and I have really never had any misunderstandings. Ivan Serhiyovich’s offensive intolerance is not personal; it is doctrinal in nature.
I do not understand how one can treat the past in such a discriminate way, seeing precisely what one wants to see and discarding all that contradicts one’s stand. The letter, it should be noted, does not mention the OUN-UPA problem in the postwar years; the Justice Ministry’s bill, currently being deliberated, addresses precisely that period. Regardless of what Ivan Khmil may assume, UPA veterans that fought the Germans in the occupied territory are recognized as combatants under the law of Ukraine of October 22, 1993.
Today’s Communists refuse to acknowledge that prewar million and postwar 500,000 of the ten million Galicians as being among the reasons for the UPA’s decade-long struggle after Germany’s defeat. Once again we hear about US security experts that allegedly controlled the insurgent operations through the Iron Curtain. Mind you, I do not deny contacts with the Americans. It would be strange if there had been none.
But, honorable Ivan Serhiyovich, you often lash out at me in your letter and this is very much on the personal side. With your permission, I will also address you personally via this newspaper.
A great many strikingly revealing documents have been published in the past 10-12 years. Remember the adage about a skeleton in the closet? We are discovering thousands upon thousands of them in the closet of every big city. Terror reigned in that epoch which I “blasphemously” refer to as totalitarian. Or maybe you prefer to see that epoch as concealed behind Stalin’s broad back? Let us discuss our Party.
Strangely, when mentioning my publications you chose to omit one whose title speaks for itself: “The Party of Lenin: Force of the People.” Indeed, I was a member of that party for thirty years and it did not interfere with my favorite occupation: studying history. It raised me in such a way that my books required no censorship, as I had a censor in my head. And I was unaware of him, because that was how I had been brought up since joining the ranks of the zhovteniatky [little Octobrists, Communist Cub Scouts, children of seven years or upward preparing for entry into succeeding indoctrinating organizations — Ed.]
I had nothing to do with all those skeletons in the closets of our beloved Party. Then the time came and I had an opportunity to sort through them. Mind you, the party appreciated the effort. I was not a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, yet I was placed on the CC committee for ideology. You see, the party wanted to know what had happened to it in the recent past.
We were all the same at the time. Ever since dissidents appeared (a phenomenon physically impossible under Stalin), their total number would not exceed a thousand. Well, there were some 100,000 individuals harboring anti-Communist views but keeping them strictly to themselves. And never mind those ten million Galicians, the scum of the nation, to borrow from your vocabulary. They had a different historical destiny. All the so-called Soviet people were raised “in the proper spirit.” Both you and I were among them. But is it not time we all looked back and tried to see things for what they actually were?
Ph.D. in history and Deputy Director
of the Ukrainian National Academy Institute of Ukrainian History
THE DAY’S COMMENT
The problem of OUN- UPA and assessing its role have for years attracted broad public circles in Ukraine. Problem is perhaps too restrained and dry a term, because here one deals with tragedies experienced by millions of our fellow countrymen: deportation, fratricidal hostilities, and national betrayal.
Abiding by the principles of pluralism, The Day has provided room for polarized views expressed by two noted historians, experts that have long studied numerous complicated bends in the road traveled by OUN-UPA. Of course, it is up to the reader to arrive at conclusions. Still, we would like to draw the reader’s attention to several essential aspects likely to provide food for thought. First, assuming that all OUN-UPA leaders were mercenaries of Nazi Germany (as insisted by Prof. Ivan Khmil, et al.), how is one to explain the fact that armed resistance in the western Ukrainian territories lasted for six, seven and more years (until 1953-54 in some territories) after the war? And this considering that the OUN-UPA units were confronted by substantial NKVD forces, even regular troops where and when Soviet authorities considered it expedient. Is this fact not evidence that OUN- UPA men were supported by at least a sizable part of the Western Ukrainian populace?
Second, we will probably never know the whole tragedy of Ukrainian history in the 1930s-1950s, unless we agree that a true civil war raged in the western territories at the period, when Ukrainians killed Ukrainians. There are two aspects: (a) none of the warring sides is entirely on the right side in a civil war, because both commit atrocities (OUN- UPA is guilty, of course, but Prof. Khmil, for reasons best known to himself, never mentions any of those NKVD “glorious deeds,” and the notorious clandestine agency obviously did far more than plant fir trees in the Carpathian Mountains); and (b) perhaps even more importantly, it is time an end were put to the “spiritual” war between the veterans from both camps. We are all Ukrainians, is this not enough to finally unite us?
Ihor SIUNDIUKOV, The Day