Hugo Chavez, president of Venezuela and sworn brother of the Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko, paid a working visit to Ukraine.
On the one hand, this is just another run-of-the-mill event, as our president’s schedule abounds with visitors of this scale. On the other hand, there is something out of the ordinary in it. The Venezuelan leader has long shied away from our country, preferring displays of friendship with Russia and Belarus. Quite recently, on the eve of the parliamentary elections in his own country, he urged his Belarusian brother to act with force, in order “not to let your opposition come to power.”
Chavez himself tried to act this way but failed. Not only did the opposition come to parliament, it also became much stronger.
It never rains but it pours. No sooner had the main ideologist and leader of the “Bolivarian revolution” suffered electoral defeat than riots in Ecuador broke out, and the country’s President Rafael Correa had to get to his palace in an armored car. Moreover, it was the police that were the ringleaders. Chavez’s other leftist neighbor, Bolivia’s Evo Morales, is faring no better.
There are also domestic troubles to complement Chavez’s international problems. Besides the failure in the elections, he faces galloping inflation and a soaring crime rate. The state populism called “21st century socialism” requires huge investments. Their principal source is oil production, but there is already no money left for the reconstruction of the oil industry. Virtually all international companies were driven out of the country, and, consequently, there are no investments. That is why Chavez is so keen on finding sources of financing other than the abominable US.
Unfortunately for the Venezuelan leader, his friends are in a similar situation, and look to him for financial support. China is the only exception, but Beijing takes its time and is not anxious to invest a lot in Venezuela, on account of its instability.
On the other hand, Belarus has suggested a sort of barter. In exchange for dump trucks and other goods, Minsk will get Venezuelan oil. The tankers are supposed to unload in the Baltic ports, whence oil will be shipped by rail to Belarusian oil refineries. Besides, Chavez has allotted several oilfields to Belarus for joint development. The oil produced there is to be either sold on international markets, or delivered to Belarus.
The problem is that profitable oil production requires considerable investments, and that is what Minsk cannot afford. Therefore the much-hyped cooperation, aimed at energy independence from Russia, progresses very slowly. Besides, the vast majority of experts believe that transporting Venezuelan oil to Belarus makes it more expensive than that imported from Russia.
So, what shall Ukraine expect from Chavez’s visit? First and foremost, the negotiations are to focus on oil supplies. In this regard, Odesa has the necessary infrastructure. Besides, transporting oil to Ukraine is less expensive due to the shorter distance. Also, Venezuelan oil is lighter than its Russian equivalent, so it will be cheaper to refine. No wonder that Belarus is also interested in transporting Venezuelan oil via Odesa. This means extra profits for Ukraine — for transit and servicing of tankers in our ports.
There have long been talks in our country about following our Belarusian neighbors and developing oilfields in Venezuela to produce oil for our own use. There used to be similar negotiations and exchanges of visits between Ukraine and Libya. The Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi gave a firm promise to the then Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.
However, it all remained mere talks, although producing and transporting oil from Libya to Ukraine is much more profitable than the Venezuelan alternative. The more so that its quality is better than that of Venezuelan oil. Chavez will expect, in case of a favorable outcome of the negotiations, that the Ukrainian party will finance oil production. Yet for Kyiv allotting money will be even more of a problem than for Lukashenko.
No doubt that Ukraine is going to offer a long list of goods that we might supply to this distant Latin American country. And Chavez would buy them with pleasure. The only snag is that he doesn’t have any money for that. And they are not likely to appear in the near future.
The Venezuelan leader’s visit has another aspect to it — the Russian one. Such a visit could only become possible after the Ukrainian regime abruptly changed its international political priorities. Moreover, it is impossible to discern all the minute details (and problems) of Moscow-Kyiv relations by looking at them from far-off Venezuelan shores. Chavez will not even bother himself with the growing tension between Moscow and Minsk, let alone the peculiarities of Ukrainian foreign policy towards Russia. However, the hawks on the banks of the Moskva River are keeping a watchful eye on all the attempts of the Ukrainian regime to find any other alternative sources of energy.
It is clear enough that even for objective reasons alone, Venezuelan oil cannot fully replace supplies from Russia. We should look for alternative sources much closer to home, and there is such an opportunity. For one, there are Libya and Algeria, and certainly the Caspian region. This, however, requires a totally different foreign and domestic policy, and the incumbent regime is not prepared to perform such complicated maneuvers. Nor is it capable of them. Besides, Moscow will object to it, and the Ukrainian leadership lacks the basic political will to oppose such pressure.
The second external factor is Europe. Due to obvious reasons, Brussels will not be delighted by Ukraine’s close contacts with the odious Venezuelan leader. Brussels understands Ukraine’s attempts to buy oil outside Russia. But just like Moscow, for its own reasons, it will not welcome such cooperation. The major European states will associate Chavez’s visit with the consolidation of Ukraine-Russia relations. There will be no outward manifestations: after all, it is up to Ukraine to decide whom to invite. Yet relevant conclusions will certainly be made.
The regime in Ukraine is frantically looking for extra trumps to use in negotiations with Moscow. The decision about constructing a reservoir for liquefied gas, finally taken with all the domestic strife going on, confirms this. Moscow strongly disapproves of such moves, and it is clear that it is preparing a reaction.
It is ridiculous to maintain that oil from Venezuela can in any way influence Ukraine-Russia negotiations. Hence, a question naturally suggests itself: why is Chavez coming to Kyiv?
