The month of March is a sad time for the Syrians, because it symbolizes the beginning of a deep crisis, which will enter its sixth year in 2016. More than a quarter of a million dead, almost half a million wounded, almost half the population (over 11 million) becoming refugees and migrants. Neighboring countries that have been taking the greatest burden of their admission have long cried about this problem. However, influential members of the international community started to truly pay attention to the tragedy only when the number of refugees in Europe approached a million. And it will not stop there.
In the wake of the Arab Spring, a few Syrian teens wrote peaceful anti-Assad slogans on a fence. The regime caught them. Some children had their nails torn off before being shot dead. This provoked mass risings in several cities. However, the regime of president Bashar al-Assad used force to disperse demonstrations. Like with the Heavenly Hundred of Kyiv’s Euromaidan, many large cities of Syria saw their own “heavenly hundreds” falling. Numbers of killed demonstrators were growing by the day. The Syrian opposition started to emerge, which had to fight for human rights in bloody confrontations. International organizations expressed “deep concern.” The UN sponsored a few meetings between representatives of the Syrian opposition and the authorities, but they were effectively futile.
After al-Assad used chemical weapons against the population in 2013, the UN Security Council finally managed to unanimously (for previous projects were always vetoed by Russia) adopt a resolution demanding destruction of the chemical weapons, and it was done. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon even called the resolution “the first hopeful news on Syria in a long time.”
However, the prolonged confrontation between the regime and the opposition enabled a third force to enter the field, which further deepened the crisis, since it was the so-called Islamic State, commonly labeled as a terrorist organization. Its popularity in the time was based on the confrontation between the Sunni and Shiite branches of Islam, for, despite the seemingly secular nature of the Syrian state in the preceding half century, the real power was in the hands of the Alawite minority (a branch of Shiism), represented by the al-Assad clan and supported by Iran. Hafez al-Assad (the previous president) and his son Bashar al-Assad (the current president) actively spread Shiite influence in the state. In turn, the Islamic State was based mainly on the most reactionary Sunni groups that considered themselves “defenders of Sunni Islam.” In fact, their ideology is closer to the dark medieval Kharijism, according to which only its adepts, the Khawarij, were considered true believers, while other Muslims were seen as dissidents and infidels who had to be destroyed.
Tormented by the Alawite regime, which was now displaying its full brutality, some Syrians trusted the pseudo-Sunni Islamic State to help them. Only with time did they understand that they had entered a trap of the bloodthirsty terrorist group, whose elite actually has nothing to do with Muslim values. Members of the Islamic State, divided into different groups, often fragmented and uncoordinated among themselves, committed wholesale massacres of moderate Muslim, Kurdish and Christian populations, tortured adults, enslaved women and exterminated children. Christian churches and places of worship of other religions were blown up. This provoked a new round of migration, and a massive wave of emigrants who sought refuge from the flames of war and terrorists flooded near and distant abroad. There was no retreat now: the international community was finally forced to really engage with the Syrian issue.
Russia, which throughout the period of confrontation actively supported the al-Assad regime, used this situation, too, to its own benefit. Facing global isolation, strengthening sanctions over the annexation of Ukrainian Crimea and failure of the Minsk Agreements, and against the backdrop of terrorist attacks in Europe (committed by the Islamic State as well), Russia decided to improve its image and present itself as an active force combating terrorism. Under the pretext of “combating the Islamic State,” the Russian Air Force invaded Syria and began to provide military support for al-Assad. It saw a Shiite-Russian alliance of sorts emerging, because al-Assad’s supporters include, besides Russia, Iranian militants and the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah. However, targeted attacks against terrorists were minimal compared to the advances of al-Assad’s army, supported by Russian airmen. Thus, according to the international observers’ reports, it is moderate opposition that is being destroyed, instead of the Islamic State’s terrorists. The regime has managed to regain control over 30 percent of previously lost areas, and fighting near Aleppo is ongoing (it is Syria’s second largest city after Damascus). At the same time, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have repeatedly stated their intention to send troops into Syria to support the opposition. However, they are waiting for US acquiescence to such a step, and it has been lacking so far.
After the Russian intervention in the conflict, a meeting was held in Vienna on November 14, 2015, which saw its participants forming the so-called International Syria Support Group, which includes 17 nations, with France, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, China, and Russia among them. Together with the UN and the EU, the group aims to help solve the Syrian crisis. The Vienna meeting’s resolution called for a truce and formed the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution No. 2254 whereby a new constitution, reflecting a road map to resolve the Syrian crisis, must be drafted over 18 months. Within six months, a “legitimate, inclusive, and secular government” should be created which will draft the basic law of Syria. However, Russia managed to achieve adoption of the wording of the resolution which says not one word about the prospects of its longtime ally al-Assad. It says only that the country’s future lies in the hands of the Syrian people. This can be interpreted in different ways. The Russian side informally does not deny that al-Assad is a concern to be solved, but the US and UK’s vision of the issue, on the one hand, and Russia’s vision on the other hand, are different. Meanwhile, a special commission charged with monitoring the ceasefire will operate in Syria. The truce began on February 27. Attacks on civilian objects, including schools and hospitals, have been discontinued. However, according to the Vienna Agreements, attacks on the Islamic State and other groups which the International Syria Support Group declared terrorist (e.g., Jabhat al-Nusra) will not be stopped.
Overall, the monitoring group says the truce has mostly held. It looks as if a weak ray of light has appeared at the end of the Syrian crisis tunnel. However, many issues are still up in the air: in particular, no solution has been offered regarding the transfer of power and the removal of dictator al-Assad. Consequently, the Shiite-Russian alliance may resume its military attacks if their scenario fails to succeed. This can be done under the pretext of combating the Islamic State’s terrorist groups. Another alarming sign is increasing likelihood of a partition of Syria. In particular, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Ryabkov told reporters that “if, as a result of talks, consultations and discussions on Syria’s future state order ... they come to an opinion that namely this (federal) model will work to serve the task of preserving Syria as a united, secular, independent, and sovereign nation, then who will object to this?” There is reason to believe that Syria, already de facto divided along religious, ethnic, and other lines, will, if federalized, disintegrate into quasi-sovereign entities in the near future. They will have their “overseers” far outside Syrian territory.
This will undoubtedly shake the established order in the Middle East, which is already in a very unstable situation, created by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Shiite-Sunni conflict exemplified by the Iranian-Saudi confrontation, the Syrian War itself, the war in Yemen, effective anarchy in Libya, etc. Meanwhile, any “hot spots,” existing or potential, especially in the oil-rich Gulf districts, are beneficial for Russia. We can assume that it wants to see the Shiite-Sunni confrontation in Syria spreading to the entire Middle East region and growing into an Iranian-Saudi war, which would also involve neighboring Qatar, UAE, and other players. Russia’s long-term strategy also includes preventing the flow of Qatari gas from reaching Europe through Turkey, which project was actively discussed before this war, but can be blocked by stoking armed conflicts along its route. Then, Europe will not have much choice where to buy gas. Russia will keep its position of the main supplier. It believes itself to be “wronged” by the Saudis, since it was their efforts that brought about the oil price collapse, which led to inflation and poverty in Russia. Thus, we can only dream of peace in the region.
Highly unfortunately for Ukraine, Syria’s lesson is not very comforting for it. It should be understood so that Ukrainians do not indulge in over-optimistic illusions, but rather play methodically and proactively to prevent foreign scenarios from determining the nation’s future development. Firstly, Russia’s interventions in military conflicts can well end just as planned by Russia. The controversial Minsk Agreements and documents on Syria were both adopted only with the consent of Russia and worded to benefit Russia. As a consequence, their implementation took place according to this wording. Secondly, Russia is highly experienced with the scenario of freezing the conflict or making it fade away so that under certain conditions it can be reverted into the hot phase. In other words, Russia wants to manage crises forever rather than resolve them. Usually, the documents adopted have vague provisions or offer direct reasons for this role that can be used if necessary. Thirdly, Russia, itself a de jure federation, likes to “strongly suggest” this model of territorial organization to other states. Right now, the partition of Syria into cantons is being debated. Is Ukraine the next in line?
Therefore, solving the Syrian crisis, which is only now beginning to look as a planned effort, can hardly be called a real political process. Differences in the stances of the Syrian opposition and the regime are just too obvious. Each party relies on the theses from international documents, which it deems beneficial to itself. Too much blood has been shed for a near-term settlement of the crisis to be anything but an illusion.
Syria is burning and all the efforts by international players resemble dancing around this fire rather than a genuine effort to extinguish it. How long will the dance last, then? Probably until the “dancers” get really tired and sincerely willing to get some rest.
