In 2002 Ukraine announced its policy of Euro-Atlantic integration, with NATO membership as the ultimate goal. During the recent parliamentary elections in Ukraine, election frontrunners avoided the subject of NATO membership in their campaign platforms. It appears that only Ukraine’s Foreign and Defense ministries have been consistent in their declarations in favor of Euro-Atlantic integration.
Now a “NATO compatibility test” awaits the government coalition now forming in Ukraine. What do NATO member states think of Ukraine’s efforts at integration into Euro-Atlantic structures? What is required of our country as it moves along the path of integration? Will Ukraine be able to revise its natural gas deal with Russia? James Sherr, fellow at the Conflict Studies Research Center of the UK’s Defense Academy, discusses these questions in the following interview. The British defense expert is no stranger to Ukraine. For many years he has been an unofficial mediator between the Ukrainian government and defense structures in the UK and NATO. Regardless of his official position with a government institution, he is entitled to his personal opinion, which may not necessarily represent the official position of the UK or the alliance.
“Are Ukraine’s goals to advance to the NATO Membership Action Plan this fall and to join the alliance in 2008 realistic?”
“These are two different questions. I believe that it is a realistic prospect for Ukraine to advance to the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) this year. But to do so, Ukraine must meet a number of requirements from alliance members concerning some key aspects. As for Ukraine’s accession to NATO in 2008, this is a completely different question.
“Before Ukraine can advance to the MAP, allies must be certain that Kyiv realizes the depth of transformations that have to be implemented in nonmilitary security sectors. So far, the question of reforms in most spheres of the security sector has only been discussed, but nothing has been done about them. Ukraine needs a fundamental transformation. But it is not mandatory that everything must begin once Ukraine has advanced to the MAP. Nevertheless, the allies must be certain that Ukraine knows what has to be done and is determined to do this.
“A second problem is this: no harm should be done to the system of national coordination in the defense sphere and the security system, let alone the dynamics of reforms in the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces.
“A third problem pertains to energy security, which is a component of security that is attracting more attention in Europe. If Ukraine hands over control of its network of oil and gas pipelines or loses ownership of this network, the allies will be very concerned, much like all the EU member states. They might question Ukraine’s ability to defend its primary interests, since the oil and gas systems are a guarantee of Ukraine’s independence. The question of energy security is becoming increasing relevant for the entire Euro-Atlantic community.
“As we know, an invitation to the Membership Action Plan is a political issue. I believe, however, that Ukraine’s advancement to the Membership Action Plan in Riga at the end of this year is a realistic prospect.”
“What about Ukraine’s accession to NATO in 2008?”
“Much harm has been caused by all the talk of dates for Ukraine’s accession to NATO. The allies will not discuss dates. I hope that advancement to the Membership Action Plan will be good news for Ukraine. However, an invitation to join NATO will not happen unless real, profound changes begin in the country following the advancement to the Membership Action Plan. Why am I saying this? Because in the past the period of the most intensive changes in all countries aspiring to NATO membership was always the period between advancing to the Membership Action Plan and actual membership. However, when some countries joined NATO, transformations slowed down significantly in individual cases. Therefore, some allies concluded that before candidates are granted membership, they must complete all critical transformations. I emphasize critical transformations, not all transformations. Even old NATO members have certain weak spots and shortcomings. Nobody intends to demand from Ukraine what is not required of NATO member states.”
“Would you name the sectors that need to be transformed?”
“The changes taking place in the Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces of Ukraine should simply continue. Perhaps this depends on predictable and consistent increases in funding. It is also important to ensure that no one will interfere with the administration mechanism in the program of reforms.
“At the same time, the Security Service of Ukraine and intelligence agencies should change the culture and style of their work. By this I mean that they must understand who their ally is and how to work jointly. This particularly applies to the general approach to intelligence work and relations with Ukrainian citizens. The Soviet and post-Soviet approach is based on pressure, blackmail, and exploiting human weaknesses and incriminating evidence against people. Such methods are not employed in modern democratic countries. New approaches require new people. Among today’s professionals are those who can work constructively in the new conditions and those who cannot. The latter should be assigned to positions where they will not be able to do harm, or they should be given an honorable discharge. All the new allies felt these changes, and it is only natural that they experienced difficulties during the process. But where there is a will, all of this can be accomplished.
“Without a doubt, it is also a question of reforming the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the law enforcement agencies. The thing is, at the local level, where the country’s population resides in its majority, in many cases the police act as tools of organized crime instead of combating it. Of course, this cannot be changed without resources. At the same time, it is important to create a program that will distribute resources to ensure optimum funding for the constituent components of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, along with reforming the system of officer training and career growth, social security, and reviving professionalism and self-respect among professionals. In addition, this program has to be publicized and discussed by independent experts. I hope that the basic principles of such a program will be represented in the new document entitled “ National Strategy in Ukraine’s Security Sphere.”
“Do you think the future Orange coalition will be able to implement the current government’s NATO goals?”
“This will not be a simple task. The Socialist Party, which is part of this coalition, is still violently opposed to Ukraine’s membership in NATO. It is not necessary to discuss this question now that coalition talks are underway. It would be good to overcome this obstacle with time. Otherwise, this may negatively affect the prospects of Ukraine’s membership in the alliance. We must clearly understand that the only fundamental thing that unites the Orange coalition is its dedication to democratizing the state and society. As for other spheres, economic and geopolitical, there are big differences among the members of this coalition. In my view, this is one of the reasons why the future Orange coalition may not be too stable.”
“Can Ukraine join NATO if it fails to normalize its relationship with Russia?”
“NATO will do everything possible to maintain normal, positive, and equitable relations between the alliance and Russia. I believe that Ukraine will do the same in its bilateral relations with its eastern neighbor. Ukraine’s current relations with Russia are not all that good, but I do not know and cannot predict what they will be like five years from now. We should expect that in the future an internal discussion will take place in Russia itself, and presidential elections will take place to bring a new president to power. I am optimistic that significant improvements in the Russo-Ukrainian relationship will happen during that period. But one thing is clear: the alliance will not let Russia dictate who should be Ukraine’s future partner. Ukrainians will make this decision themselves.”
“Do you think Russia will try to influence France or Germany and persuade them not to support Ukraine’s accession to the alliance?”
“I think the Russians have strong incentives to try to do this. Perhaps at the start of the discussion some allies might feel that we should postpone the decision on Ukraine in order not to displease Russia. But I believe that at the end of the discussion NATO members will reach a consensus, and I hope that this consensus will be a wise and correct one.”
“Do you think it is possible that Ukraine will revise its gas deal with Russia?”
“In one aspect a revision is inevitable, since gas prices are fixed only until this July. In my view, Ukraine has a strong position to defend its interests. Why?-because revenues resulting from a low transit price mean more to Russia than gas prices in Ukraine. Therefore, Ukrainians have every reason to raise the question of increasing transit rates to the European level if Russia insists on raising gas prices. It is also worth noting that for storing its gas in Ukrainian storage facilities Russia pays one-eighth of what it pays for storing its gas in European storage facilities. If the talks become protracted, Ukraine will do just that. Under the agreement reached in January, the price can be changed only by future agreements. If Ukraine disagrees with Russia’s proposals, I strongly doubt that Russia has legal grounds to reduce supplies. In fact, in political terms and taking into account its G8 chairmanship, such a policy is unlikely.
“The danger is that some Ukrainians in the upper echelons of power do not realize the strength that comes from Ukraine’s ownership of its network of gas pipelines. Habits of weakness have not completely disappeared. Ukraine must rid itself of them and stand its own ground in a wise but unyielding manner. I believe that in this case Europe understands Ukraine’s position.”
