James Sherr, fellow of the Conflict Studies Research Centre of the UK Defence Academy, is well known in Ukrainian political and expert circles that deal with matters of security and defense. This British analyst is keenly aware of everything that is happening in Ukraine. In contrast to Western diplomats and NATO bureaucrats, he can say what the West actually thinks of the processes in Ukraine.
In an earlier interview with The Day, he said he doubts that the Declaration of National Unity signed by the leading political parties of Ukraine, the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, and President Yushchenko would ensure that the targets laid down in that document will be reached. This is precisely what is happening before our very eyes.
What problems is Ukraine facing now that the new government has not seized the chance to reach a higher level of Ukraine-NATO relations? How is the Ukrainian government keeping its promises made in Brussels with respect to helping the Ukrainian public form a positive image of NATO? Will the president of Ukraine be able to withstand the prime minister’s increasing role? What role can and should the ex- prime minister play in the struggle emerging between the government and the opposition? These and other issues are raised in the following interview with the British analyst.
Mr. Sherr, what has Ukraine lost by passing up the chance to reach a higher level of relations with NATO, specifically the Membership Action Plan?
Sherr: I think the chance of Ukraine’s move to the Membership Action Plan (MAP) this year disappeared as soon as the possibility of establishing a new Orange coalition vanished. But this doesn’t exclude the future. No one in NATO with any common sense will support such an important step as MAP before it becomes absolute clear in which direction Ukraine is moving, and whether there is full consensus between the president and the government on Ukraine’s main political course. This is very reasonable.
In general, MAP has many advantages for Ukraine or for any country that truly aspires to integrate with Euro-Atlantic structures. The MAP also offers advantages even for obtaining EU membership.
Defense Minister Anatolii Hrytsenko was right when he said that the key MAP issues are internal ones and that they are the most complicated as well as the most unifying ones, which once they are crossed, will allow Ukraine to develop in keeping with the standards of the Euro-Atlantic community. I mean democratization, accountability, control over the budget, modernization of the administrative structure. Without these changes resources will never reach the people who need them. The state will not function effectively and there will be no real security. Reforms in the defense and security spheres will have no meaning unless the above-mentioned reforms are carried out. MAP embraces precisely these problems. It provides people in any candidate country with real stimuli and the kind of support required for solving these complex problems. From this standpoint, it doesn’t really matter if this happens in 2006, 2007, or 2008. The NATO Membership Action Plan could be very advantageous to Ukraine. Of course, if Ukraine doesn’t want to join NATO and the EU, then MAP will be of little use.
Is it possible that the step taken by the Yanukovych government conceals a desire not to carry out the reforms envisaged by MAP?
Sherr: In my opinion, Viktor Yanukovych wants to revive the multivectoral policy, but on a very solid basis. This year President Putin has repeatedly stated that only the strong are respected in the international arena. Yanukovych, as a Ukrainian, understands the implications of this statement for Ukraine. It seems to me that the Ukrainian prime minister realizes that, if the West loses interest in Kyiv and if its support vanishes, Ukraine will find itself in a constantly unfavorable position in relation to Russia, and he doesn’t want this. The problem that has emerged has three aspects. First of all, there are people in Yanukovych’s entourage, whose views on Russia are more or less realistic and considerably more favorable — I would even say considerably more differentiated — than the views of the prime minister himself.
The second problem is that Yanukovych and his people have the wrong idea about the West. They are overestimating our assessments of Ukraine’s geopolitical factor. They are overestimating our evaluations of Ukraine’s internal factor. We believe that the greatest problem of Ukraine’s security lies in the relationship between politics and business. The revival of Kuchma-era norms in the sphere of administration and financing is aggravating this problem. As a result, the Party of Regions is unintentionally making big blunders and mistakes, and thus making a very bad impression on the West.
The third problem is that even Yanukovych underestimates the gravity of the problems between Ukraine and Russia. Yanukovych mistakenly believes that Viktor Yushchenko created the problems with Russia. The problem, however, is that Russia feels strong and considers Ukraine to be weak. Ill-considered concessions will strengthen Russia’s position and at the same time will weaken the West’s ability to help Ukraine, especially when these concessions relate to such critical factors as ownership of pipelines, Euro-Atlantic integration, and Ukraine’s entry into the WTO.
Continuing the NATO topic, it would be interesting to hear your opinion of Ukraine’s possible road to the alliance, in view of the current situation in Ukraine. Dmitrii Trenin, a Russian political scientist, says that Ukraine’s road to NATO is entirely different from the Polish and Baltic ones.
Sherr: Trenin has a point there; Ukraine is not like Poland. Poland is a country that has self-confidence owing to its history, something Ukraine lacks; also, it has a very strong sense of identity, something Ukraine doesn’t have, and it is deeply convinced that Russia will never exert a positive influence on Poland. Ukraine is a fairly contradictory and divided country. Unless this contradiction lessens, unless Ukraine produces unifying ideas and determines what it actually wants, it will not be able to join NATO without running the risk of causing serious internal problems. That is why I have never advocated Ukraine’s speedy admission to NATO. I have always said that Ukraine can join the alliance as quickly as this is possible. But this takes leadership and the ability to convince society. Even if only the western part of Ukraine understands the advantages of NATO membership, this is not enough. If the politicians and businessmen in eastern Ukraine realize this, then the country may become convinced of the necessity of joining NATO.
Do you believe that Yanukovych will keep his promise about presenting a positive image of NATO?
Sherr: No, not for the time being. He has disbanded the Interdepartmental Euro-Atlantic Integration Commission. He is cutting the budget in spheres where money is badly needed. Budget expenditures slated for informing the public about NATO, carrying out a reform of the armed forces, and implementing national programs are also being reduced. The most sensitive program is the construction of housing for servicemen. We know that there is a link between the provision of housing and further reductions in the armed forces, and the reputation of the defense minister and the army. Therefore, a political struggle and political games predominate over solemn promises and pressing issues. There is no doubt that this exists.
After Yanukovych’s trip to Brussels, Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasiuk said that the president has instruments for implementing foreign policy. What do you think about this? Does President Yushchenko have any levers of influence for conducting and managing Ukraine’s foreign policy course?
Sherr: Unfortunately, the president has few levers. Ukraine has not yet become a society ruled by law, normative documents, commitments, and agreements. Ukrainian society is ruled by power and money. The Party of Regions has power and money. President Yushchenko should have realized that by signing the Declaration of National Unity, he gave the main levers to Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions. Even if he turns the National Security and Defense Council into an aggressive politicized implement a la Poroshenko, he won’t win. He won’t be able to restore his lost positions, but will only help the Party of Regions to accuse him of paralysis and chaos. However, if the president turns the council into a strong and politically neutral and serious instrument, he will be able to erect certain barriers and preserve some presidential prerogatives.
Can Yulia Tymoshenko become secretary of the National Security and Defense Council and thus strengthen the president’s position, as some experts say?
Sherr: First, before she becomes secretary of the council, several questions are in order. What kind of actual power will she wield? Is it possible to believe that the president’s men won’t throw monkey wrenches in the works, like before? What will be the outcome of the clash between her will and the real power of the Party of Regions? Perhaps both will lose, but how will she win? How will this help her image?
A new state of chaos and confusion will be a gift for those in Ukraine who are convinced that Tymoshenko is a dangerous personality and those in the West who believe that Ukraine is a sack of incurable problems. Tymoshenko’s strength lies in the fact that she is not infected by power. Her role is to wage a struggle against corruption, the government’s arbitrary rule, and the impoverishment of the population. For the sake of this goal she must conduct a crusade against parliamentary immunity. Her strength will increase once the Party of Regions starts making mistakes. The country will remember that only 32 percent voted for Yanukovych; people will realize who is to blame.
What, in your view, has Ukraine paid — or will have to pay — Russia for the concluded agreement to supply gas for $95 and maybe $130 next year?
Sherr: Two goals are very important for Ukraine. It should preserve its sovereignty over its energy system. At the same time, it must reform and modernize its energy system. There are two differences between the energy sectors in Ukraine and Russia. On the one hand, the Ukrainian sector is more nontransparent, darker, and ill-managed than the Russian one. On the other hand, the Russian energy sector is working on behalf of Russia’s interests, whereas the Ukrainian one is working against the interests of Ukraine. These are the two most important priorities facing your country.
It has a lever of influence over Russia, since today and in the next 10 years Ukraine will be the transit network for 80 percent of Russia’s gas. After all, the greatest advantage for Russia’s Gazprom is that Ukrainian pipelines permit inexpensive deliveries of gas to Europe. No one expects Russia to earn money by selling gas to Ukraine. Russia’s market is located in Europe. Everything that the Russians are doing right now, all the arguments about market price, is designed to achieve one goal: to acquire control over the entire Ukrainian energy sector and pipelines. As soon as Russia succeeds, it will start selling gas to Ukraine at prices considerably lower than market ones. If Ukraine will be getting cheaper gas, but will have to reset gas prices every four months, Ukraine will become Russia’s hostage in this game.
The views expressed above are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the British government.
