At long last Yulia Tymoshenko’s bloc, Our Ukraine, and the Socialist Party of Ukraine have formed a parliamentary coalition. Roman Bezsmertny’s motion to postpone the date of its announcement until Friday [June 22 being the anniversary of Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union], caused a stormy response from the Party of Regions. So the negotiating parties decided to close the issue so as not to irritate their colleagues any further, considering that their condition was lamentable enough; they thought victory was so close.
On June 22 Tymoshenko formally announced that the Orange camp had finally reached an agreement. Her speech gave the tragic date an entirely different coloration. “I think it is important to note that this coalition commences today, under the new constitution, when 65 years ago the people of Ukraine, together with the people of the Soviet Union, began their struggle against the aggressor. Today we are beginning our struggle for a democratic Ukraine, cleansed of all that dirt of corruption, so we can be proud of the country of which our forefathers dreamed, all those who fought for its independence.” She stressed that this struggled ended in victory, and so will this coalition’s struggle (even though this coalition is likely to struggle with itself in the first place — Ed.).
Tymoshenko went on to say that the situation in Ukraine largely depends on official appointments. She was right.
The Day previously wrote about the incorrect quota principle and revolutionary expediency practiced by the first post-Maidan coalition. The Orange camp’s people, interviewed by this newspaper shortly before and after the last government crisis, admitted that the quota approach was wrong. Now that there is a fresh smell of power in the air, we will see whether they remember their statements any time soon. From what is stated below it is clear that once again appointments have been assigned to coalition members on a quota basis, although the names have not been announced.
In her speech at the Verkhovna Rada, Tymoshenko lashed out at the Party of Regions. The BYuT leader said they should kiss good-bye to their hopes of taking over political power “after 10 years of ruination.” In fact, this part of Tymoshenko’s speech was not especially pleasing to the ear, as there was no mistaking the gloating tone of her voice. After all, there are years before the next elections, so a constructive approach would seem more appropriate under the circumstances, especially in regard to a rather strong opposition that makes up almost one-half of the Ukrainian parliament.
It is also safe to assume that the electorate has become sick and tired of the political shows over the past couple of months; shows that turned out to be cheap farces for the most part. Indeed, the Party of Regions did its best to torpedo a broad coalition. Language and anti-NATO recommendations proved to be the wrong way to influence Our Ukraine. Whatever the arguments in favor of a “broad format” coalition, the Orange electorate would regard the signing of an agreement between Our Ukraine and the Party of Regions as an act of capitulation.
Of course, one ought to wish the newly established coalition Godspeed because Ukraine’s well-being and progress will depend on their stable and professional performance. There is the risk that, before dedicating every effort to combating economic problems, the new coalition will have to deal with a great many internal differences, including personal issues that are not likely to have been resolved in the course of negotiations.
Mykhailo Pozhyvanov of Rukh made an interesting statement on June 22, to the effect that his party does not like way the posts were assigned within the coalition. The parliamentarian stressed that they will not recall their signatures, of course. “I am sure that if they keep up this practice, without considering the opinion of the People’s Rukh of Ukraine, for example, or other entities that created the bloc Our Ukraine, 17 MPs will always be found, who will be able to block the coalition’s further work.”
The Verkhovna Rada is in recess until Tuesday (June 27). The coalition must resolve a number of formal and cadre issues during its meeting, especially in regard to the speaker. Roman Zvarych says he has learned about a meeting of the Political Council of the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine from media coverage and that PIEU leader Anatoliy Kinakh was nominated as candidate speaker. Earlier Our Ukraine announced that their candidate was Petro Poroshenko.
Zvarych commented on the deputy prime minister’s candidacy, saying that the Verkhovna Rada’s Standing Orders read that it takes a general meeting of the coalition: “Of course, Yulia Tymoshenko’s bloc will have the post, but formal procedures must be observed.” Nor should one ignore President Yushchenko’s stand; he made it clear that he would not endorse the prime minister’s candidature before the justices of the Constitutional Court are sworn in.
On June 22 the president was pleased to inform journalists in the village of Nova Petrivka that all the “t’s” had been crossed in the coalition-forming process. When he was asked whether the process was actually complete, the head of state replied, “I believed that it is, by and large. I would also like to ask you to assess it with a great degree of patience because a majority efficiency test is being performed in parliament for the first time in 15 years.” The president noted that even clauses that are not regulated by the constitution and other laws had been agreed upon during the talks.
Whether or not these arrangements last will depend on a number of subjective and objective factors. Will the politicians learn from their mistakes? How will the team perform in the conditions of a prognosticated crisis? The Day posed these questions to its political analysts.
COMMENTARY
Volodymyr MALYNKOVYCH , Ukrainian Branch, International Institute for Humanitarian and Political Studies:
This coalition has its pluses and minuses. It unites very different forces; it includes five, maybe six blocs, rather than three. Our Ukraine alone comprises three rival groups. There are Socialist Party groups with differences in their stands. True, the BYuT is a coalition designed to serve only one political figure; it may have dissatisfied members but they keep quiet. The coalition is a markedly motley crowd.
The document they have signed contains a number of controversial provisos and implementing them will prove to be a sophisticated process, especially the one concerning NATO. We know that we have a NATO membership plan. How will the different political groups within this coalition behave when it comes time to carry out this plan? There are many such examples. In other words, this alliance is rather vague ideologically, yet I believe that this aspect isn’t that important ideologically because it will not hurt the coalition’s longevity.
I am not one of those who believe that this coalition will collapse soon. If Tymoshenko comes up with a program next spring, they will feel pretty confident during the year. In the spring of 2007 Viktor Yushchenko will have to worry about having Tymoshenko in opposition and thus having actually deprived himself of being elected for the second term. Tymoshenko, as an opposition leader, will simply never let him make the second round of the presidential campaign; she will have snatched the rest of his electorate from him. Even now Yushchenko is scared by this scenario and will be scared even more as the election date approaches.
Neither do I think that the Party of Regions should count on obtaining quick access to power. In fact, I believe that this party feels quite comfortable in opposition as a business project rather than a political party. They will have to work hard to create a full-fledged and influential party.
How will the economic situation evolve in the presence of this coalition? A most realistic option would be for both parts of Ukraine — those influenced by Our Ukraine and by the Party of Regions — to unite. This hasn’t happened, so the situation looks more complicated. Tymoshenko will have to display a great deal of flexibility in (a) persuading business circles in the east of Ukraine that business can be done with her, and (b) persuading Russia that she is its great friend. An intergovernmental protocol will have to be signed in the nearest future.
I think Russia’s requirements will be extremely harsh; I also believe that Tymoshenko will have to concur with most of them, even though she will try to portray this as though everything depended on her. She has no alternative. This flexibility may also help her push Ukraine through a complicated period. Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko will, of course, take a vividly populist stand, but she will actually conduct no populist policy. The Maidan is history and the next elections are far ahead. This leads me to assume that she will take a pragmatic stand, but will keep up her populist rhetoric.
As for the Tymoshenko-Poroshenko combination, I don’t think their relations will be normal. Their respective stands are incompatible. Today the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada is not a very important figure. Lytvyn’s days are over. There is the coalition’s secretariat and they will vote for a number of issues duly agreed upon. Decisions will be made not by the Verkhovna Rada but by the coalition’s secretariat. The prime minister cuts a much stronger figure now than last year, when s/he could be fired by the president at any moment. In other words, Tymoshenko will find it much easier to compete with Poroshenko.
Vadym KARASIOV, Director, Institute of Global Strategies:
I believe that this event ends the revolutionary cycle that started in 2004. It’s a step forward, of course, in terms of political and perhaps national development. Needless to say, this Orange family isn’t going to face a cloudless future; there will be ideological differences and personal ambitions, the more so that in the end-game phase Our Ukraine suddenly nominated Petro Poroshenko as speaker. Although the situation reminds one of what happened in the spring and summer of 2005, the alignment of political forces is essentially different.
Will the Poroshenko-Tymoshenko combination be marked by conflict? I wouldn’t overstate the situation, because both politicians are currently bound by both coalition protocol and even broader political obligations assumed by the Orange Coalition. Poroshenko and Tymoshenko realize that they won’t have another chance. In the face of a rather serious opposition (the Party of the Regions and the Communists hold 206 seats in parliament), neither has a right to make a mistake. This overall containing factor is bound to reduce conflicts to a minimum and can make this coalition sufficiently stable and lasting. Under the circumstances, one can expect the Ukrainian government to show a more or less stable performance until the second half of 2008. Other reasons and a different alignment of political forces might appear prior to the elections scheduled for 2009. Then a more autonomous and conflictual game could start being played. However, this prognosis is conventional; we still have to see what happens in 2009. So far the whole Orange Coalition is under “cloudless skies.”
As regards the economic policy, I expect it to be pragmatic and that unpopular decisions will have to be made. Tymoshenko, however, appears to possess a unique quality; she can use any unpopular decision to boost her image. Therefore, she won’t be afraid of unpopular decisions. Also, the main coalition figures are aware of having this unique historic chance and are cognizant of their own historic mission.
Kost BONDARENKO, Director, National Strategy Institute:
This turned out to be a hysterical rather than historical event because all the arrangements were made on a hasty and slapdash basis. There are still outstanding differences. Another spectacular fact is that the two leading branches of power will be headed by polarized figures. First of all, this coalition is fraught with serious controversies. Second, Yulia Tymoshenko is shouldering a burden that she may well not be able to bear. She is taking charge of the main ministries; perhaps she regards them as sinecures.
On the other hand, she will have to assume the greatest degree of responsibility for them. This and the approaching economic crisis make it possible to forecast that this coalition won’t last long. Another possibility is that the next session of the Verkhovna Rada will raise the matter of retiring the current government, all the more so as Tymoshenko won’t have critical immunity: during the negotiations it was decided that the government’s action would not be approved by the Verkhovna Rada, so Tymoshenko would be unable to be prime minister for a long time. I believe that after Tymoshenko sustains a blow from a crisis, her departure to the opposition won’t be that damaging for Yushchenko. Indeed, I think she has already sung her swan song.
