• Українська
  • Русский
  • English
Where there is no law, but every man does what is right in his own eyes, there is the least of real liberty
Henry M. Robert

Kostiantyn HRYSHCHENKO: “It’s not enough to bank on the country’s popularity alone”

17 May, 2005 - 00:00
KOSTIANTYN HRYSHCHENKO

Foreign policy is a special focus of the new leadership’s efforts. The various scandals are a thing of the past, much like Ukraine’s de facto isolation in the international arena. Every day Kyiv plays host to foreign delegations, and Ukrainian government officials travel abroad much more often. President Yushchenko spent many of his first 100 days in office overseas. What accomplishments in the foreign policy arena can the new leadership boast of today? The Day posed this question to Ukraine’s two former foreign ministers, Kostiantyn HRYSHCHENKO and Anatoliy ZLENKO. When the new government was formed in early February, the current foreign minister, Borys Tarasiuk, promised to create a special ministerial board that would include these two former ministers, who are his colleagues. As The Day has learned, this has not happened yet, probably because of time constraints. Our newspaper has beaten the ministry to the punch by divulging the former ministers’ opinions of the hottest foreign policy issues.

“What was your impression of the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow? Didn’t it seem to you that Ukraine was “whipped” in public? Vladimir Putin was with Bush and Berlusconi, while Yushchenko was seated apart from them. Was this Moscow’s revenge for the seating plan in Prague?”

“I think Moscow followed the protocol formalities of precedence for G8 leaders. In general, complications always arise during large-scale summits. In Ukraine we have always tried to follow protocol principles that would be understandable and not offensive to anybody. Had Moscow been guided by the significance of each particular country for Russia’s interests, I’m certain that Ukraine would have been placed in the foreground.”

“The beginning of your ministerial term coincided with the Tuzla crisis, which means that you have considerable experience in resolving problem issues with Russia. What recommendations do you have for Ukrainian diplomats in view of the current tensions in the Russo-Ukrainian relationship?”

“First of all, they should not automatically view Russia as an enemy or look from a preconceived negative angle at Russia’s real interests in its relationship with Ukraine. Both Russia’s long-term policy and specific tactics are not simply drawn up in the Kremlin offices. They are the product of analyses of Russia’s interests and reflections on events and statements in Ukraine. The same statements are interpreted differently by different people in these offices. Moscow has never been short of people who exploit our mistakes and rash statements to justify the need for an imperialist, anti-Ukrainian policy. Yet Russia also has politicians who fully realize that in the long term it is extremely disadvantageous for Moscow to turn Ukraine into a lasting enemy. Therefore, it is our task to find a bridge to those who are more realistic about both Russia’s capabilities and the potential benefits of building a positive relationship with Ukraine. The danger is that it doesn’t take too many rash steps and statements to nullify the possibilities for Russo-Ukrainian economic cooperation, without which it would be very difficult to develop a more solid groundwork for economic growth, which is in turn required for our accession to the EU.”

“Among the most pressing problems are those relating to the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine. How would you propose to resolve them? Is it possible that the presence of the Russian naval base in Ukraine will be prolonged after 2017?”

“Today no politician knows with any certainty what the Ukrainian president, parliament, and people will decide 12 years down the road. There have to be compelling political reasons to determine for many years in advance the position of the next generation of leaders. Therefore, I believe that the most important thing today is to focus our efforts on resolving problems relating to the unregulated issues of the Black Sea Fleet’s presence on Ukrainian territory. There are many problems, but although they are all important, they are of a more practical and down-to- earth nature. Recall that the signing of accords on the Black Sea Fleet defused tensions over the Crimea in the Russo-Ukrainian relationship. Russian extremists were constantly using these tensions to provoke a territorial conflict between the two nations. This issue is no longer an bone of contention. What good would it do for us to raise this issue all over again? All the problems in our bilateral relations have been resolved via the basic agreement and state border agreement, but there will always be radicals in Moscow who will use any pretext to poison bilateral relations. As a matter of fact, I think it would be in Russia’s interests to build a naval base on its own territory, where it would be easier to provide logistics, security, legal, navigational, and other kinds of support for such a complex military organism as the Black Sea Fleet. Today Russia is much wealthier than in 1997 and can afford to build one. I think Moscow doesn’t need our advice to understand this. But I am certain that in this sphere determinations should be accompanied by silent diplomacy. We must bear in mind the fact that all statements and aspects of bilateral relations should be coordinated. In today’s world it is impossible to take what’s best for you and disregard the interests of your partner. Politics, security, and economics are inextricably linked in our relations. They are also influenced by the emotional factor in the personal relations between the two countries’ leaders. It is a mixture in which every aspect plays a more or less important role in different time periods. Without a holistic idea of how every piece in the kaleidoscope affects the overall picture of relations today and in the future, we might face grave problems, which are simply uncalled for.”

“Is the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet an obstacle to Ukraine’s NATO accession?”

“There is no feeling in Brussels or in the NATO capitals that the very fact of the Russian fleet’s presence in Sevastopol is an obstacle to Ukraine’s further integration into the alliance. This reflects the modern understanding of the role of Ukraine, Russia, and NATO in the vast transatlantic space. The development of their relations is based on mutual respect of one another’s interests. Should unexpected changes take place, this attitude might change accordingly. But today we must proceed from objective reality.”

“But it is hard to imagine a Russian base on the territory of a NATO member state.”

“Actually, we can imagine anything that doesn’t fly in the face of common sense. At one time China put up with Great Britain’s military and economic presence in Hong Kong. Eventually, the Chinese learned to use this presence for their own interests, even though they could have expelled the Brits long ago because back in the 1960s London stated that it wouldn’t put up an armed defense of Hong Kong. Perhaps this analogy is not quite appropriate. There are no absolute parallels in this world. It’s just that in this and other issues that are crucially significant for Ukraine’s national interests it is important not just to follow emotions and current political expediency, but also have a comprehensive vision of the development and interdependence of all facts that will determine our vital interests in the medium and long term. To do this it is no longer enough to use outdated, 19th-century notions of practical politics. We must finally learn to use the political and intellectual tools of the new millennium. The question of the Black Sea Fleet is a question of Ukraine and Russia mutually honoring their commitments. The overriding goal today is to ensure the fulfillment of obligations undertaken by the two parties, which will not be questioned until 2017. Everything else is in the realm of the hypothetical.”

“At the recent meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Commission in Vilnius, Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk mentioned the year 2008 as the date by which Kyiv will have fulfilled its commitments. Can we assume that Ukraine will be invited to join the alliance at this time?”

“We can assume so. Ukraine is different from the other East European nations that have already joined NATO in that it is much bigger — it is a large European nation both in terms of its resources and army strength. After joining any structure, be it NATO or the EU, Ukraine will not be easily accepted if it brings major problems. The attitude toward Ukraine has improved and it is an opportunity that we must exploit. We can choose any benchmark date, but only after answering the question of what these forecasts are based on. If everything boiled down to desire alone, we didn’t lack it in the past either, at least as far as our declarations went. We cited different dates for EU membership. We often spoke about quick accession to the WTO. But such statements alone do not foster fresh enthusiasm inside the country. On the contrary, they might breed skepticism among those who are only beginning to believe that things are going to change fundamentally and for the long term in Ukraine.”

“The Russian factor plays a major role in Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO. If informal discussions with diplomats are anything to go by, these organizations have an informal pro-Russian club that includes France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. What should be done to tip the scales of support in Ukraine’s favor and thus ensure consensus within the EU and NATO on Ukraine’s prospective membership?”

“We must work not only in Paris, Berlin, Rome, and Madrid, but primarily in Moscow. I once said during extended Russo-Ukrainian talks with top Ukrainian and Russian Foreign Ministry officials that the Russian Federation should be interested in Ukraine’s membership in NATO, which raised many eyebrows. I gave a simple explanation. As a NATO member, Ukraine would never permit the use of alliance forces against Russia. This was an unexpected thought, but no one tried to refute it, and on the whole it was positively received. We must not disregard the fact that Germany and France have interests in Russia, much like we do, if only because without Russia it would be impossible to resolve the fundamental problem of Europe’s energy security. This issue outweighs all other issues in the European capitals; that’s the cruel reality. If we manage to persuade both Paris and Moscow that our integration into the EU is part of a range of general, positive changes that reflect Russian and French interests, we will be able to get to Europe much quicker than if we try only by focusing on our Western partners in our European policy. And this will benefit both us and France and Germany, and of course, Russia. I think it is important for Ukraine to pass the phase of conflicts with Moscow as soon as possible.”

“The West made many promises to Ukraine in the wake of the Orange revolution. However, as of today it has fulfilled few of them. For example, the US has yet to strike down the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.”

“The US should have rescinded this amendment years ago. It has no compelling excuse for having failed to do so by now. In recent years the problem of a democratic deficit came to the forefront, but in the past four months it appears to have been eliminated, and today there are no more excuses not to eliminate it. Nonetheless, it still stands, much like a number of other restrictions whose cancellation is long overdue. I know from my experience as ambassador to Washington that it is not enough to bet on your country’s popularity alone when addressing fundamental questions. All levers of influence on the US Administration and Congress should be at work. This requires mobilizing the Ukrainian Diaspora, political science hubs, the media, and, most importantly, American business. The US never does anything for free. For example, unless we eliminate intellectual property infringements as the US is demanding, we will not make any progress toward WTO membership.

“In general, I’m certain that in today’s world any country can achieve success only by choosing a systematic approach toward the multitude of challenges in the international arena. For a country like Ukraine there can never be just one factor that can help it to resolve all the pressing issues that it is currently facing. If we are guided by the principles of inclusion and not rejection, synergy and not enmity, mutuality of interests and not their confrontation, we will inevitably achieve success in the world. This is what our genuine opportunity is all about.”

Rubric: