The change of power in Ukraine and subsequent events that occurred in the post-Soviet space has presented many challenges to Russia’s foreign policy. In an interview with The Day , Boris KUZNETSOV, director of the St. Petersburg-based Center for Integration Studies, focuses on the notorious “Russian factor,” Russia’s relations with neighboring countries, and processes underway in Russia.
“What policy do you think Russia will be pursuing during the Ukrainian parliamentary campaign?”
“Looking back on its previous experience, when Vladimir Putin had to take all the flak for that huge flop, Russia is now behaving more cautiously and reasonably. The Kremlin has stopped putting all its eggs into one basket and is establishing contacts with all Ukrainian political forces. Naturally, there are forces that are more to the liking of the Russian leadership, for example, the Party of Regions, but now they no longer avoid (and are probably maintaining) contacts with Yulia Tymoshenko’s party and Our Ukraine, the ruling party. Naturally, they will be making deals with the coalition that will win. It does not rule out, however, some kind of cooperation with the opposition. I think Russia will now take a balanced approach to Ukrainian political forces.”
“What does Russia prefer to see in the post-Soviet republics: transparent regimes with which it is easy to conduct a pragmatic dialogue or ‘khanates’ that are easy to manipulate and against the background of which it is convenient to appear to be a showpiece of democracy?”
“It depends on what you call a transparent regime. On the one hand, you can say that Ilham Aliyev’s regime is transparent: the elections were held quite legitimately. There was so much talk that the Azerbaijani opposition was being repressed and the country was set for a ‘colored revolution.’ But then the Americans reversed gears, seeing that Aliyev suits them quite well because he can ensure stability. Transparency is all too relative.
“On the other hand, it is very important for Russia to be able to predict the development of a political situation. For example, we are now beginning to have friendly relations with Islam Karimov, but this does not mean that Karimov’s Uzbekistan will not radically change its policies in a year or two. Our eastern and Central Asian neighbors very often change their policies. Everything depends on who will promise them what.”
“One aspect of Russia-EU relations that affects Ukraine is the relationship between Moscow and Warsaw. There have been very many ticklish problems in the last while, beginning with the beating of Russian diplomats’ children in Poland and some Poles in Moscow. Russia recently instituted a public holiday that is quite interesting in the international context: Unity Day (Nov. 4) marking the liberation from the Poles. After celebrating this day, Russia banned imports of Polish meat and other farm products. As for more exalted matters, there is a concept that has gained popularity over the past year: a Polish conspiracy in Ukraine. Has today’s Russia chosen Poland as its main foreign adversary?”
“Poland is in no way a simple partner in bilateral relations. I consider it one of the strongest new EU members, which has taken an active stand and expressed a desire to form the EU’s eastern policy. As part of this policy, Poland was most actively involved in settling the Orange Revolution crisis. Obviously, Poland intends to increase its status in the EU and NATO by drawing its eastern neighbors — above all, Ukraine and Moldova — into these organizations. Naturally, Poland’s activity in the eastern direction is putting Russia on its guard. We have to compete with the Poles for influence on our neighbors. Our interests run counter to each other.
“What is now going on in Moscow-Warsaw relations — a ban on the import of some items from Poland, etc. — means that Russia is trying to show that it can use diverse instruments to influence the position of a country, including import restrictions, as was the case with Moldovan wine. We are now building a northern European gas pipeline that will transport gas at world prices directly to the end users, bypassing Poland and the Baltic countries and ignoring their interests. Recent reports say that Poland is negotiating the installation of US missiles on its territory. Russia looks on this as nothing but a challenge. One could say that the Americans want to defend themselves from possible Iranian terrorist attacks, but I think we’re talking about something else. Kaczynski, the new president, has openly said that an American orientation is the most important issue for the Poles. He said he will not go to Russia — let the Russian president come to Poland. This means that the Poles have quite strong ambitions, although I think they are somewhat overdoing it. Russia is a neighbor, which requires establishing a more friendly relationship with it, but so far Warsaw has failed to do so. On the other hand, the new foreign minister of Poland is Stefan Meller, former ambassador to Russia. Once he was appointed, he immediately went to Moscow in an attempt to diffuse tensions.”
“How do you think Russia will react to Ukraine’s entry into NATO?”
“I think Russia is already forecasting this in the medium term. Yet this will be preceded by quite a difficult negotiating process, with Russia among the participants, because this will affect its geopolitical interests. I hope the NATO leadership and members will display sufficient flexibility. As President Putin has said, we cannot forbid anybody to join NATO: it is up to the country in question. Should Ukraine want it, it will be a NATO member. Naturally, Russia will regard this as an unfriendly action. You say that you treat NATO membership not as a question of security but primarily as proof that your country is moving toward European democratic values. I also do not think that somebody is threatening Ukraine now. There is no military threat to Ukraine, all the more so from Russia. Furthermore, there is very close economic and military cooperation between our countries. Ukraine’s entry into NATO will affect military and technical cooperation because NATO standards differ from ours.
“I believe that NATO will undergo transformations as it expands further eastward. Further expansion will be impossible without taking into account Russia’s interests because nobody wants to complicate relations. Incidentally, our cooperation with NATO is more successful than with the EU, strange as it may sound.”
