We have witnessed various stages in relations between the US and Russia since the Soviet Union collapsed: cold peace that replaced the Cold War, signs of a new Cold War, and new promises of peace. Is there any logic in the way the US-Russian relations develop? Will warmer relations between Washington and Moscow affect Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic prospects? How should Ukraine guarantee its security and integrity in the light of the Georgian events, specifically Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Janusz BUGAJSKI, director of the New European Democracies Project, a senior fellow in the Europe Program at CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), and the author of the book Cold Peace: Russia’s New Imperialism, has answered these and other questions in his interview given to The Day.
“The fundamental competition between Russia and the United States has survived the Cold War, post-Cold War, and cold peace periods. It takes place in different parts of the world and is manifested in different ways: political, strategic, or economic. This principal competition between two global powers has not ended despite the “end of ideologies,” so-called pragmatism, and common or discrepant interests. So, we may go through hot, warm, or cold phases in relations, but the constants will remain unchanged. Russia is trying to win back its superstate status. At the same time, there are indications of decay of America’s global power, although the US has established alliances and spread its influence over various parts of the world, which are either not recognized by Russia or pronounced its exclusive zones. As a result, competition between Russia and America has grown more intense.”
It is no surprise that the Ukrainian adherents of the Euro-Atlantic integration were disturbed by the news about the “reset button.” Some of former political leaders in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Vaclav Havel and Aleksander Kwasniewski, in an open letter to Obama expressed their concern over the fact that the regions have “ceased to be a priority for the US foreign policy.” Are there any grounds for such concern?
“Central and Eastern Europe is important for the US, but it is not the key territory of risks, instability, and national interest. And this must be a good thing. If the US took keen interest in the region, it would mean that it is unstable and does not have any security guarantees.
“The US believes that the region is a sphere of influence of NATO and the European Union. When it is needed, it will not be left unprotected. However, this does not exclude cooperation with Russia on other questions. In order to give a positive signal to Central Europeans, I guess it was important for US Vice President Joe Biden to underline during his visit to Kyiv and Tbilisi that America does not believe in spheres of influence, is not going to divide the world on the grounds of a ‘great trade agreement’ with Russia, and will not give up security interests of Central European states in exchange for Russia’s help, like in the case with Afghanistan.
“It would be an exaggeration to say that America has given up its positions. Washington is trying to find balance between providing security, its alliances in Central Europe, and cooperation with Russia. Whether it is successful in doing so is another question.”
How should the “support confirmation button” work in practice? What should be done after the metaphoric declarations of support, specifically in terms of Ukraine–NATO strategies?
“Yes, we should focus on practical aspects. They include some issues of major importance. NATO is not intending to enlarge at the moment. I guess that the only country to join the Alliance next year is Macedonia, if it reaches compromise with Greece concerning its name. The question of NATO accession for Georgia, Ukraine, and other Eastern European states is not on the agenda at the moment.
“This does not mean that they cannot join NATO, but in order to do so they should meet the entry requirements, whereas in the case with Ukraine the public support is needed. In other words, the Alliance won’t be asking a country to join it, but the country itself should apply to the Alliance and fulfill the requirements. Second, there are other ways to enter NATO in addition to the NATO Membership Action Plan. What is important is not the mechanism, but the result in terms of domestic reforms, cooperation between military and civil structures, and modernization of the military branch.
“The European Union is very important for these countries. It is still too early to speak on the results of the Eastern Partnership Program. Some criticize it, considering it a typical enlarged variant of the European Neighborhood Policy and believing that insufficient money was allocated for its development and that it does not offer any concrete ways to acquire EU membership.
“I think that for all the countries, especially for Ukraine, it is important to show their adherence to this program, and take efforts to approve the Associated Membership Agreement. In other words, the Eastern Partnership Program is worth spreading, because Ukraine is very likely to become an EU member before joining NATO.”
Support of NATO membership has grown in Ukrainian society, particularly in Western regions, since the Russian-Georgian war. It is clear that understanding of the threat makes society more consolidated. What should the constructive symbols be? How should the potential of positive “pro-NATO” arguments be used?
“It would be interesting to conduct a survey among the Ukrainian military, specifically officers, whether they understand NATO and its operations. I am sure that most of them would support NATO membership, because it means modernization of the military branch, i.e., new equipment, high standards, and worldwide mobility. All these things would be important for Ukraine’s development in the 21st century.
“Unfortunately. I would say that many politicians and middle-ranking bureaucrats are not capable of breaking off with the mentality of the 20th century, and Russia’s anti-NATO propaganda takes advantage of this. Responsible leaders must explain to the citizens the advantages of NATO membership compared with the stagnation and danger produced by the Russian neo-imperialist sphere. NATO is a part of the European integration process, while Russian leadership is trying to deprive Ukraine of an appropriate place in the European community.”
What parts of experience Central and Eastern Europe acquired while preparing to join the Alliance may be applied in Ukraine? What is not acceptable due to the Ukraine’s “special” features, whether they are real or imaginary?
“There are several important messages concerning NATO. First, membership in this organization reinforces national security and is not a threat to it. Second, NATO membership is a part of European integration. In other words, EU member countries feel better protected when they join NATO. This is one of the most important aspects of the experience of Central European countries, or the Visegrad Group.
“When a country is a NATO member, it is more likely to attract investments and steps up its EU integration. Third, I should particularly emphasize concerning Ukraine that Ukraine’s NATO membership is no threat to Russia’s security. On the contrary, it makes Russian borders safer. There is much more doubtfulness and instability when a country is not a NATO member, as is case with Georgia.
“In other words, I doubt that Russia would have started its military intervention if Georgia were a NATO member and, vice versa, Georgia would have hardly apply force to return Abkhazia and South Ossetia, because NATO membership is a factor of control. Ukraine’s neutrality makes it vulnerable to Russian influence.”
Liudmyla Pavliuk lectures at the Department of Journalism at the Ivan Franko Lviv University.
