The international community is closely following the relations between Ukraine and Russia. Many in the West agree that the new Ukrainian administration should maintain conflict-free relations with their northern neighbor. At the same time, after the Kharkiv accords, there are voices expressing concern about the possibility of Kyiv going too far in making concessions to the Russian leadership in return for financial support. Without a doubt, the West will keep a sharp eye on President Medvedev’s official visit to Kyiv. The Day asked Sam Greene, deputy director, Moscow Carnegie Center, for comment on the possible results of this visit.
In your opinion, what does the Russian side, particularly President Medvedev, expect to accomplish during his visit?
Greene: “A good question. I find it hard to imagine what could have been accomplished in addition to what already has been achieved (laughing). I think that image will most likely be the key thing during the visit. An image that will show that Ukrainian-Russian relationships are being rebooted, and demonstrate a degree of friendliness between the two leaders. The Russian side may feel the need to support Yanukovych who faces some misunderstanding of the concessions he has already made to Moscow. Accordingly, the Kremlin will want to show that this isn’t being done for nothing, that Ukraine will receive quite tangible dividends. Another thing is, I’m not sure that this will be of much help.”
Help for whom?
G: “Both Yanukovych and the Russian side. Actually, it’s quite apparent that the Russian side is taking advantage of Ukraine’s weak position to achieve that which was impossible to achieve in different circumstances.
In fact, this is precisely what Russia is accusing the West of: back in the 1990s, the West took advantage of Russia’s political status and its economically weak condition, and forced Moscow to make concessions that weren’t in Russia’s interest. This gave rise to conflicts, we still see them in the relations between Russia and the West. My concern is that these accords may serve Ukraine’s short-term interests, but not the long-term ones, and that they may cause further conflicts in Ukrainian-Russian relationships.”
We hear from the Ukrainian government that the accords signed with Russia and the new integrated cooperation projects in a number of Ukrainian industries will offer Ukraine additional opportunities of integration into the EU. What do you think?
G: “There is a point here. I mean two aspects. First, no one in Europe wants or is able to undertake another financial problem. What is happening in Greece may well happen in other countries, even in veteran members of the European Union. To move toward EU integration, it is necessary to prove that Ukraine is independent and even self-sufficient in certain respects, that it won’t be another headache. Another thing is that, considering the scope of measures recently taken to exchange assets with Ukrainian businesses and the deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, I don’t see that the current Ukrainian administration is determined to move in the direction of European integration. Well, perhaps in words only.”
Some believe that Medvedev wants to show that he, not Putin, solved the problems with Ukraine — and that this should be taken into account in the confrontation between these two politicians, when predicting who will become president of Russia in 2012.
G: “There is no confrontation with Putin. They’re both on the same team, serving the same interests. They have stylistic and rhetorical distinctions, but no political differences.”
Precisely what interests is this Russian tandem serving?
G: “The Russian political system, even if consolidated, isn’t solid. There are rivaling ruling and economic elites, business and corporate interests. The role played by Putin and Medvedev boils down to legally finalizing Russian statehood, showing the public image of a corporate Russian state, and maneuvering between these competing and conflicting interests. In other words, they’re both serving all these interests. They are interested in stability and keeping all these interests balanced.”
So perhaps those in power in Ukraine, assuming they also want stability, should borrow this pattern?
G: “You won’t find a president who wouldn’t want to have stability, but the Russian political system rests on the principle that all competing interests can be brought together at a negotiating table, so as to distribute the financial and economic flows, as well as other assets, between them. As I see it, Ukraine simply doesn’t have enough assets and economic flows to gather the interested parties at this table. In Ukrainian politics someone must be left overboard a priori, and so Ukrainian politics boils down to getting a seat at this table rather than being left out of the game. Therefore, stability is for Yanukovych the stability of his status and the interests he represents at this table. His opponents, meanwhile, want to chase him and his team away from this table and take their seats. In Russia, they want a different kind of stability, one that will allow all to remain at the table. These are just different games.”
