Michael Emmerson is one of the European Commission’s leading experts. As a senior research fellow at the Center for European Policy Studies, Emmerson has a good knowledge of Brussels’s political kitchen. Below is the transcript of The Day ’s exclusive interview with this Brussels-based expert.
THE DEBATES CONCERNING UKRAINE’S EU MEMBERSHIP PROSPECTS CONTINUE
In your opinion, why has the EU not included any mention of Ukraine’s prospects in the agreement on cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union?
“The EU would like Ukraine to progress on the immediate realities rather than distant plans. This is the Ukrainian reason. The European reason is the issue of the constitution, and therefore, uncertainties about when the European Union may prove itself capable of adapting its institution for further enlargement.”
Nonetheless, the Ukrainian side is insisting on obtaining some prospects. The president and the former foreign minister were talking about this before, and now the Ukrainian prime minister is demanding this.
“I’ll tell you another story, about the president of Estonia, Toomas Ilves. When you discuss this question with him, he says: “It was like that for all of us a couple of years ago. In 1990 the European Union told the Baltic states: ‘We don’t want you as a member. You should make nice, cooperative relationships with Russia.’ A key document of the EU talks about membership prospects, not for Ukraine, but in general. The European Commission has softened its language. And article 59 says that any state that respects the political principles of the Union may apply for membership. This is making the point of the main principle as an ‘open door.’ For internal EU institutional reasons, firstly, the Union has to slow down its enlargement process. And, secondly, it is up to the Ukrainian side, Ukraine has to get together.”
So, why not put that into the agreement, by implication? A number of EU members support the Ukrainian side in this question.
“That is true. There is a divergence on the EU membership question within the EU, and there is a debate on this issue. Ukraine has a definite constituency of support led by Poland and the United Kingdom in favor of offering this signal. But you have other EU member states that are against the agreement. There is a debate going on about this question.”
THE QUESTION OF EU ENLARGEMENT MAY BE CONSIDERED IN 2015
When do you think there will be some breakthrough on the issue of EU enlargement? Will one be possible after France gets a new president?
“It will sooner happen with the president of France who comes after this new one.”
That’s a very long perspective.
“Yes, absolutely. Your question is quite a possible one for 2015. You know Ukrainian politics perfectly well. You know all about the functioning of Ukrainian democracy, which has some problems. And the relationship between government and business presents some problems. This is all the next phase in the post-Soviet, post- communist transition. All this can happen in Ukraine, but we have now had 16 years of Ukrainian independence, and a lot has happened. And a lot can happen in the next 16 years. This is a deep transformation process. And the main reason why the European Union is so difficult on this question is that it is saying the Ukrainian elites have not really understood what the implications of the position are.”
What positive role could be played by Brussels to encourage the Ukrainian elite to take some steps to get closer to the EU?
“There is a part that has already been agreed between the two parties, and it is, on the one hand, leading negotiations for the new treaty, and on the other, Ukraine began working on the deep Free Trade Agreement in 2000. These are the frameworks within which we work and within which a lot can be done in the next 5-10 years.”
YATSENIUK CAN APPROACH THE NEW AGREEMENT IN A NEW, PROFESSIONAL WAY
Do you think Yatseniuk’s appointment to the post of foreign minister may help make this new agreement more convenient and beneficial for Ukraine?
“I see Mr. Yatseniuk as a real opportunity to turn the page, a fresh mind, having the valuable experience of having been the Minister of Economy, and a younger-generation individual. He can think of giving a completely fresh, professional approach. He should go through all the possible chapters for this agreement, including the issues of deep free trade, political relations, economics, trade, foreign relationships, security, justice, migration policies, and institutional connections. He should go carefully though all the opportunities. Brussels would love it if the Ukrainian government could now adopt intense professionalism in working up the main component parts of these deepening relationships.”
You may also remember that Borys Tarasiuk and other Ukrainian diplomats criticized the new European Neighborhood Policy, because they considered it insulting to Ukraine to be among neighbors who are applying for membership. Do you think that this policy is offensive to Ukraine? Perhaps official Kyiv has not seen some beneficial sides of this policy?
“We see now that there is considerable potential for deep cooperation within that policy, in particular with respect to the EU east. We have a country that has problems with the EU’s political ideology, whereas other states, of course, have east levels of the political agenda. So Ukraine is the first country to have negotiations on the new comprehensive treaty agreement. And they should not be looking at the south, it’s irrelevant. Ukraine has all these possibilities, to negotiate this new agreement without being restricted.”
UKRAINE’S PARTICIPATION IN THE CUSTOMS AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA IS A RED LINE FOR UKRAINE
Is Brussels alarmed that Ukraine intends to deepen its integration into the Single Economic Spice while talking simultaneously about Ukraine’s strategic choice — EU integration?
“Brussels would make several points about this. What is the content of the Single Economic Space with Russia? If it is to have a basic trade agreement, the EU will say: ‘No problem. Good idea.’ But Putin is pushing Ukraine to become part of the Customs Union. That is a red line. If Ukraine does that, it will mean that Ukraine does not want to have a treaty agreement with the EU, because Russia is far from wanting Ukraine’s agreement with the EU.
“I think Mr. Yanukovych does not support the idea of the Customs Union. That’s OK. But the other issue is more detailed technical issues on standards of industrial products and norms for integration. And that is a matter of choice: one or another. Ukraine has agreed to have an ambitious program for Europeanization. So that’s OK. But you can’t do the same with Russia and Russia’s policy towards adopting new norms...It is not zero, but it is limited.”
Do you think that Russia may influence the European countries, specifically France or Germany, to slow down Ukraine’s EU integration?
“We are discussing the integration plan. We don’t discuss membership now, not because Russia says that they do not like it but because the European Union says the time is not right for it. Let’s talk about it in 2015.”
THE CONSTITUTION WILL HELP DEVELOP A STRONG EU ENERGY POLICY
Let’s talk about energy policy. Why don’t you have a unified energy policy?
“First of all, you have to view energy policy as a highly complex matter with many components, and you have to relate this to the EU’s constitutional reality of some EU powers and competencies and many national powers and competencies.
“What is happening at the moment is the quite significant transfer of effective powers from the national competencies to the EU level. There is a competition policy with respect to gas pipelines and the so-called unbuttoning of the relationship between producers and transporters of energy. Quite a lot is happening at the moment in the direction of a more substantial EU energy policy. But you see, the unique energy policy of the European Union is not centralized, so energy policy will embrace the European competencies that are growing, but still other issues, like how much to invest in nuclear power, will remain part of national issues.”
It is clear that the problem of energy policy is very important. What role will Ukraine play in this policy?
“With Ukraine there is an interesting question, whether Ukraine becomes a member of the new energy community treaty that was signed last year between the EU and all of southeastern Europe. This treaty requires all the participants to apply for the EU energy law and regulatory policies. And Ukraine says: ‘We would like to join this energy community treaty.’ But this is open. The European Union says that this would be a perfectly good example of practical possibility. Ukraine wants this, it says it wants this. It has to be tested — whether Ukraine is just making a speech or whether they mean it, because it means that Ukraine will have to apply a lot of the EU energy law.
“Let’s take the electricity sector in particular. “Ukraine at the moment is divided between a larger part of the electricity grid that is integrated with the Russian grid, and there is also the so-called ‘island’ in the southwest that is integrated with some EU member states. If you join the European energy community, in principle, you will have to integrate the whole of the electricity grid with European electricity. Ukraine would like to export electricity in the future, or even now, maybe, but certainly in the future. But there is a question of whether Russia is going to want to import Ukrainian electricity. So this is a very important question to look at in a professional way as to what Ukraine really wants.”
ON GAZPROM’S “NIET” AND THE GREEDY MONOPOLIST
Ukraine has a great treasure: the transport line through which Russian oil and gas is transported. What would Brussels’ reaction be if Ukraine gave control of these pipelines to Russia in one way or another?
“The main economic issue here is whether Russia is able to continue to treat centralization gas and Turkmen gas as if it were its own gas. And you know the story according to which President Yushchenko tried in 2006 to make a direct deal with Turkmenistan. And this was maybe impossible because of Russian control of the pipelines in Russia itself, not in Ukraine.
“The European Union wanted Russia to sign the energy charter treaty, which was supposed to provide the competitive conditions for the Turkmen gas to go through Russia and Ukraine into the European Union. Gazprom said ‘niet.’ It only said that this was a stupid idea. It is not a stupid idea, but it is an idea that would restrict the monopoly by Gazprom. Gazprom is a greedy monopoly; that is why they call it a stupid idea. There is a question: should there be powers in competition policy to restrict monopoly powers in the public interests.”
Is it possible that Ukraine’s potential could be used for reducing Europe’s dependence on Gazprom’s monopoly?
“I don’t think that is the main issue because there is another question — of the possibility of sending supplies of Caspian gas through the Caucasus into Turkey and after that into Central and Eastern Europe. There are possibilities relevant to Ukraine from the south. Of course, it means Ukraine should maintain its possibility to control its own pipeline network, which is now 50 percent Ukrainian.”
UKRAINE’S SMALL CONTRIBUTION TO THE EU OPERATION SHOULD IMPROVE
Do you think that the EU is not using enough of Ukraine’s potential to implement European foreign and security policy?
“There is a question whether Ukraine could now, in the next period, integrate more actively into the EU foreign policy and security policy. There is an open door. It is a question of advancing Ukrainian aircraft step by step. Fifteen years ago we used the Ukrainian An-124 for massive supplies of frozen meat from Russia. It is a very good plane. And apart from that, there is a question: Ukraine’s military participating in the EU crisis management regime. Ukrainian soldiers are already in the Bosnia mission, so that kind of experience should be developed step by step with the quality of Ukrainian participation needing to be improved. It is not bad now, it’s high quality, but Ukraine’s small contribution has to become excellent. And that is because of transit questions. And it is absolutely essential from the EU standpoint that Ukraine and Moldova continue their work with the EU on transit questions with the border system’s mission, which functions, I think, reasonably well. It is absolutely important that Ukraine be clearly consistent in its policies. This is a concrete test of the credibility of Ukrainian declarations, which are absolutely OK for now, but it has to be confirmed.”
Yanukovych will be in Brussels on March 26. What signals do you think will Brussels give him?
“After Yanukovych’s visit to Brussels, the EU foreign ministers will have a meeting on March 31. And the Neighborhood Policy is the main item on the agenda. Looking at the people in the Commission, it appears that they want to do something serious in this area. Ukraine is the single most important partner in the neighborhood policy, without question. And its orientation will much depend on this meeting. From this point of view, they will be looking for a conversation from Yanukovych that will show that he understands what deeper professionalism in neighborhood policy means and what its potential might be. So he could do that, or he could make another rather superficial speech about membership perspectives, which is not what they want to hear.”
