Ukrainian-Romanian relations are once again at the center of attention, although observers in the two countries are not the only interested parties. This time, owing to a successful anti-Ukrainian campaign by Romania’s government and sociopolitical organizations, European and Euro-Atlantic structures have become involved in the resolution of the ongoing dispute. The official reason for the worsening of bilateral relations is Ukraine’s decision to resume navigation in the Danube Delta.
Fully aware of how groundless and pointless their arguments are, Bucharest officials decided to capitalize on Romania’s successes in its European integration processes. Fearing fair and open competition from Ukraine and flatly rejecting all proposals for the joint monitoring of construction work in the Danube Delta and its consequences, Bucharest is betting on a forceful solution of the problem, calling on the international community to use economic and political levers to influence Ukraine. However, Romania is carefully hiding the economic and political implications of its conduct. Bucharest is constantly talking about the harmful consequences of construction in the delta. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s arguments are landing on deaf ears. The Romanians are pretending not to notice Kyiv’s openness to expert appraisals of the construction project. For some reason Romania never mentioned receiving all the necessary documentation pertaining to the Ukrainian canal. But any discussions of the ecology of the Danube basin should include data on the catastrophic consequences of toxic industrial waste that Romanian enterprises have in the past discharged into the Danube. At the time, the Romanians did not turn to environmentalists for expert appraisal of their waste disposal facilities, neither were they concerned about nature in this region, because, as the saying goes, money does not smell.
As for the current state of relations, frankly speaking, the inconsistency of Romanian diplomats’ conduct of their relations with Ukraine is neither unusual nor surprising. It is a continuation of the doctrine of Take Jonescu, Romania’s foreign minister in the 1920s, known as “a policy of national instinct.” Its bottom line may be phrased thus: “The only correct thing is the fact that nothing is final.” In the new era of relations between Kyiv and Bucharest, the former has grown accustomed to the fact that economic and political gains have always been Romania’s top priority in its dialog with Ukraine. In solving bilateral disputes, the Romanians are always second-guessing whether they should snatch something small from Ukraine today or wait to obtain something much bigger tomorrow. Bucharest’s behavior in resolving disputes with Kyiv has always been closely linked to the political situation. As soon as a certain Romanian position stands in the way of strategically important foreign policy projects, Romania immediately changes its tone in its dialog with the Ukrainians, for better or for worse. This happened in 2000, when after three years a basic bilateral agreement that resolved certain differences on a parity basis, came under sharp criticism from most of Romania’s political forces, who demanded that it be revised. The same is happening now. Not so long ago both sides were celebrating the signing of a state border agreement and its successful ratification by lawmakers in Ukraine and Romania. Representatives of Romania’s political elite expressed their readiness for a new, more advanced, stage of relations with Ukraine. Ukrainian society frankly believed in these declarations, thinking there was more to them than propaganda within the context of Romania’s European aspirations. It seemed to herald an end to the political charlatanism of Romanian radicals with respect to the Ukrainian-Romanian border and speculations about the plight of ethnic Romanians in Ukraine.
However, the political situation in the world has changed, while Ukraine’s international image has been tarnished by political scandals. So Romanian diplomats have decided to use this to their advantage.
The upcoming elections in Romania have also worsened political relations among the contenders for power in this country. Unlike the Ukrainian political struggle, Romanian society has somewhat different standards for evaluating the participants in the political race. Voters focus not only on political mudslinging, but also on political and economic gains from international agreements. Since Romanian society has grown accustomed to successes in the foreign policy projects of Euro-Atlantic integration, there is a need for new “victories” in Ukrainian-Romanian relations. For the reasons stated above the Romanian government, criticized by the opposition forces for its “concessions” to Ukrainians, has decided to make up for what was lost during the brief period of normal relations with Ukraine.
However, there is another implication of these disputes. The unsuccessful attempt to build a Great Romania, historical grievances about the “lost” territories, and the involuntary signing of the 1997 Basic Agreement with Ukraine and the 2003 Agreement on the State Border remain a plentiful source of anti-Ukrainian ideology. For this very reason anti-Ukrainian sentiment is a reliable trump card used during elections at all levels to win greater popular support. That is, for a part of Romanian society a negative attitude toward Ukraine is a determining factor when it comes to supporting one political party or another.
As a result, 2004 saw a kind of apogee in the defamation of Ukraine’s policy. Especially worrying are the scale and aggressiveness of the anti-Ukrainian campaign, which has spread beyond national borders to the international level. Events of recent months have shown that Bucharest has not ended its “mini cold war” against Ukraine, which it initiated at the diplomatic level in the 1990s. Lately, however, Romanians have been showing disrespect for both Ukraine’s officials and its history. It is worth noting that Ukraine is also well aware of international observers’ negative assessments of the level of corruption in Romania, the development of its civil society, and the reputation of representatives from its political establishment. But Ukraine is not Romania and does not seek political gains this way.
All of this points to the fragility of Romania’s democratic underpinnings and its inability to be guided in its policies by the principles of those organizations to which it aspires. This in turn is convincing proof that stability in Ukrainian-Romanian relations is determined by external rather than internal factors. The international community’s indifference to Romania’s provocative actions is proof that, in assessing Ukrainian-Romanian relations, the representatives of Euro- Atlantic structures are biased in favor of Romania.
Of course, you can’t choose your neighbors, only the character of relations with them. Despite earlier promises to respect the principles of good neighborly relations in the dialog with Ukraine, today the determination of Romanian diplomats is no cause for optimism. Meanwhile, Ukraine remains open to dialog, true strategic partnership, and the development of friendly relations with Romania.
