The Black Sea Navy is still the Achilles heel in the Moscow-Kyiv relationship. The basic naval accords, signed and then ratified by the Russian and Ukrainian Parliaments, cover only part of the issues still to be settled between the two neighboring countries. As it is, despite good gestures on the part of the presidents and military leadership, both strive to interpret the existing legal ambiguities in their respective favor, and this is precisely what has caused verbal battles between Kyiv and Moscow of late.
EVERY MAN FOR HIMSELF?
A Russian delegation arrived in Kyiv on March 15 to solve certain problems of Russian naval deployment in the Crimea. Until then all the issues remaining open had been handled by a special bilateral commission. Yet the Russian naval commander, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, also visited Kyiv Wednesday, apparently to add weight to the Russian negotiating stand with his presence.
The main objective of the meeting in Kyiv was to agree on the text of supplementary agreements to detail certain aspects of the Russian naval deployment in Ukraine that are still outstanding. The most pressing problem for the Russian side, however, is electricity supplies to the navy. At present, it has to make do with Sevastopol’s energy quotas, but even so the Russian fleet is way behind in paying its light bills, with the arrears totaling almost UAH 40 million, amounting to almost one-third of the city budget. The Crimean authorities, struggling to make ends meet, has begun cutting off electricity to Black Sea Navy units. The naval command and Russian diplomats in Kyiv responded immediately, raising the issue to almost stratospheric levels. Prior to the talks in Kyiv, the Russian Military News Agency announced that Ukraine had almost halved the Russian Navy’s electricity supply quotas, which, of course, makes it impossible for the navy to function normally.
And so the Russian admirals landing in Kyiv, led by naval commander Vladimir Kuroyedov, if not an attempt to pressure the Ukrainian leadership, was aimed at bettering the Black Sea Navy’s life as soon as possible. But to do so, it was necessary to once again ascertain what entity would handle such mutual contacts and what procedures would apply. There are plenty of option. On the one hand, the Russians suggest the navy’s arrears could be written off on account of Russia’s fuel supplies to Ukrainian nuclear power plants or by reducing Ukraine’s gas debts to Russia. This option was ultimately accepted. This option could turn out quite acceptable to Sevastopol — provided Russian naval electricity supply quotas are made a separate expense item, over and above the municipal quotas. In that case the Russian military with its debts would be Kyiv’s, not Sevastopol’s headache.
KEEPING AN EYE ON EACH OTHER
Another acute problem facing the Russian side is the completion of the deployment of Russian SU-24m bombers in the Crimea. After a three-year debate with Ukraine, Russia has transferred half of the 22 aircraft of this type to the peninsula, although it took Vladimir Putin and Leonid Kuchma to talk it over, but this is traditional; any shifts in the naval domain become possible only after the Presidents or Premiers step in.
Ukraine further insists on a bilateral agreement to regulate Black Sea Navy’s re-equipment and a possibility of Ukrainian checks of aircraft onboard systems, because the SU-24 can be used as nuclear carriers, a fact that makes Kyiv somewhat uneasy, for Ukraine does not want that. At present, Ukrainian experts admit that Kyiv faltered when signing basic accords with Russia, particularly with regard to the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the Russian military presence in the Crimea. At the time it was laid down that Russia may deploy 132 combat armored vehicles, 24 artillery systems with over 100 mm caliber on the territory of Ukraine, and that the naval ground-based aviation may consist of 22 aircraft, without specifying their type and weapon systems. So when Moscow said it wanted SU-17 replaced by SU-24 Kyiv could not say no, except that the Ukrainian side succeeded in convincing Moscow that a supplementary agreement was necessary, in particular to provide for verification of the SU-24 bombers. The first of the combat aircraft now deployed at the Hvardiyske airfield near Simferopol are already certified by Ukrainian authorities, meaning they will not be used as nuclear carriers. Such certification awaits the rest of the SU-24 after they are flown to the Crimea from Anapa. Of course, no one can guarantee that Russia will avoid the temptation and will not try to hoodwink Kyiv and deploy nuclear weapons as part of its Black Sea Navy. The more so that Russian dignitaries officially recognized the impossibility of such course of events. However, one cannot help but recall that the Russian naval combat training programs, among other things, provide for local operations, blocking Black Sea transit carriages and, most interestingly, personnel training with an eye to possible use of nuclear weapons. Against this background, an agreement on control over the Russian naval arsenal looks quite expedient. The main thing is to make it truly effective, because Kyiv now and then has to back up on some of its principles.
Starting this January, Ukraine renewed a Cabinet resolution providing for enhanced oversight of the Black Sea Navy. Kyiv took a number of steps with regard to it last May, but in June under pressure from Moscow, canceled them. At the time it was explained that such measures had to be made in consultation with Russia’s “competent authorities.”
So what changes were made in the text after the Moscow consultations? First, while previously transfer of BSN units and vessels required a three day’s notice to the Ukrainian military command, now it has been agreed that in an emergency an hour’s notice will suffice. But then any redeployment or visit within the BSN framework could be presented as an “emergency,” meaning that an hour’s notice will make no sense. Second, Kyiv previously insisted that the BSN advise on the armaments, munitions, and explosives being imported and exported using BSN sea- and aircraft. This has been canceled, as was Kyiv’s previous intention to bar access to warships and planes whose commanders refuse to allow Ukrainian inspections. After such significant corrections one thing is clear: even if Kyiv has actually resumed oversight over the Black Sea Navy it is considerably less a headache for Russia.
HARD AND HAZARDOUS FRIENDSHIP
Naturally, these discrepancies do not exhaust the list of differences between Moscow and Kyiv, relating to the prospects of Russian naval deployment in the Crimea. Both countries are expected to sign several dozen additional documents relating to the navy. Russia has prepared 15 such documents. Among other things, the Russian side needs special customs duty concessions for naval cargo carriage and the opening of a special Russian UAH bank account with the National Bank of Ukraine to finance Russia’s military units. Kyiv, of course, cannot remain indifferent seeing BSN units take part in hostilities outside Ukraine, as was the case with the Russian marines dispatched from the Crimea to Chechnya. Formally, the current Black Sea accords on the Russian military presence in the Crimea do not require Moscow to notify Kyiv in the event Ukraine- based Russian units are engaged. Previously, Ukraine preferred the notice option, but Kyiv did not succeed in legalizing it last year. Now is a good time to broach the subject again, as BSN involvement in the Chechnya War has cast a shadow of doubt on the neighborliness of Ukrainian-Russian relations. The Grand Treaty between the two countries stipulates that, in the event of a crisis affecting the national security of either of the party, appropriate consultations must be held. No such consultations have taken place on BSN units being sent to fight in Chechnya. Moscow preferred to keep its plans to itself, although such an approach has threatened Ukraine’s national interest in a way.
Will these rather acute issues affect the relationships between the Ukrainian and Russian brass? Could the planned joint Ukrainian-Russian Black Sea naval exercise be canceled? Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk assured optimistically the other day, “The Ukrainian naval command has not and does not intend to cancel any joint Black Sea naval exercises. Several such exercises are scheduled for the year 2000, including joint war games to perfect our missile and artillery fire techniques. In other words, any cancellation of exercises is out of the question.” The Ukrainian military is rapidly learning to be diplomatic. Yet this is a khaki diplomacy tactic. What about strategy?
Russia deploys its largest foreign contingent in Ukraine: 16,000 BSN men and officers in the Crimea with a conventional arsenal and warships at anchor in Sevastopol bays. De jure it is Ukraine’s strategic partner’s naval force. De facto such close proximity of two military forces belonging to different countries results in an undeclared struggle, the Russian side struggling to make maximum use of the Crimea and Sevastopol, as though both were an unsinkable aircraft carrier, and the Ukrainian side trying hard to limit Russian military influence on the peninsula.
Ukraine, however, is not in a position to offer any more or less effective resistance to Moscow’s pressure in the BSN domain, because it is still heavily dependent on Russia because of its energy debts and the absence of alternative sources of energy. Hence Kyiv’s behavior can rely on two principles: first, attempt to avoid entering into the clauses that are somehow or other geared to enhance the BSN position in the Crimea, and secondly, put forth initiatives capable of raising bilateral problems to the multilateral level. Among other things, experts believe this could include proposals to impose fixed naval deployment quotas (especially in terms of submarines and landing vessels) on all Black Sea coastal states, their obligation not to enhance their submarine arsenals, and unilaterally undertaking not to transfer any naval forces to the Black Sea. Another interesting idea is to proclaim the Black Sea a nuclear-free zone. This would imply restricted access and deployment of warships capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Of course, Kyiv would then be in a position to place an additional obstacle to Russia’s attempts to arm its BSN ships with tactical nuclear weapons.
Be it as it may, such initiatives can be implemented only if other countries want to hear them from Kyiv. Practice shows, however, that Ukraine’s previous proposals (e.g., demilitarization of the Black or Sevastopol) have passed unnoticed by its partners. Thus, when the Ukrainian- Russian SU-24m debate was in progress, Kyiv would have benefited considerably if Turkey showed any interest, because the SU-24 would inevitably reconnoiter its part of the seacoast, and do so much more effectively than its predecessor, the SU- 17. Ankara remained silent. In other words, the two strategic partners will wage their naval struggle one on one.
