Ukraine doesn’t intend to renew the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s (RBSF) presence on its territory, say representatives of the Ukrainian government at different levels. No official statements on the subject have been made in Moscow. However, even off-the-record commentaries by MPs and former representatives of the Russian naval command are evidence that the new declarations of the Ukrainian government are being painfully received.
So far nothing has been said about the Russian Fleet’s early withdrawal. President Yushchenko said earlier that the “great agreement” of 1997 concerning the fleet’s deployment in Ukraine is still in effect: “We recognize its validity until 2017.” Not so long ago, however, the Ukrainian leadership once again demonstrated its resolve concerning the naval issue. Dmytro Svystkov, deputy head of the foreign ministry’s press service, declared that Ukraine is allowing for the possibility of an early withdrawal of the RBSF from the Crimea, but on the Russian side’s initiative. At the same time “the RBSF’s base in the Crimea after 2017 is out of the question.”
Another conflict is taking shape in Russian-Ukrainian relations, in addition to a number of other painful issues between Kyiv and Moscow, but the fleet question tops the list. What makes it so topical? Almost 8 years ago Ukraine and Russia signed documents regulating the status of the Russian naval base in the Crimea, yet the situation has never been as strained as it is now. Indeed, there have been unpleasant occurrences, for example when Russian commandos held exercises in unauthorized localities. In the “good old days” the Ukrainian side would be content with forwarding a carefully worded note. Today, Ukrainian diplomats have made it clear that the problems of the RBSF must be solved now, and they emphasize that there will be no Russian military presence in Ukraine after 2017. Without a doubt, this situation would have come about sooner or later, if only because of the change in the Ukrainian government, which so far has made unequivocal statements concerning problems in its relations with Russia (just as it has openly stated that it is determined to solve them). Even though the previous government placed problem issues on the agenda, they were mostly kept away from the public eye or simply shelved. Indeed, problems relating to the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea were raised now and then, but no concrete decisions were ever made. The catalyst to the escalation of today’s debate was an incident on the eastern Crimean coast. On March 23 the landing ship Nikolai Filchenkov landed Russian commandos and matОriel on a Ukrainian training ground near Cape Opuk. The Russians had no right to stage such exercises in the Crimea.
So what are the problems? Press service deputy head Dmytro Svystkov listed them officially. First, the Russian Black Sea Fleet acts contrary to Crimean environmental laws. Second, “The Russian side’s adamant refusal to return to the Ukrainian side the navigation and hydrographic facilities on the Crimean coast is cause for special concern.”
Another problem is the inaccessibility of RBSF ground facilities. Ukrainian officials were barred access last week and RBSF Commander Vice Admiral Aleksandr Tatarinov explained that he had his orders from Moscow. First Deputy Foreign Minister Oleksandr Ohryzko says Ukrainian diplomats encountered a similar problem in 1997, in other words, since the signing of the naval accords.
So what is to be done? Ukraine, of course, refuses to denounce the signed agreements, as neither side would benefit from mounting tensions. Then what? There are several options. Option 1. President Yushchenko sees a solution in drawing up an additional agreement. According to the Ukrainian leader, the RBSF’s status is regulated by five documents that “do not reflect the entire situation.” However, it’s no secret that the Russians are ignoring the existing documents. Who can guarantee that they will comply with the new ones? Option 2 is to try solve these problems by using existing documents. Some experts believe that the current legal framework of the RBSF’s presence in the Crimea is perfectly capable of resolving a number of issues, provided of course that the Russian military honors these obligations in good faith. Option 3 is the least likely: the Russians volunteer to withdraw from Sevastopol.
Solving the naval problem is necessary not only because of regular violations of the bilateral accords. There are several other reasons, the most important being that all sovereign countries try to rid themselves of a foreign military presence (except when foreign troops are an auxiliary security factor). For Russia, its presence in a former Soviet republic is above all a tool of influence on the domestic situation (or, at least, proof that such influence is possible). So the Russians are reacting very painfully to Kyiv’s stand — until 2017 and not a day later. Thus, some believe that the current increase in oil prices by Russian companies in Ukraine is caused precisely by such declarations from Kyiv. This may be an absurd theory, but there is little doubt that the Russians will try to link the naval issue to solving other bilateral problems.
The RBSF problems are a real test of strength for the new government and its negotiating ability. Will the new Ukrainian leadership join Russia at the negotiating table? Will it be possible to avoid damaging relations with Russia? However, the current situation is an equally important test for Moscow. Now is the time to verify the equality of the partnership between our two countries, and not just on paper.
BLITZ INTERVIEW
Below, Ukraine’s first defense minister (1991-1993) Kostiantyn MOROZOV comments on the possibility of solving problems related to the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine.
What are the options for solving the problems relating to the RBSF? Should new documents be signed?
MOROZOV: There is no need to sign or work out new documents. The main bilateral clauses addressing this issue are set forth in existing intergovernmental documents. The trouble is that they are being violated precisely because the Black Sea Fleet is closed to Ukrainian monitoring and inspection. Remember the situation with an interministerial team of inspectors led by the first deputy foreign minister, when they were denied access to the naval territory. This state of affairs must be corrected. Such problems must be solved by politicians, not the military. The old Soviet practice of the military dictating conditions and civilian politicians obeying them must be discarded. Politicians ought to work out transparent and open procedures. The naval command must be reminded that they are on foreign territory, that they are foreigners and must abide by the national legislation, including monitoring of the implementation of previous agreements.
When should Ukraine start negotiating the RBSF’s withdrawal?
MOROZOV: Considering that in 2017 Russia may declare that it needs five or seven more years — even three — to make all the arrangements, we must rely on our experience in dealing with similar matters and start working out pertinent proposals today. My personal stand is that Ukraine should begin these negotiations now.
And if Russia refuses to negotiate the issue, will there be any way to counteract? Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said Russia has no intentions of leaving Sevastopol.
MOROZOV: That’s not the defense minister’s prerogative. He doesn’t shape policies in any country. It’s not worth discussing statements made by individuals who fail to understand their role in the context of the political process. This process may envisage a degree of protraction, putting off solutions to certain problems. A way to counteract this would be to prepare future decisions in advance. In advance means now; it’s crucial to assess and prognosticate the 2017 situation and start preparing now to solve this problem for the benefit of Ukraine.
The Ukrainian leadership previously declared that the RBSF’s stationing in Ukraine doesn’t contradict our integration into NATO. What do you think?
MOROZOV: I believed then and I still believe that such declarations are unfounded, because their arguments have always boiled down to our not knowing about any NATO document that objects to it. But we aren’t a NATO member and we can’t know all their documents. Of course, we won’t hear any rebukes or demands within the framework of the political process and diplomatic relations. The alliance proceeds from the assumption that such issues are to be resolved in the course of bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia. These relations are sufficiently advanced, so we can find approaches to these problems. Yet my personal stand doesn’t tally with what you’ve just said. I believe that the RBSF’s presence in Ukraine is incompatible with our intention to integrate into the alliance in the nearest future. These two processes can take place simultaneously, and preparations for the situation after 2017 should be aimed at implementing this Ukrainian interest, from the standpoint of Ukraine’s attempts to join NATO.
How can the current situation with the Russian Black Sea Fleet affect relations with Russia in general?
MOROZOV: Ukraine’s position is just. It is based on existing documents and commitment to international law. In order to avoid any kind of escalation of tensions in our relations, now is the time to initiate a process that would be aimed at resolving the problem in a positive way for Ukraine.
