There is less than a mont h to the elections, when Ukrainians will assess politicians and their policies. Obviously, we cannot expect any purification or renewal, let alone improvement, in the quality of political life after Sept. 30. We will see the same faces in parliament, and one can hardly expect these people to have learned any lessons from the recent political crisis. Without a change of players there is hardly any reason for discussing changes to the rules of the game or the players’ conduct on the parliamentary field. Therefore, there are likely to be blatant violations of the rules of this game; there will be foul plays, scandals, and of course, new crises. Well, we are used to all this, aren’t we?
All this will come to pass after the September elections, when the political “cooks” set about preparing a new coalition porridge using old ingredients. However, Vadym Karasiov, director of the Institute of Global Strategies, is predicting that at least one new player will emerge in the limelight of the sixth Ukrainian parliament. He says that the golden share of the fifth parliament’s Speaker may well pass into the hands of the Speaker of the fourth parliament. In other words, Volodymyr Lytvyn may receive the package of parliamentary mandates that will determine the coloring of the ruling coalition in the next parliament.
Karasiov notes that Lytvyn’s party is heading to the elections in the form of a satellite of the Party of Regions. Therefore, the Orange political forces will no longer be able to claim that someone betrayed somebody else, which resulted in a reshuffling of the electi on results. “Then what?” we asked Vadym KARASIOV.
Karasiov: Do you remember a [Soviet] TV program called “16 and Over”? Likewise, the situation can now be described as “until the 30th and afterward.” What’s the most important point? It seems to me that everybody is already thinking about what will happen after Sept. 30, rather than before that date. As for the elections, the situation is perfectly clear. The campaign will, of course, gain momentum in September, it will become more dynamic, dramatic; there will be more scandals. The campaign machines of all the parties are going full blast, so it’s time to figure out who and what will appear after Sept. 30.
That’s my next question.
Karasiov: The first question is who will make it into parliament. Five parties, most likely, but Lytvyn will replace Moroz. And this will substantially alter the pattern of the game.
You mean the coalition game?
That’s right. Actually, there’s already talk of a broad coalition in the Party of the Regions+Our Ukraine+People’s Self-Defense format, and an Orange coalition (BYuT+ OU+PSD). In this case, everything will depend on the mathematical majority and who will obtain it. However, if Lytvyn comes in, this will change the situation dramatically. Lytvyn is most likely part of the Party of Regions’ satellite project.
What makes you think so?
Karasiov: First of all, Khmelnytsky is on the PR slate, and he is financing Lytvyn. Second, Lytvyn is closer to the multivectoral Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy — in other words, to the Party of Regions — than to the Orange pro-Western vector. So what’s the main Lytvyn intrigue? The intrigue boils down to this: if he makes it to parliament, then he, the CPU, and the PR would have a majority, and this would make the situation serious indeed.
It would be serious because the whole game of making the fifth parliament illegitimate, dissolving it, and appointing early elections was centered on Moroz’s having treacherously left the Orange and joined the Blue side. In other words, after the 2006 elections the Orange forces got more votes and it was only Moroz’s treachery that twisted the people’s choice. Now if Lytvyn becomes Speaker — he is neither Orange, nor Blue.
There is no sense in accusing him of any treacherous acts. His would be not an accidental victory, as it was possible to say in 2006. This would confirm the assignment of leading Ukrainian political roles. In a word, if Lytvyn makes it to parliament, the intrigue will become even more intriguing. I might as well point out that this would play into the Regionals’ hands, since joining a coalition with the communists would be rather scary. The communists hardly make a predictable partner; they tend to pull off all kinds of stunts.
Could you be more specific?
Karasiov: Demanding the Speaker’s seat or an openly pro-Russia choice, or getting the Regionals involved in openly anti-Western rhetoric, you name it. In a word, the communists would try to play solo, provoking the Regionals to take a harsher, and more radical, more antipresidential stand. Proceeding from the results of the elections and the trajectory of building a coalition, the political forces will respond to the election results: to their procedure, transparency, legitimacy, and purity. Of course, courts of law will be put to the best use. I believe that the vote counting will take a long time. In addition, no one knows how the Central Election Committee will behave in such an indefinite situation, whether or not it will split up. In other words, under the circumstances we can count on a new post-election round of political crisis. Given these circumstances, I would describe the cabinet’s status as quasilegitimate: the Verkhovna Rada is no longer legitimate; the new parliament has yet to convene. It follows that the courts, the president, and the leading political parties become the main players, who will determine all the scenarios in terms of crisis as well as compromise.
Your forecast sounds anything but optimistic. What would be a crisis scenario?
Karasiov: Invalidation of the elections.
Then the logical question is: when, in your learned opinion, will the sixth parliament convene?
Karasiov: The Constitution of Ukraine provides for 30 days. A coalition must be formed during this period. Let me tell you something, though: something extraordinary is bound to happen when we’ll be celebrating the third anniversary of the Maidan.
The situation would be more or less understandable if the Orange forces formed that majority. Suppose the coalition is Blue: what kind of scenario can we expect?
Karasiov: If Lytvyn’s connection with the Regionals is strengthened, the combination will be as follows: Prime Minister Yanukovych, First Deputy Prime Minister Yatseniuk, and Speaker Lytvyn. However, it’s not an established fact that the president will nominate Yanukovych. He may stall while he looks around for more suitable options. Yulia Tymoshenko’s bloc will, of course, most actively be involved, pushing the president toward the anti-Blue scenario. Here many risks will be involved, too. Everything will depend on the Party of Regions. The Regionals won’t be likely to accept anyone but Yanukovych as prime minister. If the president takes his time submitting his candidature, then a small-scale war is likely to break out. The communists will demand impeachment, in which case their stand won’t be their own idea but perhaps one in collaboration with the Party of Regions. The Orange political forces will find it very hard to refer the case to the West, especially since the political wind has started blowing from the East. The West is tired of Ukraine and its position appears to be ambiguous. In contrast, Putin’s Russia seems to be in the lead and in good shape. In fact, authoritarian states — China, Russia, Central Asia, and Brazil — appear to be on an upswing. These countries increasingly often denounce the Western vector of the world order.
Then we probably need an iron hand, a Ukrainian Putin?
Karasiov: Here the situation is clear. The only question is: whose hand? A female one clad in a designer glove, Yushchenko’s gesticulating hand, or Yanukovych’s fist?
Could you clarify?
Karasiov: I believe that it would be best for Ukraine to do without any such hands. Ukraine needs clear-cut rules of the game, and goals can be scored with one’s feet, like in soccer. If a single “hand” — female or male — or a fist gets the upper hand, this will spell disaster for Ukraine. Therefore, the optimal solution would be to discard all those “hands” and play by the rules. By the way, these rules are laid down in the Constitution.
The recent crisis was graphic proof of how these rules of the game are observed.
Karasiov: You know the 2006 model isn’t bad. If one abstracts oneself from specific political figures, this is the most optimal system that can exist in Ukraine at this stage. There is the prime minister and the president. Everything’s balanced. However, the problem is that Yushchenko and Yanukovych are the finalists of the previous presidential race and they personify two regional Ukraines.
And the world press is carrying headlines asking where Ukraine is headed in its 16th year of independence.
Karasiov: Right. With a fist it can be made to wage a multivectoral policy — multivectoral not a la Kuchma but an asymmetrical one that is closer to Russia, although there will be curtsies made toward the West. This is Yanukovych’s road map. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko may guide Ukraine in the direction of the West. There is another option: drifting for five or six years. Perhaps this drift is necessary for the political players and the electorate to mature in order to produce new politicians or make a new choice. There are no good options. All of them are bad, very bad.
It would be strange to hear that there is something positive in our country.
Karasiov: You see, a country can be broken, seized with a fist, ruled with an iron hand, and made to start moving in a certain direction immediately. Then we will try to figure out where that direction has brought us. Maybe drifting is better, having the time to “mature” and finally understand: What Ukraine is all about? Why does it exist? What is its place in Europe?
Why is it that there is no unity even in the tactical steps of our foreign policy? Take the recent scandal connected to Yanukovych’s trip to Moscow.
Karasiov: In fact, our foreign policy is the key factor of disunity. In political science there is such a thing as a foreign political state. This is a state that emerges as a result of geopolitical circumstances and which is split among various centers of influence. The whole structure of Ukrainian politics is determined by geopolitics. Here leftists are not leftists; rightists are not rightists. We are divided into east and west. We have the right and left wing in the east, and the right and left wing in the west.
In France, for example, the president and the prime minister are often at odds, trying to divide foreign policy between the two of them. But there is a single course there, and they cannot determine the instruments. In our country there are two courses. Our president is Westerncentric-minded and our prime minister is asymmetrically multivectoral. Kuchma tried to balance equally between the West and Russia. Yanukovych is gravitating to the East. By the way, I suggest that you take a closer look at the text of his speech to the diplomatic corps. It contains a whole program aimed at the very least at directing foreign economic policy toward the eastern markets.
Part of Ukrainian society is made up of people with absolutely democratic convictions. In addition, these people have not forgotten that they are Ukrainians. This means that they are carriers of national democratic convictions. They are aiming at higher European standards; which means that they are Europeans and partially Atlantists. Who will represent this sector in the next Verkhovna Rada?
Karasiov: Judging by Western academic publications, it will be the BYuT and part of Our Ukraine. Actually, our Atlantists should probably be divided into moderate and more straightforward ones. In this sense, Our Ukraine espouses a more pragmatic Atlantism trend, whereas Yulia Tymoshenko’s bloc is largely conceptual, judging by her article “Containing Russia.”
Why does the current agitational campaign look more like a social flea market?
Karasiov: I would describe it somewhat differently. It’s a children’s disease caused by infantile socialism in Ukrainian politics. In this case, politicians are loath to broach topics that are resonant and divisive. In a word, they encode themselves; they don’t want to reveal their foreign policy.
So, as a result of this encoding, as you put it, the thinking voter doesn’t know whom to vote for.
Karasiov: In fact, this is not a problem of these political forces but the lack of new ones. Everything is crystal clear with those ones. It’s just that they have decided to put these issues aside for the time being and compete in a different field.
While they’re competing, 40 percent of Ukrainians say they want to go abroad; over 50 percent complain that they have no way of controlling the government. Perhaps it’s time all these contenders were shown the red card?
Karasiov: In any case, you can’t have a lot of Maidans. For a Maidan to take place, you absolutely need a promoter, producer, and director. People’s activism is a protoscenic situation. In order for it to become a full-fledged action, you need external dramaturgy, which is ensured by political forces. You can come out against everyone only by voting.
As for figures, they call for a very careful approach, you know, because there will always be people who say they don’t have enough control over the government, especially now that people believe that democracy means well-being for all and almost direct contacts between the government and the people. Ask Americans, whose attitude to democracy is more sober and pragmatic. Democracy comes when you can live the way you choose and no rules of the game are violated. In Ukraine, this problem should be approached by keeping in mind that people believe they should live in a self-governing commune. Remember the Soviet slogan about the party and the people being a single whole?
Forty percent want to leave Ukraine? That’s bad on the one hand and good on the other. This is proof that we live in a global world. They want to leave? Let them.
What do you mean “let them”? Then all the normal people will leave and we’ll spend another 100 years trying to figure out where Ukraine is heading, if at all!
Karasiov: Don’t worry, not everyone will go. Let them leave and see how much their brains are needed in the West. The Soviet government made a mistake when it refused to let anyone leave. If people had left and lived abroad for a while, they would have appreciated the social package offered by the Soviet government. They will return to Ukraine anyway. After all, for a person who was born and raised in this country, there is none better.
