NEW FOREIGN MINISTER MAY SAVE UKRAINE’S FACE
By Viktor Zamiatin, international observer of The Day
Replacement of the Foreign Minister is an event of great
importance for any given country and its neighbors. In the
case with Ukraine, its importance affects the foreign
political domain, of course.
And so Hennady Udovenko, a “man of consensus” as he once
described himself, was replaced by Borys Tarasiuk. Curiously,
the latter’s profile is not as detailed as it might seem.
The official story is that Mr. Udovenko made up his mind, to
become a professional parliamentarian, and that with Mr.
Tarasiuk taking over Ukraine’s foreign policy will retain
its tradition of continuity, at least such statements were
made by President Kuchma, Premier Pustovoitenko, NSDC
Chairman Horbulin, and, of course, Messrs. Udovenko and
Tarasiuk.
This, however, does not answer the question what is actually
to be retained. The much advertised “multivector” foreign
political course proved to be very much like a man driving
under the influence, with the car swerving, skidding, in this
case every such jerky movement caused by whomever the
President spoke with last. In other words, here everything is
determined by whose interests are uppermost in the Chief
Executive’s mind at a given time.
It came to the point that Ukraine’s many “strategic
partners,” both the Big Brother up north and those across
the seas, demanded that Kyiv explain exactly where all those
“vectors” were pointed. Indeed, how can a country be
considered an influential European power while unable (and
unwilling) to control its own sea frontiers or pretend to act
as an equal partner and yielding to the slightest pressure
from those same strategic partners?
Apparently, the current political leadership has finally
realized the implications. Mr. Tarasiuk seems to have
developed a clear picture of Ukraine’s interests (much was
said and written about protecting them when he was Deputy and
then First Deputy Foreign Minister, so the time would seem
ripe for actually doing something in this area). The problem
is, whether Mr. Tarasiuk will be able to put together a team
professional, mobile, and patriotic enough to resist daily
pressure from all the gray cardinals of Ukrainian politics.
And so what is actually meant is not maintaining
“continuity” but an attempt to save the foreign political
domain, something the Kuchma team was so proud of, from
complete collapse.
Foreign Minister Tarasiuk seems in no hurry to make public
his rescue plan (although he has said enough to indicate that
there is such a plan). Probably the extent to which this plan
can be put into effect will finally shape the Ukrainian
visage in the eyes of the international community and will
make Europe believe that Kyiv really sees its strategic goal
in joining Ukraine to the European structures, working to
this end by following a consistent (instead of
“multi-vectored”) and predictable political course.
Or will Kyiv continue to make the best of an increasingly
worse game, while capital flees the country, the train of
Europe passes by at full speed, and Kyiv obediently by turns
carries out whatever orders come from Moscow and Washington?
