The scenario of accelerated European integration, whereby Ukraine would drift away from Moscow and follow in the footsteps of Poland or the Baltic nations, is not adequate for the country’s size, potential, or ambitions of the domestic business community.
The first months under the new leadership have seen the emergence of a new Ukraine in the foreign policy arena, with diplomats working hard to secure a new international status for Ukraine and broaden the field of the new government’s international legitimacy. After some 100 days Ukraine’s foreign policy dynamics have noticeably slowed down. The time of foreign policy breakthroughs is over. Having formed the general outline of the new Ukraine, strategic diplomacy is giving way to fine-tuned diplomacy that is working within the new foreign policy framework.
The new diplomacy has focused the bulk of its resources on progress in the Western direction, where we can highlight several points of significance. Whereas in the Ukrainian-American dialogue Viktor Yushchenko’s visit to the US marked this kind of high point, the dynamics of Ukraine’s relationship with Europe have seen several areas that command special attention. The European Parliament’s resolution to offer Ukraine prospects of EU membership was the result of revolutionary diplomacy in the early weeks and Europe’s rejuvenating enthusiasm, which was sparked by the results of the Ukrainian revolution. Meanwhile, the adoption of the Neighborhood Action Plan and statements from top EU officials to the effect that it would be inadvisable for Ukraine to apply for EU membership marked the beginning of a downward slide. Kyiv’s official position (specifically the decision to strike the question of applying for EU membership off the agenda) suggests that EU membership is slipping down the list of the new leadership’s post-election priorities.
Europe, with its values and all that it stands for, was the underlying theme of the Ukrainian revolution and determined the new Ukrainian identity within the framework of European values. However, the experience of the new diplomacy suggests that the European trend will continue for a long while to play its civilizing role, mostly in Ukraine’s domestic political development. In the near future the question of Ukraine’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions will be largely viewed in terms of how damaging or advantageous it is for Russia. For obvious reasons Kyiv has been unable either to break or change this trend. This is playing a decisive role in the slowing dynamics of Ukraine’s European integration, along with Ukraine’s obvious inadequacy to meet European standards on top of last year’s EU expansion.
Making tremendous efforts to reinforce its European hinterland, Moscow has managed to form a pro-Russian club that includes such key players as Germany and France, along with Italy and Spain. That this friendship is largely founded on energy contracts is beyond doubt. On the other hand, the strength of this conservative Russo-European bond is also due to a personal factor, namely the triumvirate of Putin, Chirac, and Schroeder. Another factor at work is the fact that Old Europe is so far interested in using Russia’s geopolitical resource in its counterplay against the US. In the immediate future Europe’s strategy will be characterized by an energy partnership with Russia on the one hand and efforts to minimize the damage from its advances to the “undemocratic Kremlin” on the other.
Today the points on Kyiv’s European scoreboard include a significantly broader circle of supporters, rimmed by Poland and the Baltic nations in the east and the UK in the west. Great Britain represents American interests in Europe. Nonetheless, Ukraine’s positions in Old Europe are incomparably weaker than Russia’s, whereas EU strategy remains essentially unchanged, i.e., simultaneously to embrace and distance Ukraine. While keeping Ukraine at a safe distance is part of Brussels’ pro-Russian game, its policy of connecting with Ukraine is an element of Europe’s no-conflict rivalry with the US and Russia, or more specifically, part of Old Europe’s own continental game.
It is safe to assume that in the near future Ukraine’s relations with the West will be generally determined by Ukraine’s geopolitical and energy transit functionality. While Old Europe has shown interest in the latter, as confirmed by the preferential lending terms promised by Germany for Ukraine’s energy transit sector, the former is important to the US, which is looking to test Kyiv’s geopolitical skills, e.g., efforts to resolve the Transdnistrian crisis, GUUAM issues, etc. All of this will largely determine the extent of the regional authority to be delegated to Ukraine and the level of its own competitiveness in the foreign policy arena.
The scenario of accelerated European integration, whereby Ukraine would drift away from Moscow and follow in the footsteps of Poland or the Baltic nations, is not adequate for the country’s size, potential, or ambitions of the domestic business community. Therefore, it has not been ruled out that in the future we will be seeing an initiative proposed for Ukraine’s special European integration status, which will not be institutionalized within the classical European framework. In the near future, for objective reasons the Old European direction will be the most resource-intensive and long- term. At the same time, this is a path of no-conflict and balanced integration logic of small steps, which can potentially produce the best results.
Within this context, the White House has positioned itself as a most predictable partner, one that is confident about Ukraine’s international status. The Ukrainian president’s visit to Washington has shown that the US is ready to provide lobbying support to Ukraine during its EU and NATO transition period. On the other hand, one can’t help pointing out the mild efforts recently undertaken by the US to slow down Ukraine’s progress toward the EU and NATO. The latest steps by the US administration prove that it is betting on a new strategy toward Ukraine, which is not in conflict with Russia and loyal to it. Under these conditions the key objective for Kyiv should be coming to terms with Russia, i.e., making Ukraine’s EU and NATO integration less objectionable for the Kremlin.
This hiatus in foreign politics should be used to regroup forces conceptually for the transition period. This requires developing mechanisms for the practical implementation of ambitions, and therefore the institutional and diplomatic consolidation of Ukraine’s “tangible diplomatic field” outside the EU. In the nearest future Ukraine will make active efforts to support its claims for regional leadership (strengthening GUUAM), European aspirations (contributions to fuel-transit, humanitarian, and, possibly, security projects within the European-Russian format), and struggle for democracy. The latter conceptually reflects Washington’s post-Iraq logic, but because of Kyiv’s limited resources and the need to maintain the Euro-Atlantic balance it can materialize only within the framework of Ukraine’s traditional contributions to UN peacekeeping efforts.
In analyzing the results of Ukraine’s positioning within the CIS, it is worth noting that in early 2005 a number of former Soviet republics began reexamining their domestic and foreign policies in connection with a new geopolitical factor — Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. This was a period when the politically rejuvenated country of Ukraine had to adapt not only to its independent status in the foreign policy arena, but also to its new status as regional leader in the post- Soviet space.
To understand Ukraine’s current geopolitical positions we have to analyze the diplomatic dynamics of the initial period of transition from declarations of European aspirations to a hands-on foreign policy — this period saw a peak point of development followed by a further leveling off. At the peak of its foreign policy positioning Ukraine managed to achieve a high level of international recognition. Perhaps this very fact should be emphasized as a precedent for Ukraine’s foreign policy breakthrough into the pool of Europe’s legitimate geopolitics. Playing in this pool is much more difficult for Ukraine than for Russia or Poland. While Russia can boost its geopolitical ambitions with its guarantees for Europe and its energy security, Poland is using its status as EU member state in its geopolitical positioning. In this respect Ukraine’s geopolitical positions are radically shrinking. Appeals to its fuel transit status are in many ways still limited by the uncertain prospects and the development-stage nature of many undertakings, such as gas transport consortium initiatives that are still being developed and the state of Ukraine’s transit infrastructure, which does not measure up to standards.
It is worth noting that economics never outweighed politics in the Russo-Ukrainian relationship. If the repetition of this scenario does not give Ukrainian diplomats a sense of deja vu, then at least it should alert them to the rational idea that it is time to turn the Russian factor from an inhibiting one into an expediting one. This means that the indefinite status of “eternal strategic partner” should be filled with specific and effective substance. It should envision a transition from temporary foreign policy and situational geopolitical forms of relations (within the CIS framework, positioning within GUUAM, etc.) to strictly established forms of geopolitical partnerships similar to those practiced within the European Union. Russia is trying to offer this kind of cooperation to Ukraine in the form of the Single Economic Space. However, the SES can’t compete with the EU in many ways. First, the SES is viewed as a project designed to artificially prolong the post-Soviet method of geopolitical interaction. After the collapse of the USSR, this trend may be viewed as risky and undesirable for most of the post-Soviet republics, especially in the context of the European alternative. A case in point is the Baltic nations. Second, the new Ukrainian leadership is not yet ready to welcome Russia’s initiatives because Ukrainian leaders invariably take into account its experience of Moscow’s “liberal-imperial embrace” when deciding on any Russo-Ukrainian integration projects, no matter whether they are exclusively political or economic.
Preliminary conclusions about the new leadership’s accomplishments and miscalculations in terms of its positioning in the post-Soviet space boil down to the following. All three Baltic republics have welcomed Ukraine’s new European integration policy and recognized it as a natural process. After the Orange Revolution Ukraine is on the friendliest possible terms with Georgia, which are manifested both in the personal friendship of the two presidents and the symbolic union of the two revolutions. Ukraine has managed to achieve a desired level of strategic cooperation with European-oriented Moldova despite the unresolved Transdnistrian problem. There are also no disagreements between Ukraine and Azerbaijan over the choice of foreign policy.
The change of Ukraine’s geopolitical status hasn’t resulted in a foreign policy breakthrough in relations with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan is reasonably trying to distance itself from all possibilities of an imported revolution and has thus withdrawn from GUUAM. Armenia sees no point in disbanding the CIS and remains oriented toward Russia. Ukraine has a diplomatically tense relationship with Belarus, which is decisively rejecting Ukrainian criticism.
As we can see, the process of Ukraine’s revolutionary geopolitical positioning is just beginning to unfold. The consequences of being sandwiched between the East and West are quite obvious, and overcoming them will be a priority of the new Ukrainian diplomacy at least in the short run in order to establish the new state. Given such a foreign policy, the capability and readiness to shoulder geopolitical responsibility is a key factor of Ukraine’s competitiveness in the foreign policy arena. Current foreign policy is being transformed into a geopolitical responsibility that is new to Ukraine: a no-conflict and comprehensive resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict; active mediation in resolving the problems of illegitimate states in Transcaucasia; realization of leadership ambitions as part of the GUUAM project; consolidation of a democratic status and special democratic responsibility in the post-Soviet space.
