The Ukrainian People’s Party (UNP) headed by Yurii Kostenko was the first extraparliamentary association to declare its opposition plans a month ago. Early last week the leader of the Party of Reforms and Order (PRP), ex- Finance Minister Viktor Pynzenyk, announced his move to the opposition. Later, the opposition treasure-chest was further enriched when the leader of the People’s Party, ex-Parliamentary Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn made public his own opposition plans.
The Ukrainian opposition also includes Pora, which now and then stages theatricalized political protest actions, and Natalia Vitrenko’s everlasting opposition bloc. Thus, it is safe to assume that we have considerably more people monitoring the government than those discharging its functions. However, all these oppositionists are toothless, since none of these parties hold seats in parliament. Yulia Tymoshenko and her opposition, made up of 125 BYuT-affiliated parliamentarians, remain the number-one opposition trendsetter in Ukraine.
Following the example of the president, who lately has repeatedly stressed the importance of constructive cooperation with the opposition, Prime Minister Yanukovych recently expressed hopes that the opposition will be a helper rather than enemy of the government; that it will not “bark” at it, but will offer constructive criticism. Tymoshenko’s ironic response was, “We are fighters, and we will guide this country out of this planned dependence and total corruption. There are hopes and we will struggle on.”
The BYuT leader’s struggle for a place under this small political sun remains comparatively moderate. Tymoshenko had the flag marking the BYuT seats in parliament removed and asked her comrades in arms to put away their pipes and sirens; she no longer talks about what she pledged to do a month ago (“Our MPs will hand in their credentials, and the president will have to dissolve parliament”). In a word, Tymoshenko, who has found herself in the opposition, is only too well aware that this niche can be very useful: no responsibility and lots of reasons for criticism. However, before launching an offensive, the BYuT leader decided to protect her bloc on the legislative level and submitted a bill entitled “On the Opposition.”
IMMUNITY FOR THE OPPOSITION
Thanks to the BYuT and the Party of Regions (POR), the Verkhovna Rada received two bills entitled “On the Opposition.” The two documents are similar, but whereas the POR calls for protecting the rights of the opposition, the BYuT also proposes to vest it with unprecedented powers. Thus, the “shadow” (i.e., opposition) government must have access to state secrets and receive weekly progress reports from the cabinet.
Tymoshenko’s bloc also proposes to regard all complaints against the opposition from law enforcement agencies as none other than political repressions. Strange as it may seem, Tymoshenko continues to insist from the parliamentary podium on abolishing immunity for MPs.
The “Blue-and-Whites” [i.e., the Party of Regions — Trans.] had their bill ready in May. The document, which at the time had the most direct bearing on the party, was prepared by Raisa Bohatyriova, the current leader of the POR faction. The result is a bill consisting of five parts and nineteen sections.
Tymoshenko spared little ink in penning her version of the opposition “Scriptures” right after setting up an anti-crisis coalition, when her bloc found itself thrown overboard from the government’s Titanic. In other words, she worked out a draft opposition law on her own behalf and to suit her own purposes. It took Tymoshenko 54 articles included in 11 sections to make public her views on the fate of the Ukrainian opposition. The former prime minister also added a list of current normative acts, claiming they must be amended after her bill “On the Opposition” is adopted by the Verkhovna Rada.
Other than scope, both drafts differ little in essence. Bohatyriova and Tymoshenko’s bills propose practically identical rights and obligations for the opposition. Moreover, both authors propose a shadow government as an alternative to the official one. The former is to be made up of representatives of political forces opposing the existing regime. But Bohatyriov and Tymoshenko interpret the shadow government’s powers differently.
The demands of the authors of these two bills are different. Bohatyriova asked for three VR committees for the opposition: budget, freedom of speech, and law enforcement. In the POR faction leader’s opinion, the opposition has a right to claim the first vice- speaker’s seat (currently occupied by the communist Adam Martyniuk).
In addition to these staffing preferences, Yanukovych’s comrades in arms counted on placing opposition members as deputies to the chairmen of the committees controlled by the ruling coalition. They also reserve the right to delegate their people to parliamentary committees, ad hoc commissions, the board of the National Bank, the National Television and Radio Commission, the Constitutional Court, and the Supreme Council of Justice.
Tymoshenko went even further. She proposes adding the Standing Orders Committee, the chairmanship and membership of the Securities and Stock Market State Commission, leading posts in the State Financial Monitoring Committee and the State Commission for the Regulation of Financial Services Markets, and the chairmanship of the Antimonopoly Committee.
Her bloc will have to compete with the Party of Regions for these and other clauses that are supposed to legalize the opposition’s status. Speaker Volodymyr Moroz has repeatedly stated that a task force, including representatives of both of these parties, will be set up to formulate a single bill on the opposition, proceeding from the two documents submitted to parliament.
THE GARGANTUAN APPETITE OF THE “SHADOW PEOPLE”
The idea of a shadow government as an alternative to the official one is taking an interesting course. In Bohatyriova’s bill it has observer status. She believes the shadow government should constantly monitor the activities of its legitimate counterpart, as well as those of officials who represent other executive authorities.
Judging by everything, Tymoshenko is obviously dissatisfied with observer status. In her opposition bill the so-called shadow government is a lever that can be used to pressure the existing cabinet.
The BYuT leader believes that the shadow cabinet must include at least 15 persons. It is to be headed by a parliamentarian representing the faction constituting the opposition minority in the Verkhovna Rada. In addition, the shadow prime minister does not necessarily have to be a member of parliament, just a member of the opposition, a representative of one of the extraparliamentary political associations. In this case, according to Tymoshenko’s concept, this person will be entitled to a minister’s salary.
The cabinet must provide the shadow government with all necessary facilities. In her project Tymoshenko states that the official government must provide premises for sessions of its alternative counterpart, as well as free limousines for shadow ministers. Furthermore, the shadow government must have access to state secrets and the right to veto decisions made by the official Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.
In addition to these preferences, Tymoshenko believes that if alternative ministers suspect a member of the official cabinet of committing offences, the General Prosecutor’s Office must launch a case against the wrongdoer within 10 days. As for any interest shown by law enforcement agencies in any representative of the opposition, Tymoshenko interprets this as nothing more than politically motivated persecution.
In view of the BYuT leader’s ardent desire to revoke parliamentary immunity, it is safe to assume that she has no doubts about the ratification of this clause. Even if this immunity is abolished, Tymoshenko and her 125 party acolytes will be protected against law enforcement encroachments by the Law “On the Opposition.”
It should be noted that the shadow government phenomenon is nothing new in world practice. The idea belongs to Great Britain. Under the British tradition, the losing party in the elections (given a two-party system) forms a government that practically copies the ruling cabinet but does not have its political powers. The shadow government’s main function is to monitor the activities of the official one. If the opposition wins the next elections, the new government is formed from the members of the shadow cabinet. In contrast to Great Britain, where the institution of shadow government is rooted in an age-old political tradition, this is a relatively new phenomenon for Ukraine.
In our country a shadow cabinet has always been a bogeyman for all parties that for one reason or another have been denied direct participation in the formation of the main executive body. In 1998 Tymoshenko created a so- called shadow government. This idea received fresh impetus after the 2004 elections. In March 2005, after losing the presidential campaign, Yanukovych threatened to form a shadow organ known as the “Public Cabinet of Ministers” to monitor Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. At the time, Labor Ukraine’s leader Valerii Konovaliuk came up with the initiative to form the alternative “Labor Cabinet of Ministers.” After her dismissal, Mrs. Tymoshenko started discussing the possibility of a shadow government as an alternative to Yekhanurov’s cabinet.
PROSPECTS FOR THE INTERPARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION
The BYuT leader is predicting an expansion of the interfactional opposition in parliament. A few days ago she confirmed the fact that she is conducting negotiations with parliamentarians of all factions, who are ready to join an interfactional parliamentary union. According to Tymoshenko, these meetings are public in nature, and the BYuT has never kept secret its desire to create a strong opposition that will not allow the new government to abuse its office.
At the same time, Tymoshenko refuses to predict the number of parliamentarians from other factions, who will join this opposition alliance, although she is making truly sensational statements on the subject. On Sept. 13, she announced in the lobby of the Verkhovna Rada that in addition to “dissenters” from Our Ukraine and the Socialist Party,” communists and even “politically aware members of the Party of Regions” can also join this opposition alliance. In order to deprive the ruling coalition of the chance to form a constitutional majority in the VR (300 MPs) required for amending the constitution and overriding the president’s veto on bills, Tymoshenko must win over at least 26 parliamentarians from other factions (the BYuT numbers 125 members).
Meanwhile, political analysts agree that the interfactional opposition alliance proposed by Tymoshenko’s bloc will most likely be a symbolic one; she wants to demonstrate that the BYuT is not the only one in opposition. This bloc is not likely to collect the required number of parliamentarians prepared to join this interfaction opposition.
Our Ukraine’s MP Pavlo Zhebrivsky declared that if the Our Ukraine program is not supported by the anti-crisis coalition, its members will be prepared to collaborate with the coalition: “We might even find working there more comfortable because monitoring is easier than assuming responsibilities. We are prepared to do this. However, we’ll remain in the coalition provided the coalition agreement based on the clauses of the Declaration on National Unity is observed.”
He went on to say that the president’s powers have been somewhat reduced in the new constitutional conditions, so the Our Ukraine faction will assume a great deal of responsibility for the implementation of his program. Our Ukraine cannot let the president carry out his program relying only on his own resources while stepping aside and working in the opposition.
A POCKET-SIZED OPPOSITION
Today two political forces, or rather their leaders Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko, need a party capable of keeping the Blue-and-White and Orange electorates ticking. It would not do for the Party of Regions to criticize the president after just signing a truce with him, but a leftist party alliance could easily earn the POR dividends by using run-of- the-mill anti-Orange phraseology. This role was recently played by Vitrenko’s party, but now the Progressive Socialists have quarreled with the POR, who “betrayed the people by signing the Declaration.”
Before long it became clear who was assigned this role by the current prime minister’s comrades in arms. Valerii Konovaliuk, until recently a member of the POR and now the leader of the outsider party Labor Ukraine, declared not so long ago that he would support Yanukovych’s government outside parliament, that this government is here to stay, and that he would oppose the Orange opposition: the BYuT and possibly Our Ukraine. The Party of Regions may also assign the communists the role of a pseudo-opposition in parliament. CPU leader Petro Symonenko obtained the right to deliver opposition speeches on the date of the Declaration’s ratification, when he refused to sign six clauses of this document — the six most controversial clauses for the sake of which this document was drawn up. Therefore, Symonenko’s brothers in arms, while being members of the coalition, may well activate anti-NATO slogans.
All things considered, the head of state is also very interested in creating an opposition party as an alternative to Our Ukraine, which has exhausted itself. Different kinds of information are trickling down concerning the new Orange party. Some sources insist that the new project will be headed by Interior Minister Yurii Lutsenko; others say it will be Mykola Katerynchuk, leader of the so-called patriotic section of Our Ukraine. Lutsenko adamantly denies his involvement in any political projects, while Katerynchuk has often been heard confirming these rumors and even naming people linked to the new Orange project.
If Our Ukraine-2 comes to pass, it is not difficult to predict that its people will oppose the Yanukovych cabinet. They will have plenty of reasons for criticism, ranging from the “unlawful” price jumps on gas, gasoline, or bread to Blue-and-White violations of norms set forth in the Declaration.
WHAT IS THE SITUATION ELSEWHERE?
In European countries the rights of a parliamentary minority are guaranteed by law, namely: the opposition’s representation in the legislative body; control over the activities of the parliamentary majority and government; the right to present the opposition’s stand in parliament.
The oldest one is the British “Westminster” model, also accepted in Ireland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. According to this model, the opposition plays the role of a so-called functional triad: control, criticism, and alternative. In the UK the opposition party that wins the most votes and is potentially capable of forming a cabinet has the status of Her Majesty’s Opposition, and its leader is formally approved by the queen. This opposition party forms a shadow cabinet. All this takes place in the absence of any special laws, simply because it is traditional.
The German constitution or the standing orders of the Bundestag also do not contain any clauses relating to the concepts of parliamentary majority or opposition. However, a minority constituting of less than one-third of all members of parliament is entitled to demand an extraordinary session of the Bundestag; one-quarter of the parliament can demand the creation of commissions of inquiry; and one-tenth of all MPs can demand a closed session of the Bundestag.
Poland has a number of legal norms and mechanisms designed to guarantee the rights of the opposition, for example, the Seniors’ Convention of the Polish Sejm, comprising the leaders of all factions (similar to the Ukrainian Coordinating Council). The Polish convention is called to order at the request of any member, particularly an opposition one.
In France, parliamentary minority rights are set forth in the constitution, and there is a tradition of holding regular meetings between the president and the opposition. In Norway and Lithuania, opposition rights are set forth in the standing orders of their parliaments.
There is no concept of “party/faction rights” in US legislation; instead it has the “rights of congressman”. The president cannot have guaranteed support in the Senate or Congress; he can be elected as a member of a minority party and thus find himself in opposition to their “parliament.” Also, there is a rule in the US whereby every congressional committee must include people who represent the majority as well as the minority, along with unaffiliated congressmen and members of smaller parties.
A special opposition law exists only in Portugal. Enacted after the 1974 revolution, this law guarantees the opposition’s representation in parliamentary factions, pro rata faction size; the right to take the floor to deliberate the agenda, and the right to take part in debates during every session. There are two other special laws dealing with the legal status of the opposition and guarantees for opposition parties to speak their mind and be heard.
