Before the parliamentary elections two years [March 1998], political parties from the right, center and left began to appear like mushrooms after the rain, and the election ballots looked as big as bed sheets.
When then a surprised journalist cried out: “What are you doing? None of you will get through under the mixed system [Half of the parliamentary deputies were elected by constituencies while the other half by parties that received the most votes in the constituency.]!” The leader of a party that later quietly abandoned the political arena answered: “Guys, this is a new situation for us, we’ve never had this before, let us play a little!” Many of those present at that meeting of party leaders later “had a really rough play.” No sooner had the parliament formed by these new rules assumed a relatively stable shape than the rules of the game might be changing again.
May 25 was the last day when candidates could be registered for the Verkhovna Rada by-elections to be held on June 25. Nine constituencies have become underrepresented lately for various reasons (mainly, because of the latest mass-scale fad for deputies to opt for Cabinet posts). 50 candidates have registered in these constituencies.
There is the infamous 221st constituency in Kyiv that has been without a representative to parliament since the 1998 elections [The Central Election Commission nullified the results of three previous elections because of fraudulent voting]. As of last Thursday [May 25], there were 21 candidates on the Central Election Commission lists, but the Commission was unwilling to disclose the whole list until Friday [the day that this article was published in the Ukrainian and Russian versions of The Day]. Formally, any of the candidates could opt out of the elections before the end of the working day.
The leading candidates and outsiders have long ago been identified. The delicate question is whether the various influential political groupings can wheel and deal to partition the constituencies that are up for grabs.
The traditional Ukrainian election technology pattern of territorial division along the “right-wing nationalist and left-wing communist” lines does not work in this time around. Candidates put themselves foreword wherever they can. The question of the candidates’ ideological identification is more and more slipping to the background. While this division is still partially present in the western part of Ukraine, where the electorate is rigidly anticommunist, liberals dominate the traditionally “red” east. Money, as a symbol of success in a society that has no clear-cut image of an enemy, enchants indeed.
It is logical that in the Pavlohrad constituency in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast, there is no alternative to Serhiy Tyhypko. This constituency seems to be officially reserved for the Ministry of Economy. A genuine challenge to him can only come from the leader of the Independent Coal-Miners Trade Union, Mykhailo Volynets, who is rather highly esteemed by the miners. This champion of the miners’ rights can also draw some advantage from the friendship he has recently developed with the Deputy Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko. In reality, the only hope the Fatherland faction has to enlarge its ranks is with this “bayonet.”
Ms. Tymoshenko herself, although nominated by her Kirovohrad followers, had not yet given official consent by the time these lines were being written. The constituency has frozen waiting for its “Cinderella”. Failing to see one, the electorate will just have to cast their votes for a candidate from the left: either Mykola Sadovy, leader of the local Socialist Party (SPU), or Comrade Kovalsky from the Communist Party (CPU). Also a natural rival for Ms. Tymoshenko is Oleksandr Bilovol, the owner of the Liky Ukrayiny (Medicines of Ukraine) who is supported by the Democratic Union.
Meanwhile, other constituencies already see quite a healthy competition based on the ambitions of the main subjects of the political process. The Democratic Union, under the agreement with its strategic partner, Social Democratic Party of Ukraine — United [SDPU-(U)], in the division for spheres of influence, has “staked out” three constituencies. This is going to be the party’s first real test of strength in elections. That this thing is under the personal control of Oleksandr Volkov means that the Democratic Union attaches a very great importance to this process.
One of the active campaigners, the party leader Oleh Rafalsky, whom I happened to see on a train en route to Zhytomyr, where the party’s main interests are now concentrated, said they regarded this as not only a real chance to enlarge their faction but also as “an opportunity to hype up the party and its leaders in the run-up to the forthcoming political battles.”
“It is difficult to keep the situation in the state under control without regional support,” he added. In reality, the Democratic Union’s only hope for additional representation in parliament is from Zhytomyr, where Ihor Bakay [former head of Naftagaz Ukrayiny] is standing. Representatives of other political forces are either very few here or they are of entirely different orientations.
The Democratic Unionists are also pinning certain hopes on Lviv, where this country’s former media-patron Zynovyi Kulyk has been officially nominated. His main trump card is not only his Galician origins but also support from the 1+1 TV channel, the flagship of Ukrainian television. The enemies have dubbed the planned action as a mass-scale invasion of the Lviv land by TV stars, while the “Unionists” themselves only say modestly this is a presentation of the film East-West which they sponsored and which has already achieved success in the capital.
However, Mr. Kulyk will find it difficult to compete with Taras Chornovil, the nominee of the Rukh-PRP-KUN bloc, and the son of the late Vyacheslav Chornovil, who was “blessed” by the city mayor Vasyl Kuibida. Rukh members even think the main rival to Taras Chornovil will be the more radical nationalist Stepan Khmara, who has launched lately a vigorous election campaign. Rukh leader Hennady Udovenko even called the participation of Chornovil Jr. “a test for the party,” which will show its viability in the 2002 elections.
Among those who will try to win over votes are also Viktor Musiyaka, leader of Forward, Ukraine, and Andriy Parubiy, SNPU [Social-National Party of Ukraine] representative now being hyped up. At the same time, what puts the Rukh militants on their guard is the nomination in the same constituency of two candidates, Sadovy and Khvoinytsky, representing a very popular business newspaper, Halytsky Kontrakty and TV company Mist. Both of them are considered big friends of PRP [Party of Reform and Order]. This is occurring despite the Rukh-PRP-KUN [Udovenko led Rukh, Party of Reform and Order, Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists] bloc agreement to nominate in the regions a joint candidate who polled the most votes in the previous elections.
But the main conflict between the two friendly elements — Rukh and PRP — flared up in Zhytomyr, where Oleh Lahniuk, leader of the local Rukh regional organization, and Volodymyr Deboy, supported by PRP, are running simultaneously. Both are unlikely to win, but while PRP believes the decision to have two parallel candidates was approved by the bloc’s coordination council. Rukh doesn’t agree and thinks this point needs a serious inquiry.
Conditions most favorable for PRP have come about in Zaporizhzhia dominated by their comrade-in-arms, former Avto-ZAZ manager, Oleksandr Sotnykov. To oppose him here, the Democratic Union has nominated Oleksiy Sukhyi, deputy general manager of Motor-Sich, with Anatoly Holubchenko also on the list. This is no laughing matter.
PRP will take a more serious test in the 221st Kyiv constituency. Residents of Kyiv’s Obolon district are well used to dirty election technologies. Since 1998, there have been three elections here, each time nullified because of irregularities. To be more exact, there were results, but they were always nullified by a court decision. This time, the ardent anti-oligarch-crusader Yury Orobets has bumped into Ivan Saliy, from the city administration and PRP nominee. According to Mr. Orobets himself, “the authorities have thus chosen a well-mannered way to get rid of Saliy.” Should he win, he will automatically become a deputy, and should he lose, he will become a suitable butt of criticism. On the other hand, Mr. Saliy, with his rich experience in not only election battles, is unlikely to let up on his opponents. The 221st is again in the focus. 21 candidates are running simultaneously from this constituency. However, almost all of them can hardly be called popular, perhaps except for Eduard Nehrebetsky being hyped up by SDPU-U, which puts emphasis on the criticism of the city authorities. At the same time, it became known that the Democratic Union stakes on Mr. Saliy in the “unlucky constituency,” contrary to the wishes of its Social Democratic partners. However, they are unlikely to pose a serious threat to Mr. Orobets who has made himself a good name in the two years of struggle against oligarch Rabinovych, and he still stands a handsome chance to join the ranks of the “implacable” in the parliamentary association Sobornist (Unity). The presence of the United Social Democrats has also been noticed in some other constituencies, but the SDPU-U parliamentary faction leader Oleksandr Zinchenko decided to stay out of the electoral tactics debates, explaining his refusal to comment by the fact that “now it is far more important for the party to get prepared for the elections than to indulge in extensive analysis of this subject.”
The interests of pressure groups have been less clearly defined in other constituencies. After Mykhailo Pozhyvanov had withdrawn his candidature in Donetsk, the main struggle is most likely to unfold between representatives of the Democratic Union and Trudova Ukraina [Toilers of Ukraine]. Mykhailo Krylov, the idol of striking coal-miners, may throw their cards into confusion.
Vinnytsia watches the fight now underway, no one knows why, between two SDP-U representatives who must be trying to find out which of them is more “passable.”
In Ternopil, the PRP-Rukh bloc is fighting, for some reason, with a representative of the friendly KUN (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists), in Mykolayiv the Mykolayiv Alumina Plant has crossed swords with Siberian Aluminum, and Odesa has its own local traditional skirmishes: Tiukhtiy vs. Kolonchuk, the deputy city mayor.
Although the Left, including KPU and SPU, have also nominated their candidates almost in all constituencies, analysts practically do not take the Leninists into account, for their “favorite” regions have already been filled to capacity by some abler competitors. Oleh Hrachov, chairman of the Kyiv city KPU committee, is sure “the by-elections will not tip the overall balance of forces in the current Verkhovna Rada.” The Communists consider them as a good proving ground to try out their electoral technologies and an opportunity to further hype up the party and its leaders.
Other participants in the campaign give almost the same assessment of the situation. One of the leaders of the Party of Reform and Order, Serhiy Sobolev, says the by-elections are “tests for blocs rather than for individual parties.”
“It is important whether the bloc members will manage to come to terms between each other and nominate joint-ticket candidates,” he thinks, predicting that “wider negotiations will start after June 25, aimed at enlarging the blocs with due account of the next parliamentary elections.” They will have plenty of things to discuss. The current elections have again shown how difficult it is to reach a compromise when talks on merger give way to rearrangement of voting districts. The guys still seem to be playing.
As of today, in spite of a series of contradictions and a large number of parties participating in the race (30% of the total number of candidates were nominated by 64 parties), such alliances as the SDPU-U — Democratic Union — APU, the Rukh — PRP — KUN, and the UNR(Kostenko’s Ukrainian Rukh Party) — Tymoshenko’s Fatherland plus Vasyl Onopenko’s USDP, look relatively stable.
The Labor Party seems to intend to make its choice after June 25, when it will be able to really assess its potential. Solidarity and the Peasants’ Party so far stay clear of the race. The Communists, as usual, rely on their self-sufficiency and plan no alliances. SPU, left without ideological partners, is seeking understanding on the right flank. True, the Kostenko Rukh, exposed as leaning towards Oleksandr Moroz in the presidential elections, has already stated it totally rejects Mr. Moroz’s socialist ideas and even the thought of a likely alliance with him. Therefore, the scarce opposition will have to rally around SPU and Anatoly Matviyenko’s Sobor. The party Forward, Ukraine is destined to keep to this company, too. The blocs are likely to enter the year 2002 in this shape unless the post-election squabbles turn into splits.
The results of a search for compromise between the campaign participants will also be crucial in many respects when a new election law is being drawn up and debated upon after implementation of the referendum results. Large blocs will be interested in the exclusive introduction of the proportional system of elections (at least to the lower house) and the maximum raising of the parliamentary percentage barrier, which will allow them to cut off or swallow the non-competitive rivals in good time. As to the disunited political structures, they will find it much more suitable to work in the isolated regions.
Mass-scale nomination of candidates by some parties simultaneously in all constituencies rather testifies, in this context, to lack of confidence in their own strength. It is thus possible to conduct something like a cheap but rather objective social study of the degree of trust in concrete names, without hoping to get a genuine result. And those who really set out to push a few of their people to parliament prefer to inflict pinpoint strikes on the concrete, time- tested, regions, channeling into them their administrative, financial, and political resources.
It is characteristic that the current campaign is free of the mass application of “dirty technologies,” although the leading political forces have concluded no non-aggression pacts and continue to cast apprehensive glances at their rivals. On the one hand, this can be explained by there being a lot of vacant constituencies in the country this time. The main rivals, for whom it is a matter of principle to get a deputy’s card, have managed to go down their own ways without creating problems for each other, On the other hand, the rest understand it is too early to open their trump cards. It is now the time to maneuver freely, while the time to “kill” will come later...
