The government of Poland collapsed first, followed by the Czech government. Then the Hungarian prime minister resigned. The government of Slovakia lost its majority and is unstable. Within months, if not weeks, of realizing the long-sought goal of European Union membership, a wave of political instability surged through Central Europe.
Why should this historic event cause such political upheaval? Some argue that these countries are inherently unstable. Their political cultures are underdeveloped. They were admitted to the EU only fifteen years after the fall of communism, and not all of them had previous experience with democracy. Unlike EU members admitted during earlier rounds of enlargement, the Central Europeans suffer from widespread corruption, political nepotism, fragile political parties with unclear identities, and weak civil societies.
All of these problems were to some extent hidden due to the external pressure of EU accession, and have now erupted into full view. But there are more obvious causes for Central Europe’s current problems. Above all, every government that successfully led its country into the EU had to adopt — often under pressure and hastily — a range of unpopular steps. Although most citizens in these countries supported EU membership, many thought that their governments paid too high a price.
This was partly because the EU was not as generous toward its newest members as it had been toward new members in the past. Moreover, only fifteen years ago, eight of the ten new members had state-controlled economies, which meant that a period of painful transition toward a market economy was followed by, or overlapped with, sometimes painful reforms necessary for EU membership.
Even before attaining EU membership, all candidate countries’ governments had to start adopting measures aimed at meeting the Maastricht criteria within several years, because the new members had committed themselves in their accession treaties to adopting the euro. The most important measures required cutting budget deficits, often at the cost of lowering public expenditures.
In the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, the task of completing such difficult reforms just before crossing the “finish line” fell to socialist parties, forcing them to betray their socialist identity in the eyes of leftist voters. As a result, their historic mission doomed them. In Poland, the Democratic Left Alliance fell apart shortly before accession, while the Czech Social Democrats came close to a similar split.
Ruling coalitions were at the same time in disadvantageous positions vis-a-vis opposition parties, which attacked the incumbents for failing to negotiate good membership terms, without themselves having to pass the test of negotiating better conditions.
Government parties were also hurt by the nationalistic rhetoric of center-right parties, which repeatedly warned against a betrayal of national interests. The overlap between the end of the accession process and heated discussions about the new European Constitution played into the hands of the opposition. The political right in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic warned against a possible loss of sovereignty should the Constitution be adopted. Such rhetoric resonates powerfully in former Soviet satellites that have only recently regained their sovereignty.
Despite all this pressure, the ruling coalitions in the Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary held together, as the historical mission of attaining EU membership worked like a lid on a pressure cooker. Addressing conflicts among government coalition parties, as well as within individual government parties, was postponed until after official EU entry.
Not surprisingly, accession untied politicians’ hands, and conflicts came to the fore. Polish Prime Minister Lezsek Miller resigned one day after his country’s official admission to the EU. Czech Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla was forced to resign by his own party several weeks later. Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy was pushed out in late August.
Even the center-right Slovak government was not spared. It took it upon itself not only to meet EU membership criteria, but also push forward with other painful reforms. The comfortable role of criticizing the government fell into the hands of leftist populists, for a change. The Slovak government is still in power, but it has lost its majority and could fall soon.
In Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, we will now witness a period of unabashed populism. The ruling coalitions were reconstructed, with new faces at the helm. The main objective of the new prime ministers and cabinet members is to regain popularity for their parties. The ruling coalitions can finally afford, at least temporarily, “the luxury” of populism that opposition parties used as their main weapon in the last few years. Those who hope for further progress on economic reforms in Central Europe will have to wait.
