The turn of the new year 2000 was marked by tempestuous political events in Ukraine. Without going into the political results, I would like to emphasize the main thing: these events planted the seeds of firm beliefs in the minds of Ukrainians, the expectations of rapid positive changes. On what course these events may take in Ukraine and for what reasons I want to dwell below
PRESIDENT AND PEOPLE
The President has changed, becoming a confident head of state. I would even say that in the level of his authority he not only matches Volodymyr Shcherbytsky [First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, 1972-1989 — Ed.] during Soviet times, but even far surpasses him.
In truth, the accent must be placed correctly on questions such as Whom does he wields his power over? What can this power bring to the altar of Ukraine? The answer is obvious. Of course, by and large, this authority is meant to hold our bureaucratic boyars and politicians cum businessmen in check. As for the people, a correct answer is difficult. This authority, however strong, does not produce real levers of control. Actually, there is only one lever: real improvement of living conditions. However, all forecasts indicate that there is little if any hope for such improvement, while there is every indication that the crisis will deepen.
Leonid Kuchma’s election campaign gave rise to a very interesting illusion in the minds of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Many believed that in his second term the President would become like Vaclav Havel, a subtle psychologist and democrat building a civilized political system.
I will risk the assumption that, on the contrary, the President will adhere to the logic of strong authority ignoring what all the parties and Parliament might think, retaining the government’s image as that of a technical unit receiving and complying with the President’s commands.
In this context, the President’s future approach to the political parties and political structuring of society deserves separate note.
The heightened activity of the political parties during the presidential campaign has come to a close. A period of multiparty degradation is beginning; the parties will be allocated a reservation in the form of Verkhovna Rada, which is already off to the side of the political and state-building road.
Hence there is a serious danger to the state and society. History shows that political systems such as the one taking shape in Ukraine are never stable, because they rest on a single person. Once this person becomes unpopular and loses support, the system starts cracking and sinking, along with the government, Parliament, and regional authorities.
PREMIER AND CABINET
When polling to determine the popular attitude to Viktor Yushchenko’s appointment as Premier and his Cabinet, I met with controversial views I had never before experienced in my scholarly career (the study was carried out using focal groups). Classifying the results, we divided the responses into three categories,
The first was basically made up of the intelligentsia and some businessmen. They all agreed on the following:
1. This is the first coalition government, and not by its political coloration but by expressing the interests of the Right wing purporting to enhance the role and importance of the individual in the life of the state and that of every citizen; on the one hand, this government is to expedite the process of “capitalization” as the most important factor of the domestic economic reform, and make this process transparent on the other.
2. This is the first “unaffiliated” government, in that all previous ones were corporate-nomenklatura teams with many Cabinet members acting intermediary lobbyists between Mr. X and a source of enrichment, something unlikely to be practiced by the current Cabinet.
3. This is the first government capable of reflecting and protecting the interests of the middle class as well as small and medium business.
4. This is a government with new finance sources to support economic reform.
The respondents believe that the new Cabinet will get Ukraine out of its crisis. This is obviously a credit of confidence and a big one.
Unfortunately, such views voiced by learned intellectuals and a certain part of the business people are in dramatic contrast with those expressed by veteran administrators and managers at the regional level. They have serious doubts about the Yushchenko team’s actual capabilities, precisely its ability to show enough political will to make the socioeconomic situation change for the better. This is how they explain their doubts. This government is like no man’s land. Viktor Yushchenko took office without having a team of his own. Actually, he had to shape it borrowing figures from various political and economic groups, and this allows the following conclusions:
1. Those now in the Cabinet are mostly theoreticians in the truest sense of the word, with a very vague idea about realities; this means any steps made by this government are bound to meet with either criticism or distrust.
2. The first steps made by the Cabinet show that this team and its captain rely on methods practiced by prosperous European countries, rather than those befitting the ragged Ukrainian economy that needs manual control.
3. Viktor Yushchenko cannot asserted himself as a full-fledged head of the government. To date he is not regarded as an independent figure, not by the government apparatus or Parliament, or existing financial industrial groups.
4. The President’s attitude toward the new government is inwardly ambivalent. On the one hand, he has no desire to allow the Cabinet to become autonomous, so he will try to keep it on a short leash. On the other hand, without letting Yushchenko become a sufficiently independent figure it will be impossible to find positive solutions to existing socioeconomic problems, both current and those to be dealt with in the long run.
5. The situation in the foreign trade sphere is unfavorable; they cannot come to terms with Russia.
Thus we have two polarized views on the Yushchenko Cabinet and its prospects. What are its real prospects?
The people welcomed Yushchenko’s appointment as Premier. Today, his ratings are among the highest in Ukraine, but I will not make any predictions. I will only emphasize what I believe is a very important thing. Viktor Yushchenko’s team has an extremely difficult mission: it is to take decisive steps to consolidate the regime. Something seems to have been done in this direction, but it only seems so, because it is impossible to consolidate a regime dependent on the people’s vote and having to take unpopular steps, while fighting against pressure simultaneously from influential economic groups, the political class, and an angry society.
The point is not what this government of “financiers and economists” is going or not going to do. Their intentions may be quite rational. It would be senseless to argue that budget policy should be responsible, not populist, that taxes should be paid, and that the misdeeds of managers and intermediaries conspiring to do business together should be criminally prosecuted under the law.
However, several dozen high officials united into a politically powerful corporation are too weak to accomplish any of the above, even if every deputy premier or minister were made a leather-clad gun-toting commissar riding around in an armored car with a license to kill on the spot in order to restore law and order. Accomplishing this would take the united efforts of the entire bureaucracy, which is nonexistent as is the absence of corruption in its ranks. Accomplishing this takes much energy and time. And the Cabinet is very pressed for time.
PARLIAMENT AND SPEAKER
No other political force in Ukraine has such low ratings as does Verkhovna Rada. Some 70% of the population is highly critical of its performance. Yet this same society is primarily to blame with its segmentation and countless disagreements. Elections or special elections in the next five to ten years will not change the situation.
Lawmakers representing various factions and political views, when polled about what is the biggest obstacle in their work, mostly responded in the same vein: politicking.
This problem is closely linked with another: Parliament has turned into an ideological battlefield.
The only function Verkhovna Rada discharged faultlessly until the new majority’s velvet revolution was its role as a strong deterrent for the President.
Yet the events in Parliament of January and February show that the situation is becoming increasingly critical. The majority does not have any constructive ideas to rely on, remaining a something temporary and reactive.
Under the circumstances, all the objective and subjective prerequisites are forming for Ukraine’s transfer to a new political model without an alternative. Under this model the executive will take all power, and Parliament will become a comic opera body with even less power than under the Soviets. All it will be allowed to do will be now and then legally seal decisions made by the executive. And the referendum is a sure way to get there.
In the context of recent stormy political developments Ivan Pliushch’s return as Speaker has somehow faded into the background. Nor did the oligarchs, clans, and all the other influential forces attach due importance to the event. So much the worse for them. Unlike the velvet revolution in Parliament, this event has far-reaching political consequences, so much so that a lot of what has already taken place may soon turn in a different direction.
I am not idealizing Mr. Pliushch, but the fact remains that he is the second political figure in Ukraine, after President Kuchma. Just as there is no doubt that he and the Chief Executive will shortly form an active political tandem.
There are several other important aspects. Ivan Pliushch is a patriot and builder of the national state. This is no bravado or trying to prove something. This is his deep and sincere conviction and dedication. Last but not least, he has never taken anything from anyone; he owes no favors.
He and no one else will head Parliament. He will make others listen to him, whether by crafty maneuver, by force, or by a sharp and witty remark.
Whatever political orbits are traced by journalists, Ivan Pliushch’s orbit in terms of state-building and cadre policies will be the closest to that of Leonid Kuchma.
ELITE, GROUPS, AGENTS OF INFLUENCE
One could launch an endless discourse on the Ukrainian political elite, oligarchs, groups, et al. The reality, however, is such that the current central Ukrainian political orbit is manned by about a hundred heavy caliber figures capable of actually exerting serious influence on those in power, politics, and the economy.
Based on these heavy caliber figures, four most powerful groups have taken shape.
Group 1. The “aristocracy” is numerically quite insignificant, atomized, but has the strongest influence in the upper echelons of power. Here all tactics and strategies boils down to two points: (a) be in the President’s sight as often as possible, showing utmost loyalty and (b) show the presidential entourage one’s closeness to the head of state. However, in so doing this said group forgets to pose itself one question: What about the President’s attitude? A long time ago Baltasar Morales Gracian [noted fifteenth century Spanish novelist] wrote in his pocket diary that one should never try to learn the secrets of one’s betters. They pretend to share important information which turns out to be useless garbage. Many of the credulous perished that way, for being credulous is like being the fairy-tale gingerbread man. If someone in power makes you privy to his secrets it is not a privilege but a heavy burden.
Group 2. The “social-climbers” are those willing to give anything to get the post of someone above them and who they think is in contact with the President. This group is numerically the strongest, albeit rather amorphous and divided into subgroups which, nevertheless, may easily transform as combat squads to be used in operations against Group 1. Another most important aspect is that many in Group 2 have close contact with Western businesses and through them with Western politicians and media people.
Group 3. The “ОmigrОs” are composed primarily of businessmen cum politicians who had to leave Ukraine, currently living abroad — and not only in the West, but also in Russia. Although they are all sided with Pavlo Lazarenko, considering him their leader, I believe that there are several other quite influential figures present.
Group 4. The “realists” are off the battlefield and so far concerned only with strengthening their own financial and business bases as well as expanding their political contacts. They look forward to an end to the ongoing hostilities.
They are right. The inter-elite political crisis is sure to flare up again due to two factors: change of generations and mounting hostilities by Groups 2 and 3 vs. Group 1. The Western media is used here as the main strike force, mostly in countries where any publication, especially dealing with corruption, is closely followed by government agencies. And this strike force is already engaged, with compromising information blows being dealt accurately on a planned basis.
EXTERNAL FACTOR
Under the circumstances, Ukraine is hostage to the presidential campaigns in Russia and the United States.
Suppose we start with the latter. The latest US polls show that organized crime, whose rate is mounting due to immigration from the former Soviet states, is among the problems people find especially worrying. It is not without reason that Republican leaders increasingly often voice in their campaign speeches the idea that Bill Clinton with his liberal policy, specifically concerning Russia and Ukraine, has helped this negative process. Obviously, as the election approaches, the theme will be capitalized on. The more so that the number one Ukrainian Mafioso, ex-Premier Pavlo Lazarenko, is in a US jail.
Yet attributing everything to the election campaign where the Republicans are breaking lances with the Democrats, would mean misleading the Ukrainian public. The real the main reason explaining the nature of the scandal making headlines worldwide is top-level corruption in Ukraine. It is a fact that the wool is gradually falling off the eyes of Western liberals. Previously, they regarded Ukraine as an arena with noble knights (reform Democrats) fighting a dragon (the old Communist system). Now they are horrified to realize that the old Communist dragon is long dead, replaced by a young hungry one, growing and putting on weight fast, one that these same liberals have personally fed. The name of this dragon is Ukraine's criminalized and corrupt oligarchic- bureaucratic leadership. Naturally, no one in the West wants to have anything to do with it. Hence the verdict passed by the world media: only decent people can be admitted into a decent society. You want to travel across the world and deal with civilized people? Fine, but first clean up your own act and make your own country civilized.
How will the Clinton Administration, IMF, et al., respond to the restructuring of Ukraine's debts and granting further loans? This is hard to predict, but one thing is certain: their stand will harden.
A no less alarming situation might develop in the Ukrainian- Russian relationship, especially now that the presidential campaign is over. Here two factors ought to be considered.
Factor 1 is the identification of the political elite. Under Boris Yeltsin, in both Ukraine and Russia the elite came from the same incubator: the Party Central Committee and Soviet ministries. Most were Moscow mouthpieces operating in various regions of the former USSR. Even when scattered after its collapse, having become "independent" functionaries at the regional level, their mentality remained basically unchanged, held fast by their Soviet nomenklatura past. After Boris Yeltsin stepped down from the political arena he took with him most of the incubator officials who could always be persuaded to make a deal. They were replaced by a new generation quite weakly adapted to the Ukrainian political elite. In other words, while a change of generations took place in Russia, in Ukraine the process is drawn out, which means coming to terms in a loose-tie atmosphere over shot glasses will be a problem.
Factor 2 is different levels of social reform, rather the level of society becoming capitalistic. Hence the role and importance of the head of state and power structures in resolving the key issues. Russia in its development has approached a level where the President, Premier, and other top officials are no longer capable of exerting absolute influence on all processes. Moreover, they are actually forced to cater to certain strata, the national bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and on the other, they have to fit into the state administration pattern with the aid of political parties and other democratic institutions. Here society is more or less structured and the process is actively underway.
In Ukraine, the situation is somewhat different. Despite a decade of reform, the progress made toward private ownership is small, compared to Russia, with 80% of the tangible assets and finance still in state hands. I could cite dozens of examples showing that quite wealthy people have had to bow and scrape before the President, begging for government posts. Here lie the roots of the President's autocracy and, consequently, Ukraine's further course.
What conclusions could be drawn from everything stated so far? The political relations between Ukraine and Russia, originally based more on top-level personal, emotional, family-like contacts, are drawing to a close. The time is coming for national priorities (mainly those of Russia). Russia's stand toward Ukraine will be strict and inflexible. Parallel to this a serious lobby at Ukraine's upper echelons will start to take shape both at the central and regional levels.
THE PEOPLE
Whatever processes or activities take place at the summit and in the political quarters, the eyes of those in power and politics will remain fixed on the people, their social attitudes, and attitude toward the regime.
Immediately after the presidential elections, the Ukrainian-US Strategic Communications Center carried out polls to determine problems causing the greatest concern in a Ukrainian in the street. Consider these results:
(1) What priority steps would you expect from Leonid Kuchma?
Stop the plummeting living standard: 52%;
secure fair distribution of revenues for the benefit of the rank and file: 51%;
return ordinary people the money they lost during the period of reform: 32%;
secure public law and order: 32%;
continue reform but with more emphasis on social protection: 31%;
put an end to top-level corruption: 28%.
(2) Do you think the transition to capitalist social relationships will have a good or bad effect on Ukraine?
Bad: 52%;
good: 31%;
unsure: 27%.
(3) Which of the problems mentioned have affected you or your relatives and friends over the past two months, upsetting you and causing frustration?
Pay arrears: 71%;
lack of money to supply your basic needs (food, medicines, clothes, etc.): 59%;
inability to find a job: 21%;
lack of money to buy durable goods (furniture, household appliances, repair, etc.): 20%;
bureaucratic arbitrariness: 11%.
(4) How much did you spend in 1999, buying clothes, footwear, etc.?
UAH 50-100: 48%;
UAH 100-300: 12%;
UAH 500-1,000: 18%.
(5) Talking about the situation in Ukraine, which of these factors causes you personal serious concern and frightens you?
Price hikes, worsening poverty: 51%;
threat of mass unemployment: 26%;
economic crisis, stoppage of enterprises: 22;
mass public unrest: 18%;
threat of famine: 12%;
threat of dictatorship and mass purges: 11%.
(6) Do you think that the current reform in Ukraine must continue or stop?
Stop: 36%;
continue: 34%;
not sure: 30%.
What does all this mean? Considerable economic hardships being experienced by most people. Comparing this to the turnout of polls carried out two years ago, the share of the impoverished shows a steady increment. At present, this is the key factor of mounting social tensions and slowing down reform. Nor is it coincidental that measures such as taking away the "new Ukrainians'" wealth, nationalizing the leading industries and large privatized enterprises, and restoring government control over prices are most popular with this category of the populace.
IN LIEU OF EPILOGUE
Summing up the situation in Ukraine in early 2000, certain conclusions are in order, showing that a new political paradigm is taking shape in the state and society. It is based on the following key aspects:
First, cardinal changes have taken place in the public's mentality: rather than demanding immediate improvement of living standards, people should realize that this cannot be accomplished overnight, that they must rely on their own resources in the first place.
Second, Ukraine is on the verge of transition to a different constitutional model, an absolute presidential republic. Thus, one should expect serious amendments to the Constitution.
Third, Ukraine's presence in the Western world is decreasing, as it is mentioned favorably less and less often.
Thus, there are new horizons ahead, new political priorities, and new rules of the game.
Columbus went down into history as the world's greatest explorer. He is probably the best-known historical figure, because he discovered something perfect, the Americas. The land turned out to be teeming with gold. The moral is that it is important to be clever, but even more important to be lucky. After all, Columbus succeeded because he risked steering his ship in an unusual direction, contrary to strong resistance from his entourage. Without such determination he would never have found himself in a situation where so much luck came his way.
And what are we left to do under the circumstances? Just one thing. Set sail with as much resolve and desire to uncover mysteries.
