The address to German legislators delivered by Russian President Vladimir Putin in German has already been dubbed by Western analysts as a synopsis of Russia’s new foreign strategy. Moscow wants to recover its lost superpower status. Russia’s membership in NATO and the EU, unimaginable until recently mainly due to the Kremlin’s stand, is increasingly the talk of the town today, same as the new twist in Russia’s foreign policy. Given the circumstances, many of the existing trite patterns of Ukrainian-Russian relations have been rendered obsolete, to put it mildly. What should Ukraine’s foreign policy toward Russia look like? The answers are available in the comments of pundits.
Dmytro VYDRIN, Director, European Institute of Integration and Development:
Moving in the same direction toward Europe, not moving toward each other, should become Ukraine’s main strategy concerning Russia. It is Europe where Ukrainian and Russian interests should meet, interface, and attain maximum clarity. Since Ukraine’s foreign policy has been wavering among Russia, Europe, and the United States, we are now dramatically lagging behind Russia in our movement toward Europe. Judging by recent developments, Russia does not rule out joining NATO; moreover, I am sure that talks on this issue are going on behind the scenes. There is no doubt the Russians already have drawn up a strategy to join the EU sooner or later. In this respect, Ukraine is trailing far behind, and it is not difficult to foresee the consequences of Russia’s big jump on Ukraine. If Russia joins the EU, Ukraine will turn into a backwater European province, since we will cease to be that infamous buffer between Europe and Russia, losing all the advantages this status gives us.
Mykhailo HONCHAR, Vice President, Strategy-1 Foundation:
As long as Ukraine’s economic dependence on Russia continues, we will not be equal partners with Russia. For this reason the diversification of foreign trade must be high on Ukraine’s agenda. This is impossible without closer political links with the West.
Three aspects should be singled out in the context of September 11 events in the US. As never before, the creation of a full-fledged eastern border is now important for Ukraine. Our state has to erect an effective barrier against illegal immigration rife with criminals and terrorists, especially faced with the likelihood of a large scale conflict in the Middle East or Central Asia from where the main flow of illegal immigrants is coming via Russia to Ukraine. Ukraine has to say loud and clear to Russia and to itself that the safety of its citizens is its highest priority. Hence, border delimitation must be followed by demarcation, regardless of whether Russia agrees or not. We must be fully aware of Russia’s motives, for it is extremely advantageous for the Russians to funnel its illegal immigrants to Ukraine.
Russia’s dynamic rapprochement with NATO is a wake-up call for Ukraine to begin to knock on the alliance’s door. Incidentally, such a step by Kyiv will be an acid test for Russia’s proclaimed treatment of Ukraine as an equal and independent state, free to act however it chooses. This will simultaneously be a test for Moscow’s attitude toward Brussels, showing whether Russia’s new policy toward NATO is based not on momentous considerations but is a truly long-term one devoid of any relapses of Cold War or anti-American sentiments. Amid the waning confrontation between Moscow and NATO, it makes little sense for the Russians to station their troops outside their territory. In this context, Ukraine can and must raise the issue of having Russia’s Black Sea fleet withdrawn from its territory. This, incidentally, will be another acid test for the sincerity of Russia’s policy toward Ukraine and the alliance.
Oleksandr SUSHKO, Director, Center for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy:
Our relations with the Russian Federation must be based on our national interests, just as Russia does with respect to its own foreign policy. Unfortunately, we have not learned to apply traditional (post-Soviet) measures, to specific political situations and that is why stereotypes imported from Russia are more appealing to the Ukrainian public. For example, due to its great foothold in Ukraine’s media market, our northern neighbor has managed to convince Ukrainians that Russia supports integration in Eastern Europe while Ukraine opposes it. In fact, Russia is after two things: first, to implement the interests of its big business and, second, to secure Kyiv’s loyalty on the international scene. As for real integration, the construction of at least a minimal framework for integration in the shape of a free trade area continues to be steadfastly and unfailingly torpedoed by Russia. The latest evidence of such a policy is the imposition of VAT on Ukrainian goods as of July 1, 2001. That is why Ukrainian policy toward Russia should be contingent to a large degree on how consistently Ukraine will protect its own information space and promote this policy through domestic mass media. A telling example is trying to disrupt the demarcation of the Ukrainian border with Russia: the Russians trumpeted this process as building barbed wire fences and rupturing family ties, which is a flagrant misrepresentation of the truth.
Assessing the Ukrainian-Russian relations in the context of foreign policy, my recommendations can be stated very simply: designate goals in each specific situation and move consistently toward them. Sometimes, however, domestic factors can interfere in bilateral relations. We have seen the emergence in Ukraine of mighty forces linked with Russian capital. Although, to go by the official statistics, the share of Russian investment in Ukraine is rather small, there is a significant amount of Russian money circulating in the shadow economy sector. It is difficult at the moment to draw a borderline between the Ukrainian and Russian capital in this country. This is reflected in an increasingly stronger pro-Russian agenda of centrist political parties, whose representatives propose to move to Europe together with Russia. The utter inadequacy of such slogans is obvious.
