On Jan. 1, 2007, Germany will take over the rotating European Union presidency. It will also preside over the G8 summit. Clearly, Berlin’s opinion will be of paramount importance in drawing up the agenda to be tackled by the European community in the next six months.
How can Germany’s presidency influence relations between Brussels and Kyiv, as well as Ukraine’s prospective EU membership? What is Germany’s vision of Ukraine’s foreign policy? Has Berlin mapped out a new Ostpolitik (Eastern policy), and what is Germany’s attitude to Ukraine’s failure to seize the chance to assume a higher level of relations with NATO by joining the Membership Action Plan? What is Germany’s attitude to the concept of neutrality being promoted in Ukraine by some politicians and parties? These and other questions were addressed to Reinhard SCHAEFERS, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic of Germany to Ukraine.
CONSISTENCY AND PREDICTABILITY
“Mr. Ambassador, does Ukraine’s foreign policy remain consistent and far-seeing after the introduction of the political reform? Is the current government of Ukraine predictable as far as its foreign policy is concerned?”
“I think Ukrainian foreign policy remains consistent under the current government, too. I can say that the new government of Ukraine has so far been acting consistently and doing its best to pursue national interests. In principle, the new government is facing the same demands. For example, take Ukraine’s prospective WTO membership and related domestic and economic transformations. Also on the list of quite important issues are the imminent EU-Ukraine negotiations on a new extended agreement, Ukraine-NATO relations, and the role of Ukraine in settling the Transdnistria conflict. The new cabinet has issued important statements and made commitments on all these issues, which we duly appreciate. So there is no reason for me to say that the government will be working unpredictably.”
“Do you think the president of Ukraine will be able to guarantee an unalterable foreign-policy course towards integration into the EU and NATO, considering that the Ukrainian prime minister is raising the question of dismissing Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasiuk? In particular, Viktor Yanukovych expressed grave concern about the foreign minister’s oppositional stand.”
“We would not like the question to be put in such a way that only the president guarantees Ukraine’s foreign political course. Germany is a country friendly to Ukraine, and it would be very important for us to see both camps of the executive branch working together to shape foreign policy. Naturally, there can be different visions and insignificant differences as to details. But the question should not be framed in such a way as to indicate that Ukraine’s foreign policy is determined either by the president or the prime minister. They should both determine and shape this policy. That is why we are insisting that foreign policy issues should not belong to an area where certain sides of the executive power are arguing. This is extraordinarily harmful to Ukraine’s development.”
GERMANY’ VIEW
“Has Germany developed a clear view of the European Union now that your country is taking over the EU presidency on Jan. 1, 2007?”
“Germany was one of the European Union’s founding states. All German political parties have a vision of Europe that has a certain bearing on the problems of the EU’s structure and functions. Germany is one of the countries that considerably promoted the negotiations on the EU Constitution. So now we are regretting the stagnation that has emerged in this constitutional process.
“We want the EU to become a political and economic player in the international arena, where it will represent the interests of its members. With the ongoing globalization processes, individual EU countries naturally find it difficult to defend their interests by themselves. Therefore, all the EU countries should surrender part of their national sovereignty to supranational bodies. This has already been partially done. But the constitution also calls for other steps, because we want each of the countries to retain its national identity. This is why the draft constitution should strike a reasonable balance between these two aspirations: surrendering some national sovereignty while retaining national identity. We have succeeded in this. As for the EU’s geographic boundaries, there is no final and clear view. There are only debates on whether such borders can exist.”
“Is Germany going to support changes to the EU admission rules? It is common knowledge that this proposal is part of the report ‘The EU Capacity to Integrate New Member States,” which has been drawn up by the European Commission.”
“We have lived through quite a significant and powerful process of admitting new countries to the EU. The new stage of EU enlargement is expected to begin on Jan. 1, 2007, when Bulgaria and Romania join the European community. The EU will then have 27 member states. In the last while, the European Union has become more heterogeneous. This makes it even more important to formulate common rules that will govern the behavior of one country or another. These rules are part of the new constitution that is not yet in force. We are now negotiating the accession to the EU of such countries as Croatia and Turkey.
We have opened the prospect of membership for some Balkan countries with the proviso that they must satisfy some preliminary conditions. We are in for quite a difficult process and procedures. It should be noted, however, that, taking into account the current situation in the European community, all EU members and the European Commission have opted for a strict approach to concluding agreements with new EU member states. Some strictness is required to verify the implementation of legal obligations undertaken by the new EU members.”
BRINGING UKRAINE TO THE EU’S DOOR
“For a long time Kyiv has also been asking Brussels to open up prospects for EU membership. Ukraine’s aspirations are supported by a number of countries, including new EU members, which note that for them this prospect acted as a stimulus to carry out the necessary reforms. Is Germany prepared to use its authority during the presidency and support Ukraine so that it sees the prospect of membership, even if it’s a very distant one?”
“The EU and Germany now believe that Ukraine must be brought as close as possible to the European Union as far as solving pressing problems is concerned. At the same time, with due account of existing problems in the EU, the European community is not in a position to open clear and concrete prospects of EU membership. For the European Union, offering concrete membership prospects mean taking on concrete juridical obligations. At the moment, the EU cannot take on these kinds of obligations because it cannot admit such a large country as Ukraine. In principle, this does not mean that Europe refuses to recognize Ukraine or to offer it prospects of membership in the EU. So during Germany’s presidency of the EU we will try to sign a high-profile treaty with Ukraine, which envisions a free trade area. This will give Ukraine access to an enormous common market of about 500 million people. All this should be followed by the signing of a number of inter-sector agreements related to quite a large field in Ukraine’s economic life.”
“Taking into account the latest events in Ukraine, do you think Ukraine’s cabinet and parliament are prepared to pass a series of laws related to joining the WTO and then begin concrete talks on this agreement?”
“It is difficult for me to judge this because it is a question of political will. If the Ukrainian leadership shows the necessary political will, it will finally manage to pass a number of indispensable laws. Several Ukrainian governmental officials assured me of this. I know that the passage of these laws is being delayed by some problems because this affects the interests of one side or another. I don’t think Ukraine has any other option now but to reach a domestic political compromise that may include compensation to those who are in some way affected by the passage of WTO laws. I would like to say in general that Ukraine is very interested in joining a large free trade community. I’d like to reiterate that Ukraine’s WTO membership is an indispensable condition for starting the EU free trade negotiations.”
“You visited Donetsk region recently. When you spoke to the regional economic elite, did you get the sense they were interested in and set on entering the WTO in order to develop closer ties with the European Union?”
“Yes, of course, I talked to representatives of what you call the economic elite, and they all spoke in favor of WTO membership.”
NO “NEW OSTPOLITIK”
“Let’s get back to Ukrainian- German relations. Reports have been leaked to the press that Germany is formulating a new Ostpolitik that will regulate its relations with Eastern countries. Some experts claim that the new policy is being shaped with due account of relations with Russia. For example, the Berlin-based writer Bohdan Osadchuk says it is a Russophile policy. Are these reports true? Does the German Chancellor support this policy, since these documents were drawn up by the Social Democrats?”
“There is no ‘new Ostpolitik.’ I think all these reports are speculative and stem from individual comments or steps of one side or another. As for Germany’s Ostpolitik, I have been very familiar with it since the 1990s. For a period of six years I held high-ranking posts in the German government, including the federal chancellor’s department, and I can confirm that it is a consistent policy. I think it is a mistake to ascribe a Russocentric Eastern policy to Germany. This unfair reproach has been expressed in the past, too. Speaking of our attitude to Russia, I must say that German policy cannot help taking into account Russia’s great political, economic, and energy-related importance. We particularly note Russia’s central role in this matter not only for Germany but for Europe on the whole. Still, Russia’s clout does not mean that we will be formulating our policies and relations with other countries, including Ukraine, through the prism of our relations with Russia. We are very much interested in developing political, economic, and cultural relations with Ukraine on a self-sufficient and mutually beneficial basis.”
“You just mentioned Russia, where some rather negative things are going on, such as xenophobia and human rights violations. Germany, too, once went through quite a difficult period. Could your country, as the EU leader, raise this question with the European community countries and tell Russia to refrain from infringing human rights, and freedom of expression and the press?”
“The phenomena you are speaking about exist not just in Russia and Germany, but in one way or another in almost every European country. These phenomena may only differ according to the degree of their manifestation. They are especially visible in Russia because it is a very large country. I must assure you that these complex questions are being discussed both on a bilateral level between Germany and Russia and on the EU-Russia level. Our political dialogue is so productive and profound that we can discuss any complicated questions. But this does not mean that we always share the same views on these subjects.”
DIALOGUE AND CONTROL IN THE GERMAN DIRECTION
“Why is there no dialogue between President Yushchenko and Chancellor Merkel? How is this reflected on the development of bilateral relations between our two countries?”
“I would not say there is no dialogue. On the contrary, our countries have established the institution of formal meetings. These intergovernmental consultations had to be postponed this year because first there were parliamentary elections in Germany and then elections in Ukraine, followed by a long period of forming the cabinet. As for relations between the Ukrainian president and the German chancellor, I should tell you that the two of them recently had a detailed telephone conversation.”
“Can we expect that they will be seeing each other in the nearest future?”
“A meeting like this should be well-prepared. We still have not fixed the time. Ms. Merkel is not only the chancellor but also a party leader. She is soon going to take over the presidency of both the EU and the G8. So the more time passes the fewer opportunities are left to find a time slot for holding such a meeting. If you saw Ms. Merkel’s eight-month calendar of meetings, you would not envy her.”
“Oleksandr Chaly, the deputy head of the Presidential Staff, said recently that President Yushchenko would assume personal responsibility for the development of Ukrainian-German relations. Does Berlin think the president can really take control of this field or should this should be the prime minister’s preserve, especially considering that the cabinet and parliament are having a greater impact on foreign policies?” “All the three political forces you are talking about should participate to a certain extent in forming foreign policy. We, as a friendly country and a partner, must take this factor into account. I know that the situation with the organizational, legal, and political principles of foreign policy formation is not so simple in Ukraine and needs interpretation, but we still expect our partners to shape their foreign policy in such a way that our relations could be develop in a proper way. We, i.e., I personally, as the ambassador, and the representatives of the German government, are actually in constant contact with all the sides of the political process, with all the parties.”
GAS TRANSIT CONSORTIUM AND LICENSING
“Your predecessor Dietmar Stuedemann once told The Day that Germany was interested in resuming the negotiations on the gas transit consortium. What is Berlin’s position on this question, now that President Yushchenko told Ms. Merkel that Ukraine is ready to resume these talks?”
“I am also emphasizing that in principle Germany is prepared to implement the provisions of the memorandum of understanding that envisions that the three sides will undertake to form a trilateral consortium. There is an agreement to establish the consortium, but unfortunately no attempts were made to begin carrying out this intention. We, the third partner, do not consider it advisable to show concrete initiative, while the two direct participants — Ukraine and Russia — have not arrived at a conclusion about the principles behind the formation of this consortium. I’d like to stress that the federal government and the German businesses that may be involved in this are eager to work in this direction.”
“In other words, you are now expecting Ukraine and Russia to take some coordinated steps?”
“In any case, the first steps that could allow us to speak about the management of gas pipelines or laying new pipelines.”
“Continuing the topic of business relations between our countries, I would like to hear your opinion on whether the investment climate has changed for German business under the new government of Ukraine. Are German entrepreneurs more willing now to enter the Ukrainian market? Or do they still have some fears and reservations?”
“There are no reservations, but there is some caution on the part of potential German investors, although they are showing great interest in investing in Ukraine and working on the Ukrainian market. There are certain fears about the imperfect nature of the legal framework concerning foreign investments. I am convinced that we will succeed in showing German enterprises and associations of German entrepreneurs that Ukraine is an interesting place for business and investments, that there is a colossal potential and political will of the government in this country. At the same time, I want to say in no uncertain terms that there are some factors that are not in the Ukrainian government’s favor as far as economic relations between the two countries are concerned. With this in view, my American counterpart and I sent a letter to the Ukrainian government about licensing and establishing quotas for grain exports. In our opinion, this is a throwback to the old days, because such actions cause harm to a third party. I hope this kind of interference does not reoccur.”
MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN AND NEUTRALITY
“What did Ukraine lose by not joining the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)? Or did it win something? Did NATO win or lose when Ukraine failed to seize this chance?”
“As a diplomat who has dealt with security matters for quite a long time, I must say that Ukraine did not lose much when it reacted this way to the opportunity of joining the MAP. I’d like to draw your attention to the prime minister’s agreement to continue carrying out the projects and plans that were launched together with NATO, and to his agreement to conduct adequate public outreach efforts about the fundamental nature of NATO. The Ukrainian government reserves the right to join NATO in the future. The main thing is purposeful cooperation based on existing commitments. The Action Plan issue is sure to reemerge in due time. After an appropriate preparatory period, this will be merely the last formal step.”
“Do you think that Yanukovych may have deliberately refused to accept the MAP in order not to fulfill the new obligations that require corruption control, rule of law, etc.?”
“No, I don’t think so. But, in principle, the criteria you mention — combating corruption and observing rule of law — are mandatory prerequisites for NATO membership. Moreover, I must say that these are also the mandatory and more important prerequisites for Ukraine’s rapprochement with the European Union, which we are going to debate at length. And, of course, ongoing cooperation with NATO is also raising, to a certain extent, the question of controlling corruption or the rule of law. The MAP is not a panacea. It is just a formal step towards cooperation. I must also say that there is already an extended action plan on which both sides are working.”
“What is your attitude to the idea of Ukraine’s neutrality now being promoted by certain parties in our country? They cite the examples of Austria and Finland.”
“I personally think that the idea of neutrality does not suit the 21st century. It is a concept of the past, which was gradually developing in the countries you named. It was based on the specific traditions and historical development of a certain country when the blocs were in confrontation. What is neutrality today? With respect to whom or what? Just look at the situation: the Cold War period is over. Has Russia become neutral, considering its close cooperation with NATO, even within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council? In my view, this idea is not a satisfactory political goal for Ukraine. Ukraine is not Switzerland. Ukraine is a large country with a thoroughly specific history. Ukraine’s future lies, on the one hand, in close ties and cooperation with Europe and European institutions and, on the other, in maintaining good-neighborly relations with Russia. One should make a strenuous effort to achieve these goals. In this connection, neutrality would not be a panacea for existing problems.”
