The other day during his press conference one of the presidential candidates, leader of the Yabloko party Grigory Yavlinsky expressed confidence that he would not be allowed to participate in the elections. At the same time Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin published another “policy” article. This time he touched upon the national question.
The Day addressed the Russian political expert, leading scientist of Carnegie Moscow Center Lilia Shevtsova asking her to comment the situation around Yabloko and the new Putin’s article.
Putin is heading to the victory in the first voting. Following these tactics the Kremlin is interested in getting rid of all probable opponents able to pinch even a little bit of electors’ preferences off Putin’s base. Social-democratic groups and employees of government-financed organizations can make a part of Yavlinsky’s electorate. In order to eliminate this threat the Kremlin “liquidated” Yavlinsky. Another thing is that the Kremlin probably considered the leader of Yabloko as possible presidential candidate supposed to legitimize the presidential elections. In all probability, this scenario was considered until recently. However, since there is Prokhorov’s candidacy the latter has to play this role addressing the liberal and democratic social groups.
Of course, in this context they do not need Yavlinsky anymore, the more so that Yabloko has prepared thousands of skilled observers. Seeing that Yavlinsky is not participating in the elections the unpleasant factor of independent observers will be excluded. Anyway, within Putin’s tactics and strategy Yavlinsky as a potential alternative is unwanted and dangerous.
Are the Russian authorities really playing the Ukrainian scenario when Kuchma and Symonenko made it to the second round of the election; does it mean that in Russia Putin and Ziuganov will participate in the second round?
“Just like most of the Russian experts I think that there is every reason to believe that Putin and the Kremlin staked on the first round. Certainly, the situation in Russia is still unpredictable to some extent. We have very few instruments that could tell us what happens in reality. We cannot assess the direction and the depth of political processes that is why there is no guarantee that the authorities will manage to push Putin forward. However, there is no doubt that Putin has the scenario of the second round at his fingertips just in case.
“This variant is not only Ukrainian but the one of Yeltsin and Ziuganov in 1996. Back then Yeltsin had the rating of 4 percent and managed to raise it during his election campaign; he won the second round only because he made the anti-communist alternative. That is why if there is the second round Putin will compete with Ziuganov who is not bursting to go into power, his aim is to preserve his sparing partner’s role for any Kremlin’s candidate. Ironically, in this case Putin will receive more anti-communist legitimacy repeating Kuchma and Yeltsin’s variants than if he won in the first round. However, it is a more unpredictable variant than the unpredictable first round: the authorities will try to push Putin forward in the first round.”
Some political experts believe that by voting for Prokhorov people will increase Ziuganov and Zhirinovsky’s chances to make it to the second round of the elections which means Putin’s definite victory. How would you comment it?
“Prokhorov might be supported by the liberal groups if there is no Yavlinsky. Probably, a significant part of them will stay at home. Anyway, if there is the second round there is every reason to think that only Ziuganov can participate in it. Zhirinovsky is unlikely to do it. It is difficult today if Prokhorov will help Ziuganov to do it. In all probability, the authorities need Prokhorov because he legitimizes the elections in the eyes of the liberal groups in Russia and in the eyes of the West because he is not one of the usual Kremlin’s clowns: Ziuganov, Zhirinovsky, and Mironov. Prokhorov is a person trying to symbolize the liberal alternative and address the liberal electorate that will not vote for Putin anyway.
“Prokhorov does not deprive Putin of anything, he does not split his body of electors and is not dangerous for him. Prokhorov is an ideal sparring partner that will give Putin more legitimacy during the first round. Moreover, if Prokhorov is successful enough Putin might take him into his team just like Yeltsin took Lebedev in his. By doing this he will increase the chances of romantics and idealists thinking that during his new presidential term Putin might carry out some liberal reforms. However, Prokhorov is a fictitious candidate, maybe even more fictitious than Ziuganov and Zhirinovsky who have their stable body of electors.”
The other day the Supreme Court cancelled the liquidation of Ryzhkov’s Republican Party. What might it be the evidence of?
“After the international courts make decisions about the illegitimacy and unfairness of the Russian authorities’ actions that the court of Strasbourg has repeatedly done, the Russian authorities usually carry out these decisions. The decision about the unfair liquidation of the Republican Party has been already made by the European court that is why the Russian authorities could hardly ignore it. However, if the Supreme Court cancelled the decision about the liquidation of this party, it does not mean any easing of the repressive Russian legislation. It is rather a step towards its imitation and expansion.
“The Russian authorities will now prove that they are ready to ease the regime and open the ‘window.’ The so-called Medvedev’s ‘liberal’ package thrown to the State Duma has to serve this purpose. Now only 500 signatures are needed to create a party. According to this package, now there are wider possibilities for electing governors but anyway the final candidate has to be approved and selected by Putin. What is it the evidence of? Of expanding the basis of the imitational legislation: it looks like a step towards pluralism development but in fact it does not exist. In the situation when only 500 signatures are needed to start a party, there is a possibility for making hundreds and even thousands of new parties. Now the essential for the authorities is promoting this pluralistic chaos and preventing the democratic forces’ consolidation. The fact that Ryzhkov will be able to restore the party and if this party is registered, PARNAS [Party of National Freedom – Ed.] will be able to participate in any local elections under the flags of the Republican Party is taken as an outlet and a positive step. However, it does not change the system that has to be changed from the top. It does not expand the space or possibility of freedom: it is another element in the Russian Potemkin’s village, more modern and renewed one.”
This week Putin has published another article called “Russia: the national question…” Have you seen any suggestions how to solve the national question in this article? Or is it a kind of election PR aiming to win in the first round if it happens?
“This article is about a burning and dramatic question the Russian authorities have been unable to answer since the USSR collapsed and this question is getting highly-explosive. Actually, in his article Putin says that he has found his pre-election role. The role of the preacher pretending that he is not responsible for the previous 12 years, the preacher who says that all the problems appeared back in the 1990s and he has nothing to do with them. In this article he is ‘kicking’ 1990s and, indirectly, Boris Yeltsin, his ‘godfather.’ Laying the blame for everything bad and unresolved on Yeltsin is one of the pillars of Putin’s election campaign.
“This article is interesting because of the following. Firstly, he admitted the trap the Russian elite, regime, and Vladimir Putin is in. In this article there is no answer how to solve the national question. However, Putin has taken an interesting and pitiful attempt to address the Russian nationalism and somehow neutralize and ease it, give the Russian nationalists some satisfaction and at the same time prove the necessity to preserve the status quo which is the neo-empire. He is trying to mix the Russian nationalism with the Russian neo-imperialism. This is a curtsy Putin drops to the Russian nationalism: ‘The pivot and the bonding agent of this unique civilization is the Russian nation and Russian culture.’ Thus he makes the Russian nation, the Russian question state-forming. The high mission of the Russians is uniting and strengthening civilizations – it is an approach adopted from the Russian nationalism, thus he goes in the same direction as the Russian nationalists since it is their rhetoric. Having accepted the main element of the Russian nationalism Putin goes to the opposite direction. He says that, nevertheless, the Russian national state cannot exist since we have to keep everything as it is and continue the traditions of the Soviet imperialism. Actually, it is a neo-imperialism since the Russian Federation is not a federation. The current federation severely suppresses the regional formations and national republics. It is a surprising inability to understand the real situation of the Russian state. It is a surprising inability to comprehend the question of the Russian identity, it is inability to solve and answer the most dangerously explosive question.
“Of course, Putin’s answer cannot satisfy the Russian nationalists that will expect him to more actively promote the national state which he cannot accept because in this case Kadyrov will tell him: ‘And what about us? We support you and what do you do with us?’ At the same time Putin cannot pretend that the Russian national question does not exist. He is trying not to leave out anyone addressing the Russian double-dyed nationalists and Ramzan Kadyrov, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan trying to reconcile everyone by going into this scholastic maze. Putin does not have any answer. Of course, it is pre-election propaganda that will not satisfy anyone and will provoke dissatisfaction from both sides.”
