As predicted by analysts, Moscow’s “March of Millions” gathered a dramatically smaller number of protesters. Before the event, Russia’s noted author Boris Akunin wrote: “Four reasons for not attending tomorrow’s rally: (1) ‘March of Millions’ sounds stupid, it makes no sense; (2) rallies and marches are good for nothing; (3) I’m sick and tired of listening to the same kind of speeches made by the same kind of politicos; (4) I’m tired of all [political] hot air sessions. There is only one reason for attending [tomorrow’s ‘March of Millions’]: if the event turns out to have attracted a small number of activists, then those in the Kremlin will be right to assume that suppressing opposition takes some bullying and several [dozen] arrests.”
While not suppressed, Russia’s opposition has had to adopt a lower profile, due to objective as well as subjective reasons.
Objective reasons materialized this winter when the protest movement in Moscow and, partially, in St. Petersburg was covered by world media. In Russia’s major provincial centers such protest rallies numbered between several dozen and several hundred persons. On the whole, Russia’s provinces showed no response to this movement, even though having to make do with a living standard way down compared to that of Moscow and St. Petersburg. In other words, that protest movement had no public support worth writing home about at the time – and the situation is much worse today.
Without public support this movement is doomed. After quickly getting over the first scare, the Kremlin hit back with arrests and threats meant to unnerve the movement’s most susceptible activists. This scheme worked, to an extent. It was increasingly clear that those “upstairs” would never surrender political power, that they were preparing and implementing countermeasures; that they wouldn’t stop short of ordering mass repressions.
This was enough for the Russian man in the street to forget all about protest rallies. Can you blame him for trying to survive the current regime?
Last but not least, one can organize rallies of protest against a rigged presidential campaign. Then what? None of the Russian opposition leaders had an answer to this question. Of course, one can enjoy branding Putin’s administration as a team of crooks, using cartoons and billboards, but all this is nothing compared to the winning party’s ideology and action plan, if and when. No one could answer the question, “Who can replace Putin?” This is a matter of political rather than personal profile. No replacement can be found in Russia, and most voters in Russia are well aware of the fact, even if refusing comment. People who make up this silent majority never attend campaign rallies and never vote for any opposition leaders.
In regard to subjective reasons, Russia’s opposition movement is fragmented, representing all who are not satisfied with the current regime, ranging from liberals to nationalists to hard-line Bolsheviks. Needless to say, none of these can come to terms to jointly combat the regime because they are too busy fighting each other. They will never unite to overthrow this regime. What kind of positive action plan can one expect under the circumstances, considering that none of the leaders of the existing small political groups will meet the next one halfway?
One is strongly reminded of what happened in Ukraine recently, when the opposition suffered a scandalous fiasco. Those “upstairs” in Russia remember it and are scared of having it repeated on home turf.
After the protest rallies had passed their peak in Russia, the radicals started coming up front, this being the first sign of the opposition movement having lost its positive foothold. Now even those who were once described as Russia’s “creative class” are looking askance at it. All these creative-class people are pragmatic; they want to keep their distance from leftist or rightist radicalism. They do not want revolutions; they hate them.
Russia’s opposition is gripped by crisis, a fact its leaders have to admit. Boris Nemtsov said during the launch of his new book in St. Petersburg: “I’m 53 and quite honestly, I’m tired of racing down streets, away from OMON [Russion version of SWAT] men. It’s high time I ran for parliament and started working the way they do in the civilized countries.”
Journalist Yulia Latynina made a sharper statement on air at Echo of Moscow, saying that “rallies have outlived themselves; we aren’t fools, we won’t attend any from now on.”
Other opposition leaders propose to substitute rallies by other means of political resistance. Ksenia Sobchak told Echo of Moscow there was the option of vying in local election campaigns, that this was how one could make one’s name by doing a few good things for the provincial electorate.
Russia’s opposition is promoting Yevgenia Chirikova as candidate mayor of Khimki near Moscow, battling campaign falsifications, etc. The thing is that, even if she wins the campaign and becomes mayor, she won’t be able to act on her own. She will have to act as instructed by Moscow because all local budgets transfer their funds to the central bank. The Kremlin decides on local budget appropriations, so if a newly appointed mayor misbehaves, bang go budget handouts. In a word, none of the local mayors and council members will be able to function normally unless they surrender to the current regime. All this can hardly serve to build the Russian opposition’s image.
Whether one likes it or not, opposition in Russia and Ukraine have much in common, being unable to resists the current regime other than by winning the parliamentary elections, by making clear the difference between the crooks “upstairs” and honest-to-God citizens willing to replace them and make things right – by uniting all opposition forces in the first place, convincing the people that campaigning for the Ukrainian language, against encroachments on the freedom of speech, is as important as that for preferential terms for Chornobyl rescue operation survivals, or for an adequate Tax Code; that political requirements must come first (an eight-hour working day was a major requirement submitted by opposition in tsarist Russia).
Unity comes first. Chornobyl rescue operation veterans picketing the Verkhovna Rada should be accompanied by Afghan war veterans and small-time business people. A city market going on strike, facing a hostile takeover, should be supported by others, the way it is practiced in Western Europe. Those “upstairs” in Ukraine would understand.
This appears to be the only way to change the situation in Ukraine during the next scheduled or early parliamentary elections.
