High on the agenda of the talks held in Kyiv on February 8-9 by secretaries of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Yevhen Marchuk and the National Security Council of the Russian Federation Sergei Ivanov was improvement of the mechanism of consultations between national security offices of the two countries in neutralizing the possible threats. Interfax-Ukraine reports, quoting Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council sources, that Messrs. Ivanov and Marchuk approved guidelines for the agencies’ cooperation in 2001. The document calls for national security experts’ meetings, mutual assistance in combating international terrorism, cooperation in guaranteeing the safety of telecommunications and in computer crime control, as well as a number of other actions in the interests of the two countries’ national security. The sister agencies reached an agreement to handle on their level the problem of Ukraine’s nuclear safety. As Mr. Marchuk told journalists on February 9, this was a Ukrainian initiative.
The Russian security council secretary, who granted an interview to The Day last Thursday, belongs, according to many Russian analysts, to the narrow circle of the most influential figures in Vladimir Putin’s entourage. Some experts even call him the informal vice president of the Russian Federation. Among the Kremlin’s latest key innovations, in which Mr. Ivanov seems to be most closely involved, is reformation of the Russian police and security services and updating of Russian CIS-related policies.
“The new CIS-related policy you recently announced at a security conference in Munich is unlikely to mean Russia’s refusal to be CIS leader. So what is the new model of this leadership?’
“In the nine years since the CIS was formed, many have realized that the model of commonwealth economic integration does not work they way it should. The commonwealth states have undergone serious political and economic changes during these years. Various groupings like the Euro-Asian Economic Community (EAEC), GUUAM, and the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security have arisen within the CIS. We have come to the conclusion that you must go down the road of integration at a pace that suits your partner. Love cannot be forced. Trying to force somebody into various alliances is not in the spirit of our foreign policy. Different realities bring about different bilateral relations. The Russian-Belarus Union is one level of integration. On the other hand, EAEC will become, let us hope, what was earlier called the European Economic Community: the same customs and tax regulations, etc. What I have said does not mean we do not strive to cooperate with the states staying outside these associations. As to Ukraine, we intend to further maintain relations of strategic partnership with it. But I emphasize that we are not trying to impose on Ukraine the rules of the game existing in EAEC or the Russian-Belarus Union. The principle of Russian policies in the CIS I spoke about in Munich can be reduced to the formula of variable-level and variable-rate integration. We believe it is on this basis that a certain community of post-Soviet states can be revived in the distant future, given the wish and economic interest of the parties.
“As to political issues and security, this is a still more distant prospect. We should take a more careful approach here. On the other hand, we have lately established good cooperation with Ukraine in this area.”
“You used the word combination ‘we are not going to impose..’ Is ‘we’ the Kremlin, Gazprom, or Russian business?”
“The Russian leadership. Russian business is a different thing. I am sure both Russia and Ukraine have opted irreversibly for market reforms. So the reciprocal penetration of capital is a normal global tendency. This process has already begun, with the largest Russian companies and banks evincing interest in the Ukrainian market. I do not think the interest of Russian private and even semi-private entities in the Ukrainian economy is a thing to fear, for it is the two sides that decide whether or not to invest. Should Ukraine object to it, Russian capital will not come. But if the Ukrainian and our sides see it profitable, then why not? Likewise, Ukrainian capital can go to Russia.”
“Many Ukrainians fear that the presence of Russian capital here will lay a new foundation for a closer political linkage to Russia in the future.”
“I know of these fears. But this raises a question: does the active presence in Ukraine of American or West European capital not mean the same? Is it really better?”
“There are two popular viewpoints in Ukraine about how to implement our foreign political strategy, i.e., integrate in the European Union: integration in a self-contained mode and integration together with Russia. Sentiments reflecting the latter point of view increased especially after it became obvious that the West and Russia could make a deal on a bypass gas pipeline even without Ukraine. What is Russia’s position on this point?”
“We are aware that Ukraine will be receiving the bulk of its energy resources from Russia in the near future, as far as the eye can see. Gas from Norway and large-scale oil supplies from the Caspian region is nothing but theoretical imagination. This is why we think our basic reasoning is fully correct and realistic. Western Europe needs and is interested in the stable supplies of Russian natural gas. Thus Russia and Ukraine should play on the European energy market (and elsewhere) as reliable partners. Incidentally, I see no reason why Ukraine should worry over its dependence on Russian gas. The more so that we have concluded a package contract on gas supplies to Ukraine. As to gas pipelines, the problem has not yet been solved with finality. It is so far clear that even if Ukrainian pipelines are to be upgraded, our experts think their capacity will be insufficient to make the delivery of all the planned Russian gas to Europe.”
