Dictionaries define the term “diaspora” as a national or ethnic community of people living outside their ethnic homeland and still feeling spiritual ties with their ancestral lands. Naturally, Ukrainians in Russia do feel a spiritual connection with Ukraine (often rather despite than due to — over the 20 years of its existence, the Ukrainian state has done little for its own diaspora).
It is hard to say what exactly scares the Russian regime more, the ties of Russian citizens with Ukraine, or the very existence of Ukraine. But a massed offensive of the Russian Federation’s law enforcement bodies against Ukraine’s scarce cultural presence on Russian territory is a clear sign of the Kremlin’s paranoid fear of the Ukrainian issue. It looks as if Moscow were afraid of “nationalism,” “the UPA” (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), “Andrei Sheptytsky,” [Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. – Ed.] etc. These were the tags entered by the officers of Directorate 11 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (basically responsible for the war on terrorism) as they searched the Library of Ukrainian Literature in Moscow. Books on these very subjects were confiscated during the first two searches.
A new search was conducted on January 14, by the same department and, according to the library’s director Natalia Sharina, with the same search warrant of December 27, 2010. However, this time the police were more convincing: not only did they confiscate the computers, but also inflicted bodily harm on Sharina.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine got away with a vague statement to the effect that the situation concerning the library drew a wide public response — the same message as the one after the previous searches. “Maybe it is no coincidence that some in Russia see such police actions against a library as something quite ordinary, while such events grab headlines in Ukraine,” said Oleh Voloshyn, director of the Information Policy Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.
Our readers will remember that the Ukrainian foreign office offered only a rather sluggish reaction to the abolition of the Federal National Cultural Autonomy of Ukrainians in Russia which, according to Russia’s foreign minister, was closed due to its political activities. Sergei Lavrov, the minister in question, reserved only one role to the Ukrainians of Russia, that of a community like the ones in Voronezh or Chelyabinsk. You may dance and sing, but learning history, or your mother tongue, or opening your own schools is out of the question — for those are subversive acts!
The reaction of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs was very bold: it offered to help the Ukrainians of Russia open a new organization… And what if it gets closed down again, half a year later? Shall we go on singing and dancing, till we get sick and tired of it on both sides of the border, and totally give up the idea of any “spiritual ties?”
So it is no by mere coincidence that The Day chose Mykola Khriienko as the Man of the Year 2010. Khriienko is a journalist who seven years ago realized the urgency to tell the world and, first and foremost, Ukraine, that Ukrainians live even beyond the Urals, that they explored that territory at different points in time, made it habitable, and grew roots there. Just as Russians consider a great part of the Ukrainian cultural and historical heritage to be theirs, so can Ukrainians claim a great part of Russia’s history and culture. This is what normal cultural exchange is about. However, such exchange is impossible between communities in one of which a woman librarian is beaten up, and in the other top officials enjoy singing underworld songs. Better call your family or friends in Russia, talk Ukrainian, and thus support the spiritual ties.
Semen NOVOPRUDSKY, deputy editor-in-chief, Vremya Novostei, a daily, Moscow:
“The events concerning the Library of Ukrainian Literature in Moscow and Ukrainian cultural autonomy in Russia caused very little ripple effect in the media and society. This was to be expected. All in all, despite the fact that the Russian government sees the former Soviet camp, and the present-day CIS, as a zone of its particular concern and influence, interest in the post-Soviet space within Russia is negligible.
“On the one hand, the former Soviet republics continue to diverge. It is obvious that there no longer exists anything that can be dubbed ‘a monolith Soviet nation,’ there is no monolith state. Certainly there are some ties left between individuals, some memories (as long as most residents of the post-Soviet space are people who have some or other experience living under the Soviet Union). But the historical distance is such that an objective process of divergence is taking place. Besides, over the last decade Russia has managed to quarrel with virtually all former Soviet countries (with a few exceptions), and this is telling, too.
“Certain opposition centers did react to those events, but they are not numerous in Russia. Yet on the whole, unfortunately, there was no serious ripple effect. The Russian mass media are chiefly working within the information agenda set by the regime, and in this case, the regime was not interested in drawing a response.
“Personally I see these events as epic stupidity, which demonstrates that the Russian regime sadly lacks adequate ability to assess the developments on the post-Soviet terrains. They lack a national policy, and nowadays Russia is facing grave problems on a country-wide scale, including those concerning the relations of the Russian-speaking population of major cities and Central Asians.
“I reiterate: this, too, results from the lack of understanding and adequate handling of national policy. Diasporas should have an opportunity to freely conduct cultural and educational activities. And even if these activities do have a certain political coloring, in the eyes of the Russian regime, it’s quite obvious that in no way it would threaten either the Russian government, or stability in the country.”
