Media reports about the renewal of negotiations on the release of IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit, with Egypt acting as a go-between, made many shake their heads skeptically.
In return for Shalit’s release, Hamas wanted Israel to release from jail Marwan Hasib Ibrahim Barghouti, leader of the First and Second Intifadas; Ahmad Sa’adat, Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Abbas Al-Sayyed and Ibrahim Hamed, heads of Hamas’s military department. Tel Aviv wouldn’t even discuss the remotest possibility of a deal like that. [Shalit would be released under an Egyptian- and German-brokered deal to swap 1,027 Palestinian prisoners, including more than 300 serving life terms for attacks on Israelis. – Ed.] Under the circumstances, there seemed little left to say, with neither party willing to meet the other halfway. Israel couldn’t accept it for domestic political reasons. Hamas couldn’t because their key sponsors, Iran and Syria, wouldn’t agree to it. It’s hard to say how many months/years Gilad Shalit would spend in captivity, but then events took a sharp turn on the international scene (e.g., Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and most importantly, Syria). In six months, what had seemed unshakable was turning into quicksand, figuratively and literally.
October 18, 2011, Israeli authorities informed that IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit was back home. His transfer consisted of three phases. First, he was handed over to Egyptian officials at the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt. Second, he boarded an Israeli military helicopter and was flown to Israel’s Tel Nof air base to be greeted by his family and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Third, 1,027 Palestinians were released from Israel’s jails and handed over to the Palestinian side.
For Israel, Gilad Shalit’s release was a matter of principle rather than politics. TZAHAL (the Hebrew acronym for Israel Defense Forces) teaches its officers and men that, once captured, the main thing is to stay alive and healthy. In fact this is a clause of the army regulations. Any serviceman, when seized by the enemy, is allowed to tell them all he knows, revealing all secrets, because nothing is more important than human life. That’s why the Palestinian side agreed to exchange one Israeli captive for a great many Arab terrorists. For the leaders of Hamas, Hezbollah and other such organizations, human life has little value if at all. In a democratic society, the attitude is the exact opposite. Two years ago, Israel paid for a video [cassette/disk] as proof of Gilad Shalit being alive and healthy by releasing from prison over 20 [Arab] terrorists. That’s why [Israeli] captives aren’t written off but struggled for, so they can be released. This struggle may take years.
Gilad Shalit’s is a case study. The man has spent some six years in captivity (starting in 2006). The first six-minute interview after his arrival in Israel, the photos and videos show a gaunt and emotionally unbalanced man.
Some in Israel aren’t happy about the swap, not because one man was released in exchange for a thousand others. zrus.co.il quotes Yulia Shamalov-Berkovich, member of the Knesset for Kadima [a centrist and liberal party of Israel. – Ed.], as saying: “Surely the release of our soldier makes me happy, yet this is also a bad day for my country… By releasing terrorists from prison Israel appears to be welcoming further acts of terrorism and abduction.” Her stand has been shared by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu until recently. What made him change his mind? More on this further on.
Getting back to Israel’s decision to exchange a single serviceman for a thousand convicts. A historic decision is all I can say. At a time of realpolitik such government concessions aren’t popular, even less so when it comes to the life or death of an ordinary individual. A government prepared to make serious political sacrifices to save the life of an army corporal doesn’t have to prove its democratic nature (also, there are ways to economize on all those crazy national advancement projects’ budgets). However, a country that keeps building a negative international image reflected by media reports (as has been the case with Ukraine in the past several years) has noting to offer in terms of advancement. What can it advance? Political prisoners? Ever-present rallies of protest [against mounting retail and municipal prices]? The whole rotten and corrupt system?
No ads, commercials, brochures reiterating the notion of democracy and liberties will change the [international community’s] attitude to this country. Deeds rather than words can change this attitude.
In his article for Ogonyok, Vladimir Beider (Israel) wrote: “Humanism costs a fortune… That night, as soon we heard the good news, the tent of protest, put up by the soldier’s parents in front of the prime minister’s residence in Jerusalem, where they had kept picketing the residence for the past year and one half, turned into a pilgrimage center, with people visiting from all over Israel. That morning I watched people greeting each other in front of the grocery store under my apartment, saying: ‘Congratulations! The boy is coming home!’”
For the post-Soviet countries, the Gilad Shalit saga should serve as a good example. Especially for Ukraine that remains Soviet (in the worst sense of the word) in many respects, where human life is like small change left on a drugstore counter. One has to consider Ukraine’s gruesome historical legacy (something Ukrainian society is unable to figure out) and its clannish-oligarchic system created over the years of national independence.
Recent events show that the current political leadership doesn’t give a hoot about Ukraine’s international image. (I might as well point out that this attitude is typical of most post-Soviet countries.) In other words, there is no reputation; there is only the power of authority.
What made Netanyahu change his attitude to the Shalit exchange and allow the release of all those Arab terrorists? There were mounting social tensions in Israel and the prime minister was looking for ways of distracting public attention. The release of an Israeli soldier was exactly what he needed, remembering the old truth that victors aren’t judged. Haaretz wrote that Yoram Cohen, chief of Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) was all out for making arrangements with Hamas, considering that a repeated study of the options aimed at freeing Shalit, using military means, proved to be impractical. He was echoed by Mossad chief Tamir Pardo, Benny Gantz, Chief of General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, and Defense Minister Ehud Barak who convinced Prime Minister Netanyahu that his decision was the right one. The heads of Israel’s clandestine agencies realized that negotiating such deals with Hamas would become more complicated in the near future, that the current opportunity wouldn’t last long, and so it had to be used there and then.
There were external reasons behind the latter argument. First, the status of Hamas in the Gaza Strip had changed. Its political leadership remained in Damascus, being closely watched by Syria’s secret police. Although they insisted on harsh prisoner exchange conditions, the local authorities – and Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh of the Palestinian National Authority – had to reckon with realities. The Gaza War, known as Operation Cast Lead (a three-week bombing and invasion of the Gaza Strip by Israel), was vivid proof that Hamas had no military capacity to match – let alone overcome – that of TZAHAL. Another such operation would be a mi-litary and political disaster. Bringing the situation to the breaking point was too dangerous.
Second, Mahmoud Abbas had become very popular after requesting UN recognition of Palestine independence – to the detriment of his Gaza rivals. This problem had to be resolved, of course.
Third, there was the shaky position of the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad. This made Haniyeh think of new sponsors, what with support from Damascus keeping on a daily downward curve. Obviously, the president had too many important items on his agenda to deal with Hamas. Iran? There were possibilities, but they mostly remained on paper, considering that there was an increasingly smaller influx of hard cash from Tehran. What could Iran offer except for political verbiage and prayer? Even the hotheaded terrorist leaders would think twice before challenging Israel singlehandedly, because they are all pragmatists. Most likely, they will focus on Qatar and Saudi Arabia, probably on Egypt, to an extent. These countries take a more restrained stand in regard to the West and Israel.
Fourth. Cairo and Ankara insisted on the liberation of Shalit. President Shimon Peres of the State of Israel noted that, despite the existing differences, Turkey chose to adopt a humane policy; that Prime Minister Erdogan instructed his clandestine agencies to cooperate with all parties concerned and made every effort himself. Of course, the reasons behind Ankara’s active efforts aimed at having Israel and Hamas reach an understanding rate a separate story. One thing is clear: the tension in the relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv has dropped several degrees. This is another factor the terrorist leaders have to keep in mind. Incidentally, the Syrian president decided to take part in the release of Shalit on a last minute basis. This isn’t likely to help him but is sure to make Tehran hit the roof. Outside pressure convinced Hamas in the Gaza Strip not to insist on the release of their leaders. This spells fiasco – and possibly bad political consequences – for Hamas chief Khaled Meshal, who had opposed the prisoner exchange idea until the final decision was made.
In other words, a one-for-one-thousand deal will benefit all, even if in certain ways, with possible losers.
