Ukraine has an opportunity to test the validity of its claim to regional leadership. Not so long ago official Kyiv presented its plan for solving the Transdnistrian problem. Will the Yushchenko Plan, as the peacekeeping document has been dubbed by the media, work? Its failure may become the first tangible setback in Ukraine’s foreign political endeavors. If implemented, it will enhance this country’s international prestige.
“How is Viktor Yushchenko going to solve the problems in Transdnistria?” NATO HQ officials repeatedly asked in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, when the Ukrainian president couldn’t decide cadre matters, let alone settle the Transdnistrian conflict. Ukraine has long been expected to take real steps in regard to Transdnistria. The current interest in Transdnistrian events on the part of the EU and NATO is markedly different from their attitude only a few years ago. Now it has a perfectly pragmatic explanation. Neither the European Union nor the Alliance would want to share a border with a country with an uncontrollable separatist regime. Moldova’s Romanian neighbor joined NATO last year and will enter the EU on January 1, 2007. This interest may also have a different implication. Moldova has declared EU membership as its objective, thus giving ranking bureaucrats in Brussels yet another reason to closely follow developments in this country.
Ukraine was quick on the uptake. Several months ago the president lashed out at the responsible authorities because Ukraine, “which is losing billions because of this conflict,” still doesn’t have a plan for Transdnistria. Viktor Yushchenko’s criticism was obviously received as a directive, and the impression was that Kyiv’s peaceful initiative was being worked out at an accelerated rate. On April 22, during the GUAM summit in Chisinau, President Yushchenko made public Ukraine’s solution to the Transdnistrian problem. He proposed seven settlement steps entitled “To a Settlement through Democracy.” The first reaction was that there was nothing special about the proposal, that it lacked specificity. The details became known only days ago. Toward the end of last week the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine released a Transdnistria conflict resolution plan that was discussed by Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, and the OSCE during a recent meeting in Vinnytsia, with the participation of EU and US representatives. Ukrainian diplomats insist that the meeting in Vinnytsia marked a turning point in the negotiating process.
The Ukrainian conflict resolution plan consists of three phases, each to last six months. In Phase 1 the Moldovan parliament must pass a bill before the end of July, containing basic provisos defining the status of Transdnistria. In keeping with this document Transdnistria can have its own constitution, national flag, anthem, and national emblem. Its status is determined as a “special administrative-territorial [political] unit of Moldova in the form of a republic.” In other words, the bill must be passed as a basic general law. According to the Ukrainian concept, this law must legitimize parliamentary elections in Transdnistria, to be held no later than October-November 2005.
Elections are the key idea of the Ukrainian peace plan. First, Transdnistria will be able to delegate legitimate representatives to conduct further negotiations. Second, the Transdnistrian parliament will be able to rejuvenate itself with the advent of new members — who, as the Ukrainian side expects unofficially, will be easier to come to terms with. Compromise is also a vital necessity, because the second phase envisages the allocation of jurisdictions among the central bodies of power in Moldova and Transdnistria. To this end, the Transdnistrian parliament will start by passing an appropriate bill. After that, Transdnistrian MPs will delegate people to a special parliamentary commission in Moldova, who will jointly work out a bill on the special legal status of Transdnistria. Finally, in the third phase Tiraspol and Chisinau, together with the future guarantor countries (e.g., Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, assisted by the US and EU) will elaborate an agreement securing the law on the special legal status of Transdnistria.
What are the main difficulties? First of all, it’s too early to predict that this document will be approved by all sides; the situation will become clear in the next couple of weeks. At present, Moldova and Transdnistria don’t seem to object to the Ukrainian plan, but Russia has yet to determine its stand, and it exerts a direct influence on the Tiraspol administration. Moscow will find it hard to reconcile itself to the implementation of the Ukrainian reconciliation formula. Two years ago Russia’s Kozak Memorandum (Russia’s plan to settle the conflict was entrusted to Dmitriy Kozak, former first deputy head of the Russian presidential administration) suffered a fiasco. At the time Russia was conducting rather successful negotiations (ignoring the other mediators, the OSCE and Ukraine). But at the very last moment the Moldovan president refused to sign the document. The main reason was that experts from international organizations recognized that Russia’s concepts might potentially contradict Chisinau’s interests. Word in diplomatic circles was that the Russians made a last-minute correction in the document, amending it with a clause about the presence of a Russian peacekeeping contingent in the region, without coordinating it with the other side (this, considering that Moldova had to become demilitarized). In doing so, Moscow made it perfectly clear that peace in Moldova depended on the guarantees of only one country, Russia.
Even now Moscow is showing signs of envy caused by the Ukrainian proposal. Some Russian experts even allege that Ukrainian diplomats practically copied Kozak’s plan. Actually, these are two different documents. The Russian plan is more specific than the Ukrainian one. Even similar clauses reveal substantial differences (Kozak’s plan is too obviously Russia-oriented). Thus, the Russian concept states that Transdnistria may withdraw from Moldova by a referendum “on [valid] grounds.” Yet no grounds are specified (meaning that anything could be construed as grounds). An analogous clause in the Ukrainian document is more specific. Transdnistria has the right to secede from Moldova only if Moldova decides to join another country. This clause, incidentally, a priori “neutralizes” the Transdnistrians’ fear that Chisinau is harboring plans of joining Romania.
What aspects of Yushchenko’s plan are drawing most of the criticism? First of all, its generality; it doesn’t specify the legal status of Transdnistria. The Day has learned that this is not to the European Union’s liking. Off the record Ukrainian diplomats stress that this status must be determined by Moldova and Transdnistria, namely by an ad hoc parliamentary commission. Who can guarantee that the parliamentarians will come to terms? No one. Ukraine seems to be banking on the arrival of more compliant deputies in the Transdnistrian parliament. There seem to be promising signs of this, as not so long ago almost twenty current MPs submitted constitutional amendments to the Supreme Council of the Transdnistrian Moldovan Republic. These amendments expand parliamentary and reduce presidential powers (a real feat, given the rigid Transdnistrian regime). However, the electoral provisos of the Ukrainian plan are giving Transdnistria cause to worry that Ukraine is trying to export the Orange Revolution. Ukrainian diplomats adamantly refute this allegation, declaring that the revolution took place in Ukraine because of the rigged election turnout. The election campaign and voting in Transdnistria will be monitored by the OSCE in order to provide equal terms and conditions for all candidates.
What worries Russia about the Ukrainian plan is the presence of the US and EU. During the mediators’ meeting in Vinnytsia on May 16-17, the Russians asked point blank how Ukraine sees Brussels and Washington’s involvement. From what The Day knows, the EU and US will act as observers during the first stage. If Transdnistria and Moldova support the idea of increasing the number of mediators, Kyiv will follow suit (although neither Kyiv nor Moscow have received letters in this regard from the US and EU). Another possibility is that the presence of Western diplomats will somewhat narrow the field for Russian manipulations — at least they won’t be attempted in the open. However, it’s worth remembering that Russia has repeatedly demonstrated “independent” actions (i.e., ones not coordinated with the other sides) and Transdnistria isn’t likely to be an exception from the rule.
Naturally, Ukraine will find itself exposed to further criticism concerning its settlement plan. Ukrainian diplomats have a ready answer to this: something must be done to give a fresh impetus to the peace settlement.
