The election results in Moldova did not create a sensation. As expected, Moldova’s pro-European Communists garnered the largest percentage of votes. The elections in this country were not decisive in geopolitical terms to the extent that the Ukrainian presidential elections were, since in Moldova it was not a struggle between conflicting geopolitical trends, but primarily a struggle for power, which in Moldova’s case is a struggle for the right to head the country’s course toward European integration. The focus of international attention has been not so much on Moldovan party candidacies as on the question of territories in the post-Soviet space, which was shelved until recently.
ATLANTIZATION OF PSEUDO-COUNTRIES
Before the expansion of the EU and the Euro-Atlantic zone, Transdnistria was largely an internal issue of the CIS in Russia’s backyard. Under the present circumstances, the best possible option for Russia would be the federalization of Moldova whereby it would preserve its influence over this “Russian-oriented enclave.” However, so far the Kremlin has been unable to offer an adequate solution to the Transdnistrian problem, which is the reason behind the major cooling of Russo-Moldovan relations of late.
In its regional policy at the stage of post-Soviet positioning in the foreign policy arena, Russia focused on creating “pro-Russian” buffer zones on the basis of new micro-territorial formations, such as Northern Osetia, Ajaria, the Transdnistrian Moldovan Republic (TMR), etc. Taking into account the fact that splinters of the Soviet empire are continuing their movement “away from the Moscow center,” one may assume with a great degree of certainty that Russia’s attempts to change the course of these splinters and direct their movement will clash with a stronger trend, the economic and political atlantization of Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, small enclaves, like the TMR, have very few chances of adequately realizing their own geopolitical positioning scenarios while remaining under Russia’s patronage. The essence of the political and economic atlantization process is not only the EU’s socioeconomic artificiality (which is only a result of atlantization), but the historical and territorial de-Sovietization of Eastern Europe after a long period of history when the politics, society, and economy of this territory were being shaped after the Soviet fashion.
Today’s Russia, which is ready to establish patronage over the TMR, is becoming involved in the post-Iraqi geopolitical scheme of the distribution of control over global security. According to this scheme, economic power implies a level of military potential. Russia’s obvious economic inadequacy is becoming an increasingly decisive factor, which is driving Russia out of the club of global leaders. In this context, the initiatives to expel Russia from the G-8 club graphically support this statement. Therefore, Russia’s attempts to preserve its external zones of influence will most likely reduce its inter-leadership dialog with the USA and Europe to the level of legal recommendations. This means the introduction of a new rule of global security: the level of access to security control is determined by every individual country’s resources and status.
“A DRIFT AWAY FROM MOSCOW” OR DIVERSIFICATION OF INFLUENCE
Speaking of foreign policy technologies employed to involve the TMR in the Euro-Atlantic space, it is worth noting that despite a series of technical problems that prevented the Moldovan government from securing a real majority in parliament, the scenario in which Voronin is elected president for a second term is quite acceptable for the West. The Moldovan president is a key functional figure when it comes to the reintegration of the TMR into Moldova. In this case even the Communist profile of the Moldovan government did not seem objectionable to the West: even though they voiced some reservations, both Washington and Brussels recognized the elections as legitimate.
In many respects, the TMR was a result of a Russo-American compromise. However, the role of the TMR as a buffer and customs zone under Russian domination has been neutralized by Ukraine’s European ambitions on the one hand and Moldova’s European integration aspirations on the other. This means that the TMR’s internal transformation strategies notwithstanding, the external trend envisions a gradual assimilation of this republic by Moldova in the format of a federation and autonomy, and not by Ukraine or Russia.
Meanwhile, the American administration is currently focused on eliminating pseudo-countries and pseudo-autonomies, i.e., regulated regional conflicts that serve as isolated enclaves of Russian influence and transcend the boundaries of the new logic of post-Soviet integration. Overall, the current situation in the post-Soviet space is following the scenario of a second democratic wave, which, much like the first wave, is characterized by the trend of nations “moving away from the Kremlin.” However, this time the goal of such internal transformations is not the formation of nation states, but a choice of an integration scenario and involvement in supranational structures. Russia has failed as a leader of integration processes and proven unable to carry out a scenario of effective political and security coordination in the CIS. Today smaller but more mobile players are trying out this role.
The process of breaking up follows a new logic of integration that is founded on the diversification of “centers of delegated influence.” On the technological side, this process involves the creation of several regional centers or coalitions. The idea of a Union of Central Asian States, proposed by Kazakhstan, is no doubt connected with the upcoming election campaign. However, taking into account the intensification of relations along the Kyiv-Chisinau-Tbilisi line, such shifts in the logic of integration are signaling that in the foreseeable future the post-Soviet space might evolve in terms of competition among new integration centers.
UKRAINE’S CHANCE OF LEADERSHIP
The Ukrainian factor has brought the logic of separation into the relationship between Russia and the TMR. Further proof of this is the Ukrainian president’s new customs program, which will probably involve German capital. The Russian president cannot play a stronger counter game in this direction if he is to follow international legislation that is generally more advantageous to the West than Russia. Against the backdrop of Russia’s withdrawal, the EU is becoming more and more involved in the Transdnistrian scenario. Ukraine is interested in greater European involvement in the Transdnistrian scenario, since it is trying to act as a conveyor of European influence in the region. Active participation in the settlement of the conflict and, more importantly, its successful resolution would strengthen Kyiv’s leadership positions in the region. In turn, the Euro-Atlantic format of the Transdnistrian scenario would give greater legitimacy to Ukraine’s claims to regional leadership. Therefore, it is in Kyiv’s interests for the TMR problem to be resolved within the framework of European and Euro-Atlantic international legal practices.
Kyiv, which is claiming an active role in the Transdnistrian process, should not only be an effective “European representative” in the region, but also create another niche that is quite natural in the current situation. Today, Ukraine has sufficient foreign policy potential to balance and level off the counter-Russian trend, which is becoming a basic factor in the new coalitions forming in the post-Soviet space. Kyiv, which has become an informal leader of an essentially counter-Russian coalition, should become the key factor in easing conflicts in post-Soviet scenarios and thus become a mediator between the “old” and “new” players in the region. Ukraine is now in a position to determine the nature of the GUUAM — whether it will be integration for the sake of jointly achieving European standards, or integration in a drift “away from Russia.”
