The gas conflict between Russia and Belarus has entered an openly hostile phase, with Minsk standing no chance of winning the game. Either way, for Belarus it’s cash on the barrelhead, with gas supplies on Russia’s terms and conditions, albeit with slight concessions and each side proclaiming victory. We have been through this in Ukraine, and we’ve seen it in neighboring countries.
It is evident that the commercial component of this confrontation between the two allied countries is very small. For Russia, even for Gazprom, Belarus’ $200 million worth of arrears is a small sum, especially when one takes into account the fact that it is actually smaller, as Gazprom has acknowledged its gas transit debt. For Belarus, the situation appears somewhat more complicated, but not fatal. They can pay this sum, even if with difficulty.
The true reasons behind this conflict are political, even geopolitical. There are also domestic political factors that appear to be even more important, though are too complex and intertwined to make sense of them. Of late, one should also add psychological factors, including Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s departure from Belarus this March during Prime Minister Putin’s visit. It was proof of deterioration in Russia-Belarus relations, and the utter psychological incompatibility between the leaders of the two countries. Knowing Putin’s character, it wasn’t hard to predict the consequences that the Belarusian president would face.
Compared to previous gas conflicts, Moscow sees this one from a different perspective.
Apparently, the Kremlin has a somewhat different propaganda scenario for this gas conflict, starring Dmitry Medvedev as a defender of the people, telling — in fact, ordering — Gazprom’s CEO not to accept any blini, cakes or other payments in kind, only hard currency — USD, not RUB. Why not rubles? To make these payments more complicated? It is a publicity stunt, involving the head of state prohibiting even a single ruble (dollar?) from appearing in the books of a country devastated by a financial crisis, just so that the overdue debts can not be paid. A good old time-tested tactic…
Once again, Russians can clearly see who is controlling the [Russia-Belarus] tandem’s handlebars. This demonstration is not so much for the people as it is for that part of the political elite and bureaucracy that is still unable to figure out who the next president of the Russian Federation will be. Every effort is being made, on all bureaucratic levels in Russia, to secure Medvedev’s second term. During the notorious Khodorkovsky Trial, Herman Gref actually testified for the defendant’s benefit (considering that Mikhail Khodorkovsky had been hauled in on Putin’s personal orders). The very fact of high-ranking bureaucrats being subpoenaed, their appearance and subsequent arrogant behavior in the courtroom, is vivid proof of such bureaucrats keeping their noses to the wind, staying on the right level and moving in the right direction in the corridors of power.
As it is, the Kremlin has taken a sharp twist in relations with its neighbors. The previous stick-and-carrot attitude now focuses on the stick part. Russia’s policy is easily understandable, with the world financial crisis underway: no one seems to have money to spare and budgets are in dire need of ba-lancing. You want loans? We have the money. But you must come up with bigger collateral, better guarantees, and behave as instructed. In fact, Moscow expected little from Minsk, all things considered: recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Minsk refused and took an openly anti-Moscow stand in the matter of Kyrgyzstan, granting ex-Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev political asylum (this despite the increasing amount of media reports accusing him of having organized public unrest in the south of Kyrgyzstan).
At this stage the relations between Russia and Belarus appear to have reached a deadlock, making it easier, by comparison, for Moscow to solve a number of problems with Washington. At first the Kremlin simply couldn’t believe Minsk’s stance, attributing it to Lukashenka’s extravaganza as the [Moscow-backed] president of the Republic of Belarus. So they decided to wait until things became clearer. Then the ax fell, and gas supplies were cut. Anishchenko [Russia’s chief sanitary inspector] was about to start checking Belarusian milk for mustard gas or phosgene, but was ordered to stand down, so he confined himself to issuing warnings addressing a number of suppliers of dairy products.
Add here the opposition to the customs union. Moscow is not just chagrined by the presence of differing attitudes. There are enough of them in Kazakhstan, despite Astana’s gas and oil fields, and other things without which Russia simply can’t do, let alone Kazakhstan’s political clout in Central Asia. The Kremlin keeps in mind and carefully estimates every neighbor’s weight category, so that some are allowed to do something while others are recommended that certain steps not be taken. Lukashenka’s attempt to become a member of the [CIS] customs union on an equal footing also annoyed the Kremlin. There was his attempt to blackmail them with oil/gas transit and joint defense. For Russia, setting up a customs union, with Belarus among its members, is a matter of principle and one that has considerable political meaning. Any obstacles on this road are treated accordingly. In addition, Belarusian authorities are skillfully and consistently barring Russian companies’ access to the Belarusian market. Despite their interest in acquiring Belarusian assets, the most valuable ones remain in the hands of the president’s closest associates — and there is the increasing likelihood of these assets passing into the hands of Western owners. Minsk is apparently planning to take advantage of the privatization campaign, in lieu of domestic political liberalization, as a key to the construction of new relationships with the EU. That is why fueling the fire of relationships with the neighbors has been a geometric sequence in regard to the integer denominator.
Strange as it may seem, for Lukashenka the conflict with Russia was actually a godsend in terms of politics. He is soon to undergo another election campaign and he hasn’t much to show for his performance as head of state. There is a very short distance between love and hate, the more so that independent Belarus has discovered that its worst enemy isn’t across the ocean — or across the Rhine — but beyond the cities of Gomel and Mogilev. In his April 2010 message to the Belarusian people and parliament, President Lukashenka declared that Russia is the enemy, and claimed that Moscow’s planned efforts threatened Belarus’ survival.
Moscow is obviously daydreaming about Belarus longing after a common Soviet home. It seems the Kremlin has overlooked the fact that in the two decades since the USSR’s collapse Belarus has realized the value of national independence, and that this awareness has been proved by nationwide polls. Belarusians travel to Russia to get better-paid jobs, but they don’t want to live in the same state. There are many reasons behind their negative attitude, including terror[ism] and militia [police] brutality. Belarus has all this and to spare, so why add to this burden? In fact, Lukashenka used this as a hobbyhorse. He replaced post-Soviet nostalgia with sovereignty and independence rhe-toric in his domestic political strategy.
Besides, this anti-Russia stand allowed him to obliterate the boundary lines between the domestic opposition and the powers that be. Without a doubt, Minsk regards the EU as an alternative to Russia. Using the opposition’s former slogans will make it possible to slacken the existing regime, even if outwardly, and stage the next presidential election with a favorable outcome. This outcome, however, will be recognized across the Buh River [i.e., Western Europe. — Ed.]. Not coincidentally, Stefan Fule, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy, is expected to visit Minsk on July 8-9. He has told the European Parliament that he will advise official Minsk of the terms and conditions on which the EU will recognize the outcome of the next presidential campaign as legitimate, also the prospects of an agreement between Belarus and EU in regard to simplified visa procedures and cooperation with the European Investment Bank. His statement has given rise to assumptions, including the possibility of the European Union taking a stand with respect to events in Belarus. There is a strong likelihood that the attempt to postpone settlements with Gazprom is based on Minsk’s expectations regarding Stefan Fule’s visit. And there is the Chinese card up the Belarusian sleeve, kept as a last resort. After all, Communist China’s breakthrough in Russia’s western periphery is fraught with unwelcome consequences that will make themselves felt before long.
Gazprom is getting prepared to direct a considerable part of its gas supplies to Europe through the Ukrainian pipeline. It is a feasible project, technically speaking, although Poland will be unable to receive the full amount. The big question is: should Ukraine be happy about the prospect of receiving extra revenue, if it comes from a neighbour’s problems? After all, the Moscow dictatorship can be instantly directed against Ukraine. It would seem far more important to work out a common political course with the [gas] transit countries than to take advantage of the current situation. Needless to say, the Belarusian leader is neither Ukraine’s ally, nor even its travel companion. On the other hand, the Ukrainian political leadership would make a bad mistake by failing to use the current common interests with Belarus to its benefit. Ukraine can’t receive guarantees on the amount of gas being pumped through the pipeline from Gazprom, so why not propose our own terms and conditions, and make sure they are accepted, with Belarus’ knowledge and consent? Ukraine is in a position to benefit from the current situation. We won’t sell the Black Sea Fleet lease again, just as we aren’t likely to have another opportunity of negotiating a deal with our haughty northern neighbor on equal terms. After all, two heads are better than one — in terms of concerted action in this case. Europe will support us. This is what we want, don’t we?
