Starting from the mid-1990s the world has been discussing the relatively new concept of a “failed state,” which means a dysfunctional state, a state that has failed to develop, a state in ruins. According to the definition of an authoritative political science reference book, a failed state is “A nominally sovereign state that is no longer able to maintain itself as a viable political and economic unit. It is a state that has become ungovernable and lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.” (Griffits, M., O’Callaghan, T. International relations: the key concepts. Routledge, 2003, p.105–107).
The same reference book gives examples of “failed states”: Rwanda, Haiti, Cambodia, and Sierra Leone. Among the factors that facilitate the transformation of an ordinary state in a failed state the authors mention transition from autocracy and tyranny to democracy, which creates power vacuum, as well as poor governance and corruption exacerbated by the global capitalist system in which weak states are too much in debt and thus lose the ability to develop.
Several years ago mentioning Ukraine as a failed state would seem a nightmare to many citizens: the country was widely recognized in the world, was a member of authoritative international organizations, a strategic partner of the US and Russia, and an important link of the European security system. It could not, by definition, be one of those several remote failed states, which are seized by anarchy, civil conflicts, and decay of the state power. Today the label of a “failed state” is being all the more frequently and persistently attached to Ukraine — and this fact, surprisingly, evokes no anxiety among the state leadership and the ruling elite both of which are focused on the struggle for power and electoral victories.
What is the real situation with the Ukrainian statehood and what motivates those who want to proclaim Ukraine “a failed state”?
1. THE NUMBER-ONE TARGET IS TO DESTROY THE UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD
The topic of Ukraine as a failed state has recently become especially fashionable among a certain circle of the Russian political scientists—“Ukraine’s mortal friends.” One of these “friends,” Sergey Karaganov, is not the last person in the Moscow establishment. He is the head of the Presidium of Russia’s Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and has expressed a number of views that must draw the attention of those who care about the future of the Ukrainian state.
In his interview to Russkiy zhurnal (The Russian Magazine) on March 20, 2009, published under the remarkable title “No One Needs Monsters. Desovereignization of Ukraine,” this experienced adherent of Russia’s neo-imperialistic policy, who has been hardened in international discussions (like many of my colleagues, I have been “fortunate” to meet this man who has never and nowhere concealed his hatred for Ukraine’s independence), replies to the openly provocative questions of Russkiy zhurnal.
– Is the current situation in Ukraine threatening to turn it into a failed state?
– We are dealing with a case a state bankruptcy. Are there any possible limits to desovereignization? Is the introduction of external governance possible?
– Is any kind of discussion, possibly implicit rather than a direct one, in the expert circles on what should be done in the current situation on the territory of our western neighbor Ukraine? For example, events may get out of hand there as the problem with gas pipelines has already shown (!—hereinafter emphasis is added).
– Can the recent warming of relations between Russia and the United States include this question? (i.e., is there any possibility of a joint Russian-American action against Ukraine?— Author)
– Can we, Russia and Europe (!), permit the collapse of such a significant country?
In his answers Karaganov draws the conclusion concerning the “passive desovereignization,” i.e., loss of sovereignty as the ability of the people, society, and the state to govern themselves. Acknowledging that in 1999 Russia was on the verge of desovereignization and real collapse, Karaganov returns to Ukraine, stating that “Europeans have started to push Ukraine away by all available means… Now they are dismissing Ukraine without unnecessary sentiments, and everyone wants to ‘stay away from it’ for the time being … No one, roughly speaking, is ready and able to undertake the responsibility.” Then, departing from the academic tone, the political scientist starts dreaming, “With regard to Ukraine and Moldova, precisely these two countries are the biggest concern (!), and Russia and the US could speak about a common responsibility (!) concerning them.”
However, Karaganov admits sadly, “the level of distrust between Russia and the US is so high that I am not sure whether we are ready for this kind of talk… Neither Russia nor US has any tools to influence the situation in Ukraine… And the possibility of occupation, even by a group of friendly (!) states… Unfortunately (!), it would be sad and ridiculous to surmise this.”
Karaganov gave a resolute answer to the last question on whether one can allow Ukraine to collapse: “No. We have no right to do so. (!) It is inadmissible to let things drift. However, I see no real possibilities for Europe to give Russia carte blanche to occupy Ukraine entirely or its parts. On the other hand, Russia will not want to see absolutely ungovernable territories close by… So Russia will not permit anyone to exhibit excessive activeness.”
This example is not the only one in Russia’s imperial discourse of today: this kind of talk, often even more aggressive, concerning Ukraine and the possible division of its territory has been persistently imposed on Russian society as a geopolitical entity by Zatulins, Prokhanovs, Dugins, and other suchlike personalities. In this way the Russian Bolsheviks were once shaping the bloody reality using fantasy propaganda slogans.
Without doubt, the ideas about Ukraine’s “desovereignization,” its “ungovernable territory,” and “disintegration” into parts are under serious scrutiny on different levels of Russia’s political, military, and intelligence leadership: big and small Russian bosses have not yet forgotten the words their leader shouted at the Bucharest summit in 2007 at the moment of angry revelation: “Ukraine is not even a state! What is Ukraine? Part of its territory is Eastern Europe, while the other one, which is quite big, was given to it by Russia!” (Geopolitika, August 1, 2008)
Everything is clear with this direction of political science thought. In military language it is called the ideological-propagandistic support of the future operation on capturing the territory of a sovereign state.
2. THE REAL SITUATION WITH FAILED STATES
Different political science organizations in the West make their ratings of the countries that belong to failed states or are close to this status. So, the magazine Foreign Policy (2006, May/June, p. 50–58) provides the country instability indices calculated on the basis of a number of indicators, such as the demographic situation, refugees, military conflicts, human rights violations, reliable security system, economic situation, etc. All the countries under study are divided into five categories depending on whether they are in a critical, dangerous, boundary, stable, and most stable situation. Twenty-nine countries were included in the first category (critical situation), including Somalia, Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Burma, etc.
The countries in the “dangerous” group (18 states) include such Russia’s allies as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well Egypt, Uganda, Syria, Laos, etc.
The group of the “boundary” countries, which are close to the failed state status, include such countries as Russia (!), Tajikistan, Belarus, and Moldova. This list ends with Ukraine and China.
We can see the US among the stable states, and Canada, among the most stable ones.
The Washington, D.C.-based Fund for Peace, founded in the mid-20th century, makes lists of failed states in the most professional way based on of the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST). It studies 12 sociological, economic, political, and military indicators, assesses the ability of the state’s five most important institutions to guarantee stability and security, and takes into account risk factors and unexpected (negative) events that may have an impact on the situation in the state. Great attention is paid to the state’s vulnerability and the risks of violence.
The grades from zero to 10 (0 indicates the most stable situation) are assigned according to 12 indicators. The Failed States Index 2008 lists 177 states divided into four groups. The “alert” index was assigned to 56 countries — from Somalia to Georgia, from Haiti to Uzbekistan, from Guinea-Bissau to Turkmenistan, and from Yemen to Moldova. Neither Ukraine nor Russia is in this group. They are part of the following “warning” category, with Russia taking a much worse place (72nd, 79.7 points) than Ukraine (108th, 70.8 points). The other countries of this group include Israel (58th), Azerbaijan (64th), China (68th), Saudi Arabia (84th), Turkey (92nd), Armenia (109th), and the new member of NATO Albania (112th).
The group of the countries in which the situation needs to be monitored includes Latvia (136th), Estonia (139th), Slovakia (142nd), Lithuania (143rd), Poland (145th), the Czech Republic (149th), France (158th), Great Britain (160th), and the US (161st).
The most stable group of “sustainable” states includes Japan (163rd), Canada (167th), Austria (168th), Sweden (175th), Finland (176th), and Norway (177th).
In the light of the above-mentioned failed states index, which is based on objective indicators, the attempts of certain Russian political scientists to pry in others’ affairs with their unhealthy and aggressive dreams appear to be quite comic, if not tragicomic. These people fail to see the situation on their own territories, which are far from being trouble-free, to put it mildly. This reminds one of an old caricature in which some demented saboteurs are fixing a mine to an enemy ship, while sitting on a huge mine dotted with detonator wires.
Of course, our “friends” may find comfort in the fact that the index was compiled before the global crisis of 2008–09, which will affect the status of many countries, probably increasing the number of failed states. It is worth lending an ear to the opinion of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, who said that the deepening of the financial crisis may stir up civil riots and “violence extremism” in “weak” European countries (let us recall the events in Greece, Iceland, and Latvia). Some NATO officers believe that Ukraine is “closer to failed states than any other functioning (European) country.” (Newsweek, April 6, 13, 2009).
Not very pleasant is the fact that The Economist listed Ukraine among the twenty least stable states (16th place, between Ecuador and Bangladesh, while the list is topped by Zimbabwe, Chad, Congo, Cambodia, and Sudan). Ukraine received this index owing not only to its financial-economic crisis, but also to the chronic paralysis of parliament and the discord in the highest echelons of power.
Under these circumstances one cannot dismiss various scenarios, even the most undesirable ones. However, provided there is no interference of external forces with Ukraine’s domestic affairs, our state — even in the current dangerously unbalanced situation — has sufficient safety margin owing to its uniquely peace-loving society. Whereas southern hot-tempered nations take up arms over the slightest cause, Ukrainians will be lazily ignoring the resistance actions until they are brought to the condition such as in the fall of 2004, when people’s patience snapped. However, cases like that are rare, occurring once in 10–12 years.
Today everybody is talking about Mexico with its drug war in which over 7,000 people died in 2008 (the influenza A/H1N1 only increased the instability in the country), as well nuclear Pakistan — these are the countries that, in Pentagon’s opinion, “are approaching a quick and sudden collapse” (Time, April 6, 2009).
The authors of the Failed States Index–2008 underline that it does not necessarily indicate that the state may face violence or collapse. Rather, it makes it possible to measure the vulnerability of the state to conflicts or collapse. The rate and direction of every state’s development may lead to either improvement or deterioration.
A classical example of considerable improvement of the state’s positions is India, which in 1970s was swept with a wave of famine and mass violence and became a classical example of a failed state. Today India, the episodic terrorist acts notwithstanding, is the largest democratic state in the world with a competitive economy and representative political system.
A similar example is found in the South African Republic, which after the racial war of 1980s has managed to create a new political system, adopt a liberal constitution, and drop its nuclear program. A certain improvement of the situation in 2007–08 was registered in Liberia, Haiti, C te d’Ivoire, while deterioration was found in Pakistan, Israel, Palestine territories, and Bangladesh.
Special attention is paid to the situation with parliamentarianism: an impotent, weak parliament, which rubberstamps government-approved resolutions is a necessary attribute of the dictatorial-authoritarian state, which is approaching a failed state. It turns out that there is a separate index of the parliamentary power, which takes into account the real power of the legislative body — its ability to declare war, use impeachment to the executive power, and adopt the laws that cannot be vetoed by the president (or other leader of the nation).
3. REALITY AND ILLUSIONS
We have seen now that Ukraine, fortunately, does not belong to the group of “critical” countries, which are characterized by mass hunger, riots, civil wars, total collapse of state power, unchecked anarchy, etc.). Therefore, what our caring neighbors are saying about the danger of “ungovernable failed state” of Ukraine is in the category of information warfare designed to sway the public opinion in Russia and a number of European states (France and Germany) in favor of the legitimacy of sanctions against Ukraine and the possibility of carrying out an operation to subdue the disobedient state, which dared (what an impudence!) realize its own foreign policy that differs from Russia’s Eurasian, imperial, and autocratic lines of development.
What I have said urges (rather than removes the need for) a serious public discussion of the current situation in the state, the increasing weakness of many state institutions, which is dangerous in view of the threats emerging both within Ukraine and to the north and east of it.
Let us not forget what the important indicators of a failed state are:
– loss of physical control over the territory;
– loss of the right (monopoly) of the state to legal exercise of power;
– inability of government representatives to make collective decisions;
– growing level of corruption and organized crime;
– inability to collect taxes;
– massive movements of refuges and demographic catastrophes;
– environmental catastrophes (such as Chornobyl);
– foreign intervention.
It would be good if the readers of The Day who care about the situation of Ukrainian statehood, made their own assessment of the existing threats. The exhausting and absurd infighting in the supreme leadership, the partial paralysis of power, an abrupt fall of economic indices do not add to Ukraine’s stability. The country needs the political will and coordinated actions of all branches of power to move away from the dangerous zone of failed states. There is a need for honest and open discussion of our urgent problems with the participation of independent experts and entire civil society.
Despite all of our obvious weak points and mistakes, Ukraine’s great advantage over Putin-Medvedev’s closed, authoritarian, pompously imperialistic Russia is in the level of our democracy, political competition, freedom for discussion of all aspects of the state’s operation, and the awareness of the problems that need to be resolved immediately.
The latest issue of the American magazine Foreign Affairs contains a remarkable article dedicated to Ukraine’s problems (Foreign Affairs, May/June 2009. Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl: The Key to Kiev, p. 106–120). The authors believe that the recent deterioration of Russia–Ukraine relations should be greatly alarming to the West, because Ukraine’s security is critical for Europe’s stability. The authors maintain that Ukraine should return to its political agenda as a state defending its own rights, rather than moving toward the status of Russia’s vassal.
The article characterizes Russia as undemocratic, authoritarian, complacently nationalistic country whose mass media are consistent in creating an image of hostile and aggressive Ukraine. They portray Ukraine as stealing Russian gas and forming alliances with Moscow’s enemies. (According to a VTsIOM survey of Feb. 15, 2009, one-sixths of Russia’s population is ready for a war against Ukraine, while 70 percent of the respondents believe that an armed conflict with our country is possible.) It takes a mind-boggling amount of zombifying to produce these results from our former “brothers,” who not so long ago claimed they loved Ukraine. This contradicts the interests of Russia and its people, and the blame is entirely on Russia’s ruling regime.
The authors of the article in Foreign Affairs offer possible scenarios for Ukraine–Russia relations, pointing out that Moscow’s aim is to subordinate Ukraine through economic pressure and possible military adventures. They believe that these kinds of scenarios are extremely dangerous both for the Western countries and Russia itself, which is a split, corrupt, and potentially unstable oil-rich state. Russia possesses nuclear weapons, while it is still closer to the Third World than post-industrial countries.
Comparing Ukraine–Russia relations with those India–Pakistan and Israel–Syria relations, the authors urge the West to reject unilateral approaches (Russia first and foremost) and suggest pursuing a well-balanced policy that takes into account both Russia’s and independent Ukraine’s interests. The conclusion of the article is important: “Europe and the United States must … understand that even with all its imperfections, Ukraine is not a failed state, nor is it likely to become one. … Despite … [its] weaknesses and political uncertainties, Ukraine will not collapse, as Russia’s ultranationalists have predicted.”
The Russian policy of increasing hostility toward Ukraine and a number of other post-Soviet and post-socialist countries is gradually leading to a cul-de-sac and runs into the increasing resistance on the part of Western public opinion. So, according to the BBC, Russia lost more in the eyes of other countries than any other country of the world in 2008. The number of people in the West who consider that Russia is playing a negative role in the world has grown from 34 to 47 percent.
Shouldn’t the Russian politicians, among which, no doubt, there are many who have not been brainwashed by the official propaganda, think about the need to return to the realistic policy of equitable, neighbor relations with Ukraine as a sovereign state instead of toying with phantom mirages of deceptive imperial illusions?
