The reshuffles in Russia’s “upper echelons” are further proof of the strengthening of the power vertical. Ukraine has chosen a different path of development based on a decentralization of power. The implementation of political reform is further proof of the chosen direction. Which road will ultimately prove more effective, the Russian or the Ukrainian one? The Day addressed this question to Vadym KARASIOV, a noted political scientist and the director of the Institute of Global Studies.
Ukraine and Russia are different countries; therefore it is difficult to do a comparative analysis; they have different tasks. Russia has a geopolitical mission, while Ukraine’s mission lies not so much in independent geopolitics as integration into collective security structures. What are the distinctions of these countries?
The first distinction: any version of the successor scenario that is constantly being discussed in Russia, including in connection with the latest personnel decisions, is impossible in Ukraine. Such a scenario was dismantled in Ukraine in 2004, and it is unlikely that it will return to it. In Russia there is a possibility that the Russian elite will discard the “successor” formula and a strong president. And so preparations are gradually being made for Vladimir Putin to lead the government. This will enable him to retain his real commanding status without the necessity of being elected for a third term. Personnel rotation in Russia’s higher echelons can be regarded as the beginning of the transformation from a presidential to a parliamentary-presidential political regime with a strong prime minister, who will actually act as a chancellor. Vladimir Putin may be this chancellor.
The second distinction: even if Russia changes in the direction of a parliamentary-presidential republic like the one in Ukraine, the consequences, tools, and final formulation of the political regimes may be different. Russia doesn’t have real multiparty competition, but there is a dominating-party system. In Ukraine there exists de facto multiparty pluralism, which will most likely be preserved in the new political order. This is linked to the fact that the structure of elites in Ukraine is essentially different from Russia’s. The structure of elites in Russia is high- integrated and low-differentiated; its elites are actually lined up as a clear-cut hierarchical chain. In Ukraine this structure is different: it is low-integrated and high-differentiated, which provides conditions for competition. Freedom is bursting into these corridors of competition, which does not allow any side to have the strength to monopolize power in this country and create its own party or nonparty vertical of power. In Ukraine no political force has a controlling interest in power; all the forces mostly have a blocking share of power, which makes coalition agreements and various forms of collegial and compromise rule simply imperative for institutional effectiveness. From the standpoint of effective solutions to short-term tasks, a collegial system of power based on a fragmentation of elites can be ineffective. We can see as much from the economic indices. In the long run, however, especially in the case of the long-term democratic brand, this road may lead to success, given a correct approach to strengthening democracy and then to pulling the economy out of the depression. In conditions of freedom and democracy there may evolve a creative, enterprising economy that will be more in conformity with European standards. Therefore, a comparison made over a short period of time shows that vertical power can be more effective, but from the standpoint of a long-term trend, allowing for Ukraine’s democratic and European orientation, the current structure of elites is a step in the direction of an effective political system and an effective business-oriented economy.
