Two years ago, Sergei Ivanov, currently one of Vladimir Putin’s closest associates — then Secretary of the Russian Security Council, appointed Premier under the new President — announced a new turn in the Russian policy with regard to the Commonwealth of Independent States. It could be summed up as a multilevel and multirate integration. This, however, did not mean discarding Russian dominance in the post-Soviet realm. Over the past few years, Moscow has applied rather effective methods to protect its interests, ranging from intergovernmental alliances, military cooperation, a combination of trade wars, antidumping, to political support.
The regular, fourth informal CIS summit will take place January 28-29 in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast. Serhiy Borodenko, head of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry’s press service, says this summit will actually be nonpolitical. The heads of states will mostly deal with economic issues, including cooperation in terms of energy supplies, transport, and food markets. All CIS presidents will attend the summit. Uzbekistan will be the only exception, represented by its premier, as President Islam Karimov will be on an official visit to Spain at the time. The previous informal CIS summit took place in March 2002 in Chimbulak, a mountain resort, at the Kazakh President’s initiative. What are the CIS’ prospects and how can Ukraine benefit from its membership economically and politically? Below are comments by The Day’s experts.
Dmytro VYDRIN, director, European Integration and Development Institute:
The CIS is an organization founded not to carry out some global, well- planned strategies. It came to be simply because it had to. Rather, it is an involuntary entity and, as all such forced alliances, burdensome to most members. Therefore, I can’t see much by way of CIS prospects. Had there been an elite, a group of leaders capable of proposing something more effective, this organization would have long ceased to exist. There are no such strategists among the CIS leaders, so this body shows a rather miserable modus vivendi. Everybody feels it is a pain in the neck, yet none can show a more effective way to join the interests. EURASEC is almost as forced an alliance; I’d describe it as a mini-CIS.
I see two CIS scenarios. The ideal one would be if a strong national elite appeared within this body, developing an essentially new model, allowing for the law of the world, with all subjects being placed on an equal footing, regardless of their resources and military potential. The other scenario is not ideal, with CIS and EURASEC being gradually torn apart by more effective organizations. Some of their members would quit and join the EU and others would join Asian structures involving China, India, and other giants.
Ukraine can only wait and get prepared to participate in more effective international cooperation patterns. Such participation, however, will be possible only in the presence of an effective elite, because countries do not participate in effective international formations (although outwardly the reverse seems true). Their national elite does. Kyiv must prepare an elite capable of including this country in a conglomerate where Ukraine’s objectives could be most effectively realized. There is no such elite at present, as evidenced by Ukrainian-WTO relationships. We are lagging far behind, although we could have joined WTO last year. If our elite remains its old inactive and shortsighted self, the same will happen with the other organizations. We are constantly late for “good company” and constantly hang around the bad ones. Countries with a more advanced and energetic elite will continue to skim the cream off their membership of such international entities.
Serhiy MAKSYMENKO, director, Kyiv Center, East-West Institute:
CIS is a kind of international organization formed by powerful countries to advance their interests. Therefore, CIS should be regarded primarily in the context of Russian interests. Its future depends on the development of Russia in the first place.
Ukraine’s cooperation with CIS member countries is quite natural, primarily in the economic sphere. Ukraine is interested in having equal partner’s economic contacts with other CIS participants, Russia included. It is possible and some steps have been taken in that direction. As for the foreign political strategy, Ukraine would benefit from taking a more active part in the European integration process. One must distinguish between this process and Ukraine’s ultimate goal: EU membership. This goal cannot be reached in the nearest future, but it does not mean that no European integration efforts should be made. It takes daily painstaking work, for this is Ukraine’s future.
Hryhory NEMYRIA, director, European and International Study Center:
I don’t think that the coming summit will be any different from the previous ones in terms of CIS prospects — and all the previous summits were markedly ineffective. Their ineffectiveness is obvious compared to the constructive debates on the future of Europe at the European Convent and European Union as a whole. Several major European leaders have submitted their concepts of a new EU. We haven’t heard any such concepts or seen any more or less substantial programs with regard to CIS, except for the Kazakh President’s more or less systemic presentation. I think it was well to be expected. It is evidence of the low CIS efficiency, as this body largely remains a symbolic political mechanism, rather than a tool with which to achieve economic results.
Russia, being the most powerful CIS member, has for almost two years been mostly concentrating on the development of bilateral relationships within this body, rather than on a strategy focused on CIS as an international organization. The Year of Ukraine in Russia, in 2002, and the current Year of Kazakhstan are vivid examples. If one compares CIS to EU (where the interests of leading countries have an impact on the Union’s future), the former shows that the Russian interests consist not in the strengthening and institutional revision of CIS, but in trying to retain at least something of what has been achieved, while advancing bilateral relationships with CIS countries. By the way, this strongly reminds one of Ukraine’s attitude to the role played by the CIS. Ukrainian diplomats constantly stress that Ukraine is a founder but not a member of the CIS.
Kyiv could show an effective policy in relation to CIS by adhering to the ad hoc principle, using the opportunities stemming from such bilateral contacts and avoiding any legally binding commitments, not singing any agreements deviating from Ukraine’s formally stated course of European integration.
Ihor OSTASH, deputy chairman, foreign affairs committee of the Verkhovna Rada:
Ukraine’s attitude to CIS is clearly stated in the pertinent documents. Kyiv does not recognize the CIS status as a subject of international law. This is a very important aspect, because CIS is trying to be a serious mechanism precisely in this sphere of international law. Ukraine did not sign several statutory documents, particularly the CIS Charter and the document setting up the economic alliance. Hence, the question of Ukraine’s actual standing within CIS. Can this country preside over CIS, as is currently proposed? No, it can’t, not in the context of international law and CIS statutory instruments, because Ukraine is not a full-fledged CIS member. Furthermore, this organization ought to be considered as a mechanism with which Ukraine can be pressured.
CIS was once described as an organization set up to affect a civilized divorce. In a sense, this allegation has been proved right, for we can now see several intergovernmental formations within CIS: the alliance between Russia and Belarus, EurAsEC, and GUUAM. CIS is more like an advisory body these days. As for the prospects of Ukrainian membership, CIS ought to be considered not as an intergovernmental organization but as just a vehicle of multilateral consultations. Of course, there is chance to give CIS more meaning, by establishing a free trade zone. But we can see a lot of difficulties there. Russia practically does not support the idea, placing major emphasis on EURASEC. There are definite attempts to persuade Ukraine to join EURASEC. Fortunately, our legislative and executive branches take the same stand in the matter: Ukraine cannot be a CIS member.
The coming informal CIS summit ought to be regarded as a consultative meeting that cannot have any serious legal consequences. We should convince the executive that Ukraine cannot benefit from presiding over CIS. After all, the CIS Charter reads that the CIS chairmanship must be held by all the member countries on a rotary basis. Russia has been the only chairman to date and proposed to Ukraine the status only at this stage, apparently in order to put forth certain ideas.
