April 20 witnessed major compromises achieved in Verkhovna Rada. Three intergovernmental documents addressing Ukrainian-Russian relations were ratified. The first was an agreement on the state frontier. The second one, an agreement on cooperation in the use of the Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait, and the third, an agreement on the formation of a single economic space [mostly referred to as a free trade area by the Western media]. The ratification process was not impeded even by the Mukacheve unrest, although the opposition insisted on its deliberation the previous day; nor by the arguments of most lawmakers taking the floor, not even by convincing admonitions voiced by experts. What is behind each of these documents?
Remarkably, the agreement on the Ukrainian-Russian border collected 352 ayes, and it was a well-deserved turnout. It was the target of least criticism, with just several people’s deputies voicing incomprehension of certain aspects like the absence of annexes (e.g., charts with the borderline). Foreign Minister Kostiantyn Hryshchenko in attendance responded by pointing to their voluminous size. By and large, the deputies could not be able to make much sense of them, as the Ukrainian-Russian frontier coincides with the administrative borderline. What makes this agreement important? First, it gives Ukraine an additional significant attribute of statehood, namely the formal presence of the national frontier. Second, Kyiv now has a preventive argument of sorts, in case Russia attempts to apply the Tuzla mode to the ground section of the border. Third, by taking the first step in the legal border procedures, namely by performing the delimitation, Ukraine is now free to enter the next phase, demarcation. This, in turn, will allow Ukraine to combat illegal migration (mostly from Russia) more effectively. After all, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that Russia has long rejected the very idea of a borderline with Ukraine. It took diplomats from both countries over forty consultations to work out a draft agreement. Only five years ago few would expect Moscow to agree to a delimitation, or that any such arrangements would ever be made with Russia.
Incidentally, a similar atmosphere is present at the Ukrainian-Russian talks concerning the maritime sector of the frontier. The Ukrainian foreign ministry believes that the ratification of the agreement on cooperation in the Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait is the “first stage” in the maritime delimitation. The parliamentary vote turnout showed 274 ayes. The Tuzla crisis actually prompted Vladimir Putin and Leonid Kuchma to sign the document in Kerch (December 24, 2003). Can this agreement be considered flawless? No. Does it protect Ukraine from future encroachments on its territorial integrity? No, it does not. This document is largely on the interim side. It reads that the Sea of Azov is delimited by a state borderline, as agreed between the signatories. The Ukrainian diplomats consider this a major breakthrough, for it means that the Kremlin has finally admitted the presence of a maritime state frontier. Concessions had to be made, but the Ukrainian diplomats regard them as insignificant. Thus, the joint presidential statement (also signed in Kerch) has it that both sides undertake to provide that warships flying the national colors of a third country may pass into the Sea of Azov and through the Kerch Strait only if so invited by Ukraine or by Russia. Kyiv correctly questions the practicality of inviting warships to pass through the Kerch Strait, considering that its depth makes it impassable for military vessels. However, Ukraine’s main concession is that the agreement does not mention border delimitation in the Kerch Strait.
Are there any guarantees that Russia will eventually agree to this as well? One thing is certain. The agreement ratified April 20 does not envisage this. Was is necessary to ratify such a “raw” agreement? Foreign Minister Kostiantyn Hryshchenko is convinced that it was. Moreover, he insists that this procedure is extensively applied internationally: “In international law, there exist a great many documents based precisely on commitment law, establishing certain principles and offering an opportunity to make final decisions in the course of subsequent negotiations.”
Finally, the SES agreement. While the first two bills were passed without much ado, reasonably viewed as being of importance to Ukraine, the third one caused an avalanche of criticism. Many lawmakers did not even feel gratified hearing First Vice Premier Mykola Azarov address the audience in Ukrainian (albeit with a kind of Russian- Belarusian accent). His main argument was that the agreement would allow Ukrainian producers to access new markets. Mykola Azarov explained, “The main objective is enhancing the competitiveness of the Ukrainian economy, considering that this economy is transparent and more than half of the GDP is on the foreign market.” He also stressed that the formation of SES is aimed at providing “conditions securing a high level of regional economic integration and, at the same time, not contradicting the Constitution, laws of Ukraine, and its strategy of European and Euro-Atlantic integration and WTO membership, on conditions answering our national interests.” Ukraine, as repeatedly assured by the government, strives to form a free trade area within the single economic space. Is this actually what Moscow expects from Kyiv? The SES agreement is essentially a political rather than economic instrument. It is important for Russia not to lose Ukrainian from the geopolitical point of view. The SES agreement is a perfect tool with which to not only slow down Kyiv’s European integration, but also put an end to the process. In fact, Moscow makes no secret of its aspirations, comparing SES integration with the European Union. The Russian leadership publicly declares that the main thing for Moscow is the creation of a customs union, waging a coordinated tax and credit policy; they are even seriously considering the institution of a single currency. Their explanation that this will allow the SES countries to receive Russian energy supplies at the domestic Russian prices is fiction, of course. Ambassador Viktor Chernomyrdin has often broached the subject and the Belarusian experience is graphic proof. SES participation contradicts not only Kyiv’s declared policy of European integration, but also its intention to achieve WTO membership soon (Russia insists that the signatories must move toward this membership simultaneously; considering Russia’s problems, this progress could take twenty years).
The only consolation for Kyiv is the fact that the SES agreement was signed with the reservation that Ukraine will participate in the formation and operation of the single economic space inasmuch as this conforms to its constitution. This primarily means that any SES proposal may be brought to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine to verify its constitutionality. Such proceedings may last long enough for the SES to sink into oblivion — or until it transforms into CIS-2. In any event, this scenario will be much better for Ukraine than an opportunity to lose its sovereignty for the benefit of a partner trying to build relations on the best-man-wins principle.
— P.S.: The Russian Duma also ratified two agreements with Ukraine on April 20, on the Russian-Ukrainian border and on the cooperation in the use of the Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait. The Lower House ratified the SES agreement.
