I think democracy began in modern Ukraine when politicians with different visions of society’s development were given an opportunity to debate on television. I am referring, first of all, to my debates with the founders of Rukh (Popular Movement of Ukraine — Ed.) in 1989 and to the contested elections of the people’s deputies of the USSR and Soviet Ukraine in 1989 and 1990, respectively. Therefore, the signing of the Bilovezka Agreement was just the final stage of our state’s journey toward independence and institutionalized democracy. My assessment of the objective and subjective factors has not changed since then. The Ukrainian people began their movement toward independence.
The next milestone was the period between 1990 and 1994, when the first democratically elected Verkhovna Rada proclaimed Ukraine’s independence and passed a number of democratic laws. That period saw the triumph of viable democracy, when power was transferred through democratic elections to a new president and a new parliament. It was this milestone that paved our way to the Council of Europe and other political, military- political, and economic European structures. At that stage, Ukraine was firmly adhering to democratic principles of development.
The following milestone was the 1996 Constitution and economic reforms during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma. Ideally, those reforms were supposed to establish a firm material basis for democracy. Although this groundwork was never laid in the way it was conceived, those transformations eliminated the possibility of restoring the USSR or returning communism to Ukraine. Unfortunately, for objective and subjective reasons, the emergent model of a strong presidential state did not fully meet European democratic standards. Democratic institutions began to decline, which created colossal problems with human rights, freedom of speech, and rule of law.
All this brought on the next milestone that saw wide-scale street protests organized by the opposition — sometimes teetering on the brink of legality. That was the period between the “Ukraine without Kuchma” campaign and the Orange Revolution on Kyiv’s Independence Square, when the president himself also understood that the existing model of power had become outdated and that political reform was required. President Kuchma actively supported the latter, and parliament voted to amend the Constitution of Ukraine.
Now that a new president is in power and the political reform has been set in motion, it is supposedly possible to usher in a new era in the development of Ukrainian democracy, and introduce European standards and practices of political competition. What our country’s population expected from the new president was this: genuine protection of the state’s national interests, an inseparable link between words and deeds, consistency in actions, and respect for the law and the Constitution. Regrettably, there have been very few improvements in the country during the 110 days since the new president was sworn in. It is thus crucial to find the root causes of this situation and identify their nature (objective or subjective).
“IF THE ENEMY DOES NOT SURRENDER...”
As for the processes in today’s Ukraine, which should be analyzed in order to forestall undesirable consequences, I am mostly troubled by three things: first, political persecution and repression; second, redistribution of property; and, third — the most dangerous one because it is a direct result of the first and the second — the transmission of all the negative features of the old government to the new one. When I say “old government,” I don’t mean just the previous president but the Soviet system that begot both Kuchma and Yushchenko.
Instead of true democracy, we have public shows and attempts to resort to so-called street democracy, while the crucial problems of democracy — the democratic organization of power, methods and forms of administration, human rights, rule of law — remain on the back burner.
Moreover, former governmental officials, as well as millions of ordinary Ukrainians, do not always agree with the new government on many points and have a constitutional right to air their opinions, for instance, in the mass media. An Our Ukraine National Union (OUNU) party functionary said recently, “The old government won’t surrender.” In this case “surrender” means to keep silent and be submissive. The words of this new party-of- power apparatchik remind me of what Maxim Gorky famously said during the Holodomor and the reprisals: “If the enemy does not surrender, he is to be destroyed.” This is not just a bureaucratic slip of the tongue, for last February President Yushchenko declared bluntly in Donetsk that all the oppositionists are potential convicts.
Can one really believe after such statements, after fixed court orders (e.g., the impoundment of Dynamo Kyiv’s shares was lifted but re-imposed a few hours later after a phone call from the top), that these are just the attempts of prosecutors and policemen to find the truth in criminal cases?
What raises special concern is that even parliamentarians’ efforts to stop the juggernaut of repression are not only being thwarted but are leading to greater brutality. For instance, parliament recently approved (with votes from all factions except for those elected on Yushchenko’s OU and UNP list) a resolution requesting the Prosecutor-General to consider non-custodial treatment for Kolesnykov and Rizak. What was the government’s reaction? In response, Rizak was smuggled out of hospital, in violation of routine police regulations, while the MPs who came to his defense were beaten up.
What about the redistribution of property? This has in fact slowed down our economic growth. Owners of the largest enterprises are reluctant to invest more funds in their development for they are uncertain of tomorrow. Those who are tied up with these businesses in one technological chain are also afraid that the changed status of their main partners will make a shambles of their production process. Indeed, today this problem can no longer be solved by simply publishing a list of dodgy privatizations. Let’s suppose that such a list of 29 businesses is published. But what will happen if individual citizens sue the 30th and 31st businesses, and during the examination of these lawsuits it becomes obvious that the courts are handling fixed cases, the way they did with Dynamo Kyiv?
This is why we don’t need to be compiling lists but legitimizing through jurisprudence all instances of denationalization that have occurred in the years of independence. Otherwise we will bog down in property redistribution squabbles, enterprises will begin grinding to a halt, people will be getting poorer, and investors — both Western and Eastern — will be giving us a wide berth.
The root cause of all these drawbacks is that we inherited the practices of the system from which we came, whereby every new leader tried either to humiliate or hush up what his predecessor had done: Khrushchev debunked Stalin, then Breznnev did the same to Khrushchev, Andropov to Brezhnev, and Kuchma tried not to recall the achievements of the Kravchuk era. Now Yushchenko is doing the same with Kuchma. Alexander Pushkin once said, “Respect for the past is what separates culture from savagery.”
REVISING HISTORY
I lost the 1994 elections. Frankly speaking, at that moment, in July 1994, I was still smarting from the very unexpected and bitter defeat. But it was my initiative to arrange a power transfer ceremony in Mariinsky Palace after Leonid Kuchma’s formal inauguration at the Verkhovna Rada. It seems to me ceremonies like this have never been held in the other CIS countries. Still, I would not like to indulge in wishful thinking: the experience of Ukraine’s first democratic transfer of power has played a less than desirable role because society has raised far more complaints about all the subsequent elections than the one held in 1994. And if the president had cherished that experience, the Constitutional Court may not have handed down a positive ruling on a third term in office, and the head of state’s conduct in 2004 would not have provided grounds to assume that he was seeking a way to remain in office for just a little more time.
These steps by Kuchma exacerbated relations between the government and the opposition to an extraordinary degree, and the people were certain that the winners of the election would not be able to assume power in a peaceful and democratic manner.
My relations with Kuchma were difficult, especially at the beginning of his term. Some time later, well before he completed his first term in office, they became very proper. Yet, he and his entourage constantly tried to exalt themselves by degrading me, for which purpose they kept revising recent history. There was a very popular catch-phrase at the time: Kuchma came to power when there was four-digit inflation, the economy was in shambles, etc. But, in reality, four-digit inflation had set in a year before, precisely when Kuchma was prime minister with legislative powers. I am not going to blame this inflation on him alone: the main factor was skyrocketing prices of Russian energy resources. I am just reminding you of the true course of events. The industrial slump and inflation radically slowed down from early 1994 until Election Day: in June, on the eve of the elections, the cash dollar cost 20% less than in February. In other words, the Ukrainian currency (the coupon-karbovanets, not the hryvnia) gained strength. Once Kuchma was elected, the dollar shot up again — by more than four times in one year. The Ukrainian currency was falling again.
Now the new president is also counting on the people’s short memory. During his campaign, instead of recalling that we had already had a normal experience of power transfer, he bandied about a myth and called on his supporters, “If you struggle and keep watch, the elections will not be rigged the way they were in 1994 and 1999.”
But I, who lost that election, have never said it was rigged.
According to ordinary logic, there was no reason why Kuchma should have taken a dim view of my presidency. In 1993 he himself offered to resign, and I had never publicly accused him of building a political image for himself when he held the prime minister’s post, as he did with respect to subsequent prime ministers. I think Kuchma took offense when in the summer of 1993 I came out against extending the prime minister’s right to issue decrees that have the force of law. I still think that this six-month-long practice did not justify itself; in general, extraordinary powers for a prime minister is utter nonsense in a democracy, no matter what exceptional circumstances are used to justify this. Incidentally, most members of that parliament also shared this view.
During the first years of Kuchma’s rule some of my close associates — Sukhin, Palyvoda, Kudiukin — spent several years behind bars on trumped-up charges. The police tried to beat them into testifying against me, and I was interrogated several times. I described all this in detail in my book We Have What We Have. The only difference is that in those days law-enforcers never informed the media about serving me with an interrogation summons, and now it is just the contrary: they summon people for questioning via the media, put on a political show, and flout established legal procedures.
In many respects Kuchma’s rule resembled the Soviet government model: the president is like a party’s General-Secretary around whom his entourage creates a halo of sinlessness; the Presidential Administration is the analogue of the party’s Central Committee or Politburo, a parallel government of sorts that wields more power than the Cabinet of Ministers but is responsible for nothing. Naturally, there was an essential difference from the Soviet era: the government worked in the conditions of political pluralism and had the opposition to reckon with.
THE BURDEN OF THE MAIDAN
I would like to explain again my attitude to the new government. Right after Viktor Yushchenko’s inauguration I said I would not hinder the president from building a democratic Ukraine, for this is the land where I was born and where my children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren live. We love this land, our people, our language and culture; we are proud to be Ukrainian.
I entertained the great hope that Mr. Yushchenko would keep his promises. Now that four months have passed, I see that nobody is going to fulfill the promises that were given to the people, and some fundamental things are no longer even mentioned.
As for the style and methods of work, they produce nothing but surprise. There is no systematic or consistent approach in domestic and foreign policy. The leaders seem to have forgotten their original intentions. An illustrative example of this is the attitude to the Single Economic Space. Just a few weeks ago they said it was a trap for Ukraine, a threat to its independence, etc. Now they are saying it is a very important strategic direction of our policy.
I resolutely condemn this kind of policy. I think the president and his cabinet are unable to be consistent and responsible and to firmly defend the Ukrainian people’s interests.
This is why I have decided to oppose such an unpredictable policy, the often provocative actions of the president’s retinue, and their crude attempts to make a “national leader” out of Yushchenko.
A high-ranking official from the president’s entourage recently scolded the Donetsk governor for using “wrong” words and old-style thinking and threatened immediately to dismiss him from office. He emphasized that he was quoting the president himself. So this bureaucrat thinks the way the president does. Earlier, he urged journalists to interpret the president’s words correctly, not to “distort” them, which means not to have one’s own opinion.
At one time, the CPSU Central Committee used to issue guidelines on how to interpret and convey the General Secretary’s speeches to the people. The Chinese opted for a different way: they published the Great Helmsman’s quotation books, much to the delight of grateful citizens: all you had to do was pull the book out your pocket, and “your opinion” was 100% correct.
Mr. Yushchenko, fear the gung-ho bureaucrats who may organize a race for demonstrating the greatest devotion to you, because they are mostly pursuing their own interests, not yours! Should they pray in this way, they are sure to crack their skulls (a Ukrainian saying — Ed.). But I’m not talking about them. The trouble is they will drag you into trouble and Ukraine into misfortune.
Having encountered enormous problems and difficulties, the new government, instead of drawing up well-grounded strategic plans to solve them and develop Ukraine, began to run a number of experiments and apply dubious methods of administration. They go from one extreme to another in domestic and foreign policy — from market reforms to hands-on regulation, from the EU to SES, etc. The Maidan still weighs heavily on the government, together with the generously dished-out promises of a happy, prosperous and democratic life. While the Maidan waits patiently, the powers-that-be are getting nervous. Hence a search for enemies and wreckers, primitive explanations for the causes of reduced output and dwindling investments, price hikes, fuel problems, etc.
If you sum up all the problems the new government has created in domestic and foreign policy, research, and culture, you will arrive at the unhappy conclusion that these are not just occasional misunderstandings that can be rectified but, unfortunately, a way of thinking, a level of management culture, a vision of Ukrainian prospects. The team lacks expertise, while people who could influence the situation are kept at bay, for they are “not Orange.”
To reverse this trend, you must carry out a political reform and apply the European principles of forming a government. And it is wrong to say that the president will thus turn into the British queen — this is a deliberate concoction by those who wish to perpetuate the old system and retain their powers, which were unlawfully granted by the president, and by those who have not read other states’ constitutions. In reality, Yushchenko may remain this country’s topmost official thanks to the combination of personal prestige and statutory powers. Even after the political reform, the president of Ukraine will enjoy more power than his French counterpart. Lesser power was sufficient for Charles de Gaulle, who, thanks to his personal prestige, became France’s highest individual and who went down in history as a prominent statesman. Can everyone recall the names of the French prime ministers who served during de Gaulle’s presidency?
PAYMENT FOR INSINCERITY
As for the Ukrainian experience of power organization, there is a small difference between the Kuchma and Yushchenko periods. The worst thing is that both regimes have failed the test of democracy. The new government has inherited all the worst features of the old one. Incidentally, the top-down formation of blocs and parties does not appear to be too great a sin, for our civil society is too immature to ensure a bottom-up process. What is much worse is that the old system of parallel governmental bodies is being revived, the only difference being that the Presidential Administration now bears the more high-sounding name of State Secretariat of Ukraine, while the role of the National Security and Defense Council has been raised to that of another, a third, parallel government. Both governments have displayed the same intolerance to criticism, but the present one alleges that the mass media are free today. What kind of freedom is it when I was recently barred, under all kinds of “objective” pretexts, from making a live appearance on the 1st National TV Channel, which loves to bang on about democratic reforms? As regards trivial and trumped-up charges against its adversaries, the new government has outstripped the old one: under the old one there were no cases like the Dynamo Kyiv affair. Likewise, the Yushchenko government has outdone Kuchma’s as far as the numbers of businessmen in the Cabinet and regional administrations are concerned. The difference is that the Kuchma government never swore to root out links between politics and business for good.
The current government, like the old one, is pursuing sweep-it-under-the-rug policies disguised as political shows that sometimes involve transgressions of the law. A typical example of this was the appointment of governors when the Cabinet of Ministers was being formed in the Verkhovna Rada’s session room.
A considerable part of big-time politics is and will always be non- public, owing to its very nature. So when the president calls on ministers not to wash dirty linen in public when they deal with journalists, naturally he cares about the government’s microclimate, although the press will be denied some scoops. Yet, everything should be in good measure. If a large number of important decisions are made behind the scenes, this will inevitably raise the level of hypocrisy and deceit in the relations between the government and the people, and this will further widen the gap between them. The parliamentary system of government is good in that it makes politics more public and less hidden.
As the next parliamentary elections are approaching, the political merry-go-round is spinning all the faster. New parties are cropping up, as though there is a scarcity of them; the others say they intend to form blocs. Naturally, it is up to the president, prime minister, speaker, and their parties to decide whether to form a bloc or run for office on their own. Perhaps many of those who gathered on the Maidan really would like the three main ruling political forces to go to the polls together. It seems to me, though, that it would be better for society if our leading political forces chose to instill European political culture.
What do I mean by this? Sociological surveys show that OUNU, BYuT, and NPU will easily reach the 3-% barrier. In Europe, if each of the governmental coalition parties has obvious chances to go through to parliament, they go to election on their own. For every party is oriented to a certain electorate and presents its own vision of society, which is not opposed to its coalition partners but still has many elements of alternativeness. Have you ever heard Schroeder telling Fischer that the Greens should be on the same list with the SDs or else — whoever is not with us is against us? On the other hand, have you ever heard the Greens and the SDs indulging in polemics during a campaign, let alone slinging mud at each other? No, each of the coalition parties defends its own program, instead of criticizing the program of its allies. A similar situation exists in Holland, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway — in all the countries ruled by coalition governments. In Holland, for instance, coalition governments have been in power for the past 90 years.
After the elections, the coalition parties’ correlation of forces in parliament, as well as their members’ representation in the government, may change. In this case, the parties hold transparent talks about a new format of government within the walls of parliament. In this country, though, the single-bloc model will only increase unnecessary secrecy in politics, for this model is aimed at secretly identifying the correlation of forces in the Rada between the largest political parties of one camp well before the elections. I think if the three forces of the governmental camp ran on their own instead of forming a bloc, and campaigned for themselves, not against their partners, this would go a long way to civilizing our politics.
Yet, this is only possible if the government has democratic intentions; intentions to build Ukraine by European standards. But when it tries to preserve and strengthen a totalitarian system, these hopes are futile.
One more thing: lately it has become a fad among our politicians to swear an oath at Taras Shevchenko’s grave. But what is the most striking aspect of the Bard’s poetry? Above all, it is unbounded sincerity. And when politicians insincerely pronounce nice words at the grave of by far the sincerest poet in the world... Although I am not inclined toward mysticism, I have a premonition that insincerity will very soon bring forth a very harsh day of reckoning. We still remember the destiny of the Kaniv Four.
Parliamentary Speaker Lytvyn hopes, for example, that his party will either poll at least 8% or obtain a quota on Yushchenko’s list that will allow all the current NPU deputies to retain their seats. In my view, this is an optimistic and realistic forecast. Of course, one should encourage his fellow party men, but Lytvyn recently complained that his party’s activists were being harassed in the provinces. This means his prospects are not so rosy. Naturally, seats in the new Rada have not been distributed in advance, but quite a few people would like them to be, so the campaign will most likely be a very dirty one, with the current government generously tapping the administrative resource. It remains to be seen what attitude Europe will take and what conclusions it will draw.
LOVE OF ORANGE COLORS
Lately, the government’s representatives have been talking about revising the Verkhovna Rada’s “package” resolution on the constitutional reform passed on December 8, 2004, and holding a referendum.
I am a politician, not a lawyer. Still, I know the law well enough to say, first of all, that only the Constitutional Court can revise the reform on legal, not formal, grounds. Secondly, there should be some reasons to cancel it, because a few months ago the Constitutional Court ruled that the Verkhovna Rada had passed quite a legitimate resolution. As for the allegations that the Constitutional Court judges are being “dealt with” and “talked into doing something,” this question is not in my line, although we do have some experience of “dealing with judges.” There are even professionals for this sort of “work.”
As for the referendum, president Kuchma once made this kind of attempt, which failed, as you may remember. In my view, the referendum will only deepen the split in society that occurred during the presidential elections. A referendum or, to be more exact, a plebiscite, will have no direct juridical force because it is up to the Verkhovna Rada to pronounce the final word. Certain members of the party of power, e.g., Mykola Martynenko, are also aware of this.
Today there is much talk about the opposition. Some say that it does exist on the political stage, others that it does not. Our party was the first to openly announce its move to the opposition.
Naturally, it is difficult to work, primarily because there is no bank of experience of constructive work between the opposition and the government, and because none of us has ever really worked in the opposition. Furthermore, there are many businessmen in parliament and the new opposition who are afraid of governmental pressure. The new opposition is striving primarily to oppose actions, not personalities, and to assess actions exclusively from the angle of the Ukrainian people’s core interests. This is why, for example, we voted for budgetary changes and some other government initiatives. Many of my colleagues in the opposition and I agree with the government’s long-term approaches, philosophy and program of state building. What I do not agree with is the work methods. I disagree with the crowd-pleasing ways of tackling economic problems, the harassment of opponents, and the purges in the provinces.
Now the opposition is getting into shape and becoming stronger, seeking out ways of cooperation, or at least mutual understanding with the government.
When the government behaves in an uncivilized fashion, the opposition cannot but behave the same way. It is unthinkable that the opposition should be civilized when the members of the government behave like cavemen. I think the opposition will finally crystallize in the new parliament.
I disagree with the president’s staffing policy. In fact, there is no policy as such here. By all accounts, people are being appointed to offices on the basis of their loyalty to the new government, not proficiency. Loyalty is in turn determined on the basis of one’s love of orange colors.
I receive a lot of letters that provide glaring examples of staff placement: people are being taken right off the street, people with neither education nor experience, with a blemished record, who are allowed to occupy high positions.
If the government fails to repudiate these so-called principles, its plans for Ukraine’s development, especially in the economic sector, will be thwarted. Of course, there are instances when a teacher manages better than an economist, but these are exceptions from the rule. I am talking about the mass appointments of laymen, not professionals, to key offices. First of all, one must draw the line between democracy and licentiousness, the law and revolutionary expediency.
I think it is very easy to draw this line. Whatever runs counter to the law is illegal, and under no circumstances should offenses be justified by revolutionary expediency, all the more so as Ukraine has rather democratic laws, which even the Council of Europe has recognized. The problem is not their quality but the way they are being applied. Those who flout the law on the grounds of revolutionary expediency must remember that they themselves may end up as victims of this expediency — suffice it to recall the experience of the French and Russian revolutions and the destinies of Danton, Robespierre, Trotsky, Bukharin, and Kamenev. It is a very dangerous thing when the president’s entourage is trying to drive home an appalling philosophy: the president said so and that’s that. In other words, the government is being guided by what the president says, not by the law. Nobody should explain constitutional violations by any bizarre logic. The president should not in turn take a liberal attitude to such violators, even if they come from the Maidan.
P.S. I was going to finish the article here, but last week’s goings- on in parliament forced me to write a few more lines. I am aware that many did not like my speech from the parliamentary rostrum, in which I expressed my views and my alarm, as I have done in this article. Let me remind you that I said that peace and harmony in society — one of the greatest achievements in Ukraine — are at risk, that the current helmsmen, who contested the elections under the slogans of consolidation and unity in society, are now deepening the split in society, creating new hotbeds of tension, looking for enemies, and victimizing their opponents. My fears were confirmed the next day: what some of the now pro-governmental MPs said about me in my absence was nothing but a manifestation of neo- Bolshevism. Every government makes mistakes, including the one during my presidency, but we never displayed the kind of disrespect for people that the current “democrats” are showing now.
