They say that true friendship is tested by time. This is also true of the relations that have been established between the new Ukrainian administration and Russia’s political leadership. Less than four months have elapsed since new people came to power in Ukraine. The new administration keeps saying it will bring Ukrainian-Russian relationships to a new level. As proof of this, they refer to Viktor Yanukovych’s seven meetings with President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation over the past several months. The Russian head of state, in turn, points to an increase in the level of bilateral trade and says he feels comfortable working with the new Ukrainian president.
Of course, Medvedev should feel good about a new Ukrainian administration which has prolonged the deployment of the Black Sea Fleet for 25 years, until 2042. Under the previous presidency such a deal would have been impossible. But the Russian president wasn’t entirely sincere in blaming the previous Ukrainian administration for the deterioration of bilateral relations. The Russian side is also partially to blame – the Kremlin refused to talk to the previous Ukrainian president knowing that he stood no chance of winning the next election. Perhaps the economic crisis would have caused less damage in both countries if the Russian government had really wanted to develop mutually advantageous relations with Ukraine.
In view of all this, it is too early to say if Ukrainian-Russian relations are becoming ones between equal partners, or are mutually beneficial in their nature. Also, the Kharkiv accords cannot be regarded as proof of the equality of the contracting parties, let alone brotherly relations, since brothers do not sell each other out. On May 17 Medvedev declared that the agreements reached in Kharkiv envisage the transfer of an equivalent of 40 billion dollars to Ukraine. Not coincidentally, some European parliamentarians called these accords a surrender of a part of Ukrainian sovereignty to Russia. Moreover, these accords narrow Ukraine’s choices. It is anyone’s guess what the situation will be like 15-20 years from now, but Ukraine is already bound by these accords until 2042.
Russia can also come up with unpleasant surprises and treat Ukraine on rather rigid terms, as evidenced Vladimir Kozhin, head of the Russian President’s Business Administration Department, who stated that Russia insists on Ukraine’s recognition of the Russian Federation’s title to the [former] Soviet property abroad. “Our stand has been and remains the same: Russia undertook to pay all the debts of the Soviet republics and has paid all of them, with all property held abroad being transferred to the Russian Federation. This leaves no room for compromise because Russia shouldered a tremendous debt, and did so during a most trying period, and we have made all the payments. Therefore, it is simply necessary to carry out all the arrangements and agreements that were made at one time or another, and to which everybody agreed,” Kozhin told Radio Moscow Echo.
Ukrainian media carried the news precisely when President Medvedev was charming the audience during a one-hour lecture at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. He was comfortable in this role.
At the beginning he told the audience that he had visited Shevchenko University as a lecturer before, to attend a law conference, when the Soviet Union had started falling apart. He said it was here he had first become aware of an atmosphere of toppling authorities, and that he had celebrated the end of the conference in the party committee room, something heretofore unthinkable.
After a three-minute introduction, the Russian president started answering students’ questions. He looked quite confident and not a single question seemed to make him hesitate, not even the last one, posed by an international law student, about whether Russia wanted Ukraine to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization. He said the issue wasn't topical. There weren't many questions concerning collective security and the Ukrainian students by and large weren't critical about the ranking Russian guest. In fact, they applauded every answer.
Nevertheless, Medvedev's reply that the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol is an element of the European security system, and that this naval base doesn't get in anyone's way requires clarification. As does his assurance that Russia won't use the Black Sea Fleet to attack any neighboring countries. What about the conflict between Russia and Georgia? Weren't Russian warships deployed from Sevastopol to destroy Georgian ships and boats?
One can also call into question Medvedev's statement that "true guarantees are a system of international relations, they are our commitments within the United Nations in accordance with international conventions," that Russia will not ignore its international commitments simply because this wouldn't be in its interests. If so, what about Russia's — particularly Medvedev's — recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, contrary to the Helsinki Act?
Medvedev admitted that Russia would be happy to see Ukraine join the CSTO, but that "Ukraine make its own decision on this issue. If it is interested to take part in the CSTO, it is welcome. If there are any doubts, we will respect them." He added that as a president of Russia, he was "perfectly satisfied by Yanukovych's statement about Ukraine's non-bloc status, because this fits our interests in full."
Quite a few Ukrainians aren't sure that their country's non-bloc status — or the prolongation of deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet — is in the national interest. The Ukrainian government prefers to ignore their opinions, playing out its own scenario. The fact remains, however, that one will have to pay for this "brotherly friendship" sooner or later.
