Mykola TOMENKO, Vice Prime Minister for Humanitarian Questions, visited The Day right before the recent government-parliamentary crisis. His interview answers many questions that have emerged. So far, Mr. Tomenko may be the only government official who has given an honest explanation of the crisis: the “quota principle” didn’t work.
THE GOVERNMENT’S MORAL MISTAKE
Why is the party in power being built from the “roof”?
M.T.: My stand and that of my like-minded associates is that we must have a single European democratic political party, except that this should be done in a different way. In other words, we must start with a strategy, values, program, and then proceed to rally people.
We now have a political recess and this is a good opportunity to have a serious talk, first of all within our team. It’s time to analyze our mistakes so we don’t repeat them. For example, we should admit the current government’s responsibility for the problems facing our parliament, our emotional responsibility, because the case of the “moonlighters” is more on the moral and emotional than the rational side. In fact, there are a number of “moonlighters” in the opposition. They seem to have long since vanished from the political arena, and the current regime should have shown a different standard, above all a morally and legally motivated one. Moonlighting is one of the greatest moral errors made by this government because simultaneous calls for ethics and morals, and stories about a moonlighter who breaks a leg and thus cannot appear in court sound like nursery tales. I believe that the president and the prime minister should take a tougher stand on this matter.
This moonlighting business has forced me to consider everything we’re doing in a broader perspective. At the start of my career in this government I tried to expose every problem to public debate, but then was criticized by the team. I agreed that perhaps not all problems should instantly be publicized; that some of them should first be discussed in the inner circle. I’ve tried to act very properly, telling my colleagues, for example, that there should be a single decision-making center, not three or four; that we should have a bill on the Cabinet of Ministers. After all, we always lectured the previous government about the need for such a law. Regrettably, we couldn’t have a serious, frank discussion in the milieu that is known as the coalition. We’re members of a real coalition government. Our socialist colleagues attend faction and party meetings. The Narodny Soyuz Popular Union has gone even further by setting up a party committee.
Is this party committee really effective, or is it just a threat?
M.T.: There was a statement concerning its formal establishment. There was also a list of party committee members...I don’t think that they would hold meetings of this party committee before the government one, but there was a formal and public statement to this effect.
Wasn’t our prime minister supposed to fire all those party members that same day, simply because all our state government organs were still politically unaffiliated in the early 1990s?
M.T.: It was hard to form this government and there were two factors at play: the winning political parties and the president. Parliament played a lesser role. Prime Minister Tymoshenko actually held a minor position in the scheme of forming the cabinet. She was delegated to the cabinet — this is what happened historically. That is why it was extraordinarily difficult for her to have a free hand in making any staffing decisions. I’ll let you in on a secret; she suggested several executive replacement proposals to the president, and not just on the cabinet level. But her initiatives didn’t always meet with the chief executive’s approval. The president’s attitude is understandable. He would say that such-and-such a functionary was delegated by such- and-such a party; we must keep this coalition. That is why there are difficulties, including with the party committee. The main thing is to uphold the rules that we established at the outset, party work must be done after hours. However, certain governors among the NSNU supporters hold party meetings in their offices, during office hours. This is also immoral because we criticized the previous regime for abuses of office.
Another reason why I reject this kind of logic for forming a party is that one of the key theses put forth by the new president from the beginning is that business and politics must be divided. I’ve always supported the idea and was sharply critical of the manner in which Our Ukraine’s roster was drawn up in 2002. However, politics and business were actually separated only in terms of public statements or by formally quitting business.
You mean hypocritical statements?
M.T.: Yes. On the level of certain actions, with brothers, sisters, wives, in business...Getting back to the party, let me remind you that four parties recently undersigned a message to the NSNU, which was delivered at a National Union convention by Borys Tarasiuk as the leader of RUKH and Minister of Foreign Affairs. I took the floor at a convention of the Party “Our Ukraine” (formerly known as PRP — Ed.) that was being held simultaneously, and I was more critical about what was happening. I said that after failing to form a democratic party, they could try setting up a democratic bloc, but only if they started from scratch: principles, ideas, and program. We’ve spent years using a mixed party election pattern. No one has raised the issue of drawing up such unique documents as party lists. I tried to make some changes in the election law in parliament. But I wasn’t supported. Now, again, a number of parties will face the list problem. When they visit the regions, the first thing our local activists want to know is how to obtain a seat in parliament. They say they have worked for the party but businessmen will once again purchase spots in the list, but we’ll have to keep on distributing leaflets. And so my current initiative is to have a formula that would make such lists transparent, even if this isn’t set forth in the law, so we could show an example worth being emulated. Otherwise, the next parliament will be made up only of Kyiv deputies. In other words, the regions won’t figure in the party roster. I proposed to have every second name in the roster determined by regional organizations.
Lately, I’ve been visiting the regions a lot. I recognized that I made a bad mistake when I practically stayed put in Kyiv for three months, out of respect for the prime minister and my other cabinet colleagues, believing that I was needed to concentrate and work fruitfully. Last month, however, I started traveling and realized after meeting with people that our rule has been divided into three periods: (1) the fantastic degree of popular trust and hope, (2) expectations, with people waiting to see what happens, and (3) the current phase of critically assessing the steps taken by the government — or its inability to take the necessary steps. The people are mostly dissatisfied by the current government’s inability to overcome corruption, and even more so by the emergence of a new pattern of giving and taking bribes. Even if it is less cynical, it still exists. I spoke with Kyiv street market vendors. They refuse to file any written complaints with my office, saying that with the existing system of relations between the proprietors, militia, and local authorities, they’d simply be thrown out onto the street. They admitted, off the record, that they had to pay even more protection money than under the previous regime, but that a new, more market-like pattern was being used, involving banks. Business here is in a state of shock. Our businessmen found the previous government more convenient because it had a clear-cut and understandable procedure for setting prices and institutionally supporting corruption. They knew that a certain sum had to be paid to a certain bureaucrat for the allocation of a plot, and so on. Now this system is hiccupping, meaning that no payments were made for some time but now they have to pay to many different persons. Of course, this doesn’t make them happy. They say they’re prepared to pay the way they did before, so long as they have an understandable and effective pattern.
Mr. Tomenko, what party are you from?
M.T.: There are legal discussions underway and so far no one has canceled the name “Our Ukraine.” I’m not going to comment on renaming the PRP, because until the day before yesterday (this interview was recorded on July 12 — Ed. ) I was a rank-and-file member of that party and couldn’t influence the situation. I believe that renaming it was a mistake. In other words, I’m a member of Our Ukraine de jure, because the justice minister’s letter about recalling the ministry’s decision doesn’t fully conform to the law on political parties. It reads that the Supreme Court has the final say in every such matter.
THE QUOTA GORDIAN KNOT
We’ve often criticized the quota principle of distributing portfolios, according to which members of the victorious party obtained their cabinet posts. None of them were put to the vote. Everybody voted for the president. How will the quota situation evolve? On the level of the Teriokhyn-Baranivsky squabble or is there another way to cut this knot?
M.T.: The quota principle was largely the president’s idea. When it came to appointing the prime minister, it was clear that a single appointment couldn’t solve the problem of what kind of cabinet the head of state would have to work with. It was apparent that a system of coordinates had to be worked out with parliament so that we could have if not some kind of support, then at least 226 MPs on whom we could always rely. It was a way out of the situation that had developed. Afterward there was a differentiated approach to the political forces that had backed the president between the first and second election rounds, also those that supported him after the second round. Later we saw, however, that there were problems with the People’s Party, because it opposed our regional appointments. Although this party remains largely within the system of cadre appointments, ranging from the head of the Derzhkomrezerv [State Reserve Committee] to lesser posts, most of the key posts, of course, went to people representing three political forces.
By the way, the quota principle didn’t actually work on the regional level. This provides grounds to politicians like Oleksandr Moroz to declare that ‘we have only 15 members in Donetsk oblast, instead of 155 as previously agreed upon.’
The quota principle didn’t work in parliament, either, when it was debating the WTO membership bills.
M.T.: This principle could work if it were institutionally formalized. When it came to supporting the principle by a cabinet-oriented coalition, the negotiating parties determined that previous majority-forming practices caused conflicts between the Verkhovna Rada chairman and the majority leader. These arguments, presented by Volodymyr Lytvyn and his party, were recognized as serious enough, and it became clear that no such arrangements would be valid without an institutional, i.e., coalition, structure in parliament.
Do you believe that adopting this quota principle was a mistake?
M.T.: Yes, it was a mistake because during the president’s first year in office, having received such tremendous popular support “on credit,” he had a unique opportunity to form the kind of government he considered necessary, and to assume full responsibility for its performance. Or he could appoint a prime minister who could fully form a cabinet, so that the prime minister could then be answerable. The system of coordinates contained in the political reform means that the majority, as an institution, proposes the prime minister’s candidacy to the president and then the newly appointed prime minister proposes the cabinet members. Then the prime minister can be brought to account for any mistakes made by the cabinet.
I’ll let you in on another secret. I’ve always supported the political reform, but I objected to this reform being used in any election campaigns. The idea of political reform emerged as a means of having Kuchma elected for a third term, or having him in office again through the Verkhovna Rada, or by pulling off another political stunt...Of course, I was adamantly against this, but I was in favor of the political reform as a way to optimize the political system. Oleksandr Moroz’s first bill, when the political reform wasn’t on the agenda, had my signature. Even during the revolutionary period I was among those that made every effort to have Our Ukraine vote for the political reform. We had a harsh debate within our team. Filenko, Stetskiv, and I — people who had played major roles during the revolutionary process — agreed that we had to come up with an optimal model of government, on the one hand. On the other hand, we had to look for an option to reduce the risks during the third round of the presidential campaign, lest we have a fourth round. The president finally supported our stand, so I now have absolutely no moral or other reasons to consider the possibility of revising the political reform. My only reservations today have to do with the reform’s timeframe. I believe that it could be introduced starting on the day following the convocation of the new parliament. This would be proper, considering that we didn’t elect this parliament with such powers. I also believe that there’s no problem with introducing such a change into the transitional clauses. And I have my doubts concerning the prosecutor’s office; these clauses could be discussed. Another clause I’d like to see in this bill is something many would be surprised to see, because it was proposed by the previous regime, particularly Leonid Kuchma. However, in the context of business and politics I would raise the issue of parliamentary immunity. I don’t expect this parliament to vote for this, just as I expect the new opposition to regard this as an attempt to open new criminal cases. However, the new parliament should do this and clearly formulate a message to business. If we come up with fair business game rules, they’ll have no reason to buy seats in parliament; they’ll concentrate on their business. In other words, the idea of annulling parliamentary immunity is to me primarily a way of separating the government from business.
What are the differences among the government team members all about, especially between the National Security and Defense Council, the Presidential Secretariat, and the Cabinet of Ministers? No matter what major issue is on the agenda, be it gas, privatization, or the SES, various government representatives voice different opinions, not to mention the attendant information warfare.
M.T.: I think there are subjective as well as objective factors at play. The subjective ones are about fighting for key political posts. As usual, the subjective aspect prevails. All of us are perfectly aware that the government will keep playing the key role, political reform or not. But I dearly want this reform to take place; a decision that is passed will be hard to revise; it can be canceled only with the help of the Constitutional Court. By the way, certain games are being played here, too. I’d like your journalists to find out why members of the Constitutional Court are not being appointed.
Really? Why?
M.T.: I haven’t personally investigated the matter, but it is my understanding that one of the elements in the discussion around the appointment of the Constitutional Court members is curiosity about their attitude to the political reform. I think that various sides want to know the viewpoints of the candidates, and they are trying to work them into a restored model of the CC, to see how the court’s judges will vote if attempts are made to abolish the political reform. No one will be making a constitutional inquiry at this stage, but it could be made, say, on January 2, 2006. This reform will be effective as of January 1; then it could be contested as unconstitutional.
However, let me say again that the government will remain the key political player, with or without the constitutional reform. I think that during the parliamentary campaign the government’s mission will be debated — whether within or outside the election process — and its destiny will be decided: retirement or staying in office. The situation before the parliamentary elections will largely depend on this government’s performance. Moreover, the way I understand those who are acting as this cabinet’s opponents (which doesn’t always mean the opposition but people who insist that the composition of the cabinet and its modus operandi should be changed), they will act in a different way, struggling to have certain cabinet members replaced. I’m honored to know that I’m the first on their list. It means that I’ve been doing something. Teriokhyn is next on the list. In other words, this will be a warning for the prime minister and the cabinet. Our prime minister has such high ratings that everyone realizes that Mrs. Tymoshenko’s dismissal would cause a crisis in Ukraine. Like I said, there is a subjective conjuncture of conflicting circumstances, a power play focusing on the government as the most tangible political and socioeconomic resource.
Another aspect is the existence of serious ideological differences in implementing the president’s strategy. There is a conflict between more socially and liberally oriented approaches. Why does this confrontation become so antagonistic at times? The answer is because in most cases it has to do with confrontations between the current government and big business. The more socially oriented approach, as represented by the prime minister and me, relies on the principle that there should be a clearly formulated stand taken in regard to all lines of business, including big business, regardless of whether some businesspeople have supported or opposed this president. In this case, the important thing is for businessmen officially to pay the difference in the event of privatization problems.
Can business that does not support the president exist in Ukraine?
M.T.: Such businesses can oppose him indirectly. By support I mean something different. When I visited Khortytsia in Zaporizhia, people told me that a number of influential people were helping to restore this island, so maybe they should be encouraged while the government is making up its mind. I replied that a philanthropic approach to Khortytsia would absolve no one of criminal liability. And that the same was true of people who spent staggering sums (e.g., UAH 200 million) on certain projects carried out formally under the president’s “patronage.” Personally I believe that the safe existence of business in Ukraine should be secured not by generous donations to whatever projects but by a single standard.
But the approach to Khortytsia is universal, isn’t it? Any sponsorship, philanthropic effort doesn’t mean that people guilty of criminal offences can get off scot-free, does it?
M.T.: Yes, it is a universal approach in my own opinion. Yet this is precisely what is causing differences among our team members. Some of them say: here are representatives of big business who are willing to help the Ukrainian state in every way, in return asking simply to forget about past confrontations; they want to cooperate with this government, start from scratch. Why not? I describe this as a liberal approach, but I’m against it. I believe that businessmen shouldn’t contribute to projects and expect pardons in return; they should keep doing their business and pay their taxes. This way it will be better for everyone.
We have information pointing to the fact that fellow villagers and relatives of the president are visiting banks and saying: if you loan us money for this or that, then you can take this letter and go to the Presidential Secretariat with a request. The head of state or some of his entourage should issue some unambiguous signals about their attitude to this practice.
M.T.: Afterwards they probably stick these letters on the walls of their offices.
ABOUT THE “ARCHITECTS”
The Day recently held a roundtable with Mr. Ihor Shkiria of the Party of the Regions. He noted quite correctly that Viktor Yanukovych was our prime minister for two years, but that his name figures in several criminal cases. Also, that Leonid Kuchma was our president for ten years, yet the law enforcement authorities are treating him with a noticeable degree of caution. All this once again brings up the social matter of guarantees that were made when transferring power from the coalition that you represent — also perhaps involving certain international intermediaries. How will you be explaining Leonid Kuchma’s “untouchability” to your electorate?
M.T.: This is a complicated issue. If I held the general prosecutor’s post, I’d be able to answer this question easily. If I had a way to influence the law-enforcement decision makers, I’d have a different strategy. As it is, I’m happy to have convinced everybody that schoolteachers and housewives shouldn’t be made scapegoats of the past presidential campaign and all those infringements. I’m happy that cases have been closed and the guilty parties pardoned. The current government’s attitude to wrongdoings is another serious mistake that can still be corrected. It was made when those in power began at the bottom instead of at the top.
You really think it was a mistake?
M.T.: I do, for I would have gone about this differently, but it’s hard to say who devised the concept or strategy. In fact, I don’t consider this a strategy, that there are people blacklisted and left out of these lists. I think that decisions are being made under certain circumstances, and that the general prosecutor’s office, SBU, and the militia lack a coordinated strategy.
Our judicial system is the biggest problem. I’m still convinced that keeping our judges in office ad infinitum is a mistake in our impoverished and corrupt country. The third acute problem is the phenomenon of politicians commenting on current criminal cases; these comments don’t always correspond to reality and often prove irrelevant and immaterial. Actually, I myself did this at first because I wanted some criminal proceedings stepped up. That was a mistake. Such proceedings must be done without being exposed to public debate.
What about the lack of progress in the Gongadze case?
M.T.: For me this case — and I wanted to help solve it as soon as absolutely possible — is the same as the Leonid Kuchma case and, according to experts, the Volodymyr Lytvyn case. But to a significant degree there was a conscious decision not to enter into direct conflict with certain political players. I have a feeling that a certain category of politicians agreed to cooperate, to make sure that the law enforcement agencies would look the other way with respect to them. Once again, if I were the prosecutor general, I’d start with the Kuchma case, because the Gongadze case proceeds from it and is directly associated with the Leonid Kuchma case.
I have spoken with Mykola Melnychenko on several occasions. He is a complicated individual and he has made a number of mistakes. I’ve always tried to convince him that he has a historical mission to keep this society informed as best as he can about the key figures in the case. In my opinion, Leonid Kuchma comes first, followed by Gongadze, and Yeliashkevych. Naturally, the latter two had contracts out on them by the previous regime headed by the president. If Major Melnychenko has any tapes addressing other very important, strategic issues, they should be duly examined and taken into account. But the rest should be liquidated. Melnychenko shouldn’t be fooling around, expecting visits from politicians and offering to pay for tapes compromising some colleague or other. I visited his apartment and listened to many tapes in his collection. It was like an audio serial, but you can’t keep a society interested in a serial about the previous regime, which lasts for five or six years. The names of the architects of a given regime must be discussed, although I do agree that the Kuchma case isn’t likely to be started in the near future. And if this case is not started, all the other cases will be shelved. As it is, I can’t see an end to the Gongadze and Yeliashkevych cases. There will probably be sequels on what I’d describe as a second, “gubernatorial” level. These are the cases that will attract special attention from the law enforcement authorities. I’m also sick and tired of listening to stories about who was subpoenaed, interrogated, and so on. Every time I meet with colleagues and hear progress reports on cases, I ask them as an ordinary citizen: “When will a single individual guilty of a crime be thrown behind bars?” This may sound cynical, but I’m interested in concrete steps being taken.
A SENSITIVE DOMAIN
Do you believe that Christian Ethics should be taught to Ukrainian schoolchildren? If so, then what is to be done with children of other faiths?
M.T.: I don’t think that this subject should be compulsory. It should be an extracurricular one, taught in the context of ethics, encouraging students to profess their respective religions. Years back I moonlighted as a teacher in an art school in Kyiv, because I was a graduate student and was paid a tiny salary. I taught a subject called “Man and the World.” Frankly speaking, I was learning right along with my students. When it came to religion, I told my class about the Holy Bible and the Koran. They liked my approach. I don’t mean that it’s a good example, but school subjects can be taught using different methods, for example depending on the regional structure. Here no uniform principles can be worked out.
Two months have passed since the 60th anniversary of V-Day. We haven’t seen any signs of reconciliation between the veterans of the Red Army and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. We still don’t have a law on the social protection of all those “Soldiers without a State.” What steps will official Kyiv be making in the matter of reconciling our grandfathers?
M.T.: I believe that some mistakes were made in the tactic of implementing this good idea. No reconciliation can be achieved through politics. It has to be made by people and by providing adequate information. First of all, the political talks between various war veterans’ unions or associations should be stopped. For such talks are as effective as those between the Communist Party and the NSNU. Of course, we must arrange for meetings to remove the burden from our hearts, but not expect a result because there won’t be any. The most effective way is to keep our society adequately informed. Nothing will work without an effective campaign of enlightenment.
