One of the factors that cause problems in the Ukrainian political life is society’s failure to reconsider many historical stereotypes. Owing to ignorance, some tragic events have been repeating in our history with enviable frequency. Moreover, when we are in the grip of stereotypes, we are unable to assess some of our contemporary politicians and, if you like, to draw parallels with well-known historical personalities and give a fresh look (for our own benefit) at the activities of present-day politicians. Let us seek help in history.
May 2005 marks the 126th and 79th anniversaries of the birth and assassination, respectively, of Symon Petliura, a symbol of the era of the Ukrainian National Republic. Why does Petliura’s figure still remain little known and his name is often used as a political bugbear? Conversely, the figure of his contemporary Volodymyr Vinnychenko, a political comrade-in-arms and, later, a bitter opponent, has been exalted to a degree that begins to alert and even cause certain discomfort in those citizens who take a more selective and not so rapturous approach to Ukrainian history. Why did it happen? And what is its impact on Ukraine’s modern political life?
This is the subject of the article by Prof. Serhiy Lytvyn, Doctor of History, author of the book The Judgment of History, which spotlights, on the basis of a wide range of historical literature, memoirs, periodicals and archival materials, the life and deeds of Symon Petliura against the backdrop of the Ukrainian people’s national liberation struggle and clearly explains various, sometimes diametrically opposed, views and assessments of this controversial historical figure.
There have been so many polemical lances broken over Symon Petliura that they could arm an entire new army if it still used this kind of weapons. At the same time, Ukrainian society is heavily indebted to the figure of the Directory chairman and Chief Ataman of the Ukrainian National Republic’s troops. Ukrainian society is essentially in the dark about Petliura. The word petliurivshchyna (Petliura’s rule) still calls up unclear and even fearsome associations in the mind of the common people. The trail of predominantly accusative assessments of Petliura as well as of scholarly and ideological stereotypes formed around his figure makes it difficult to find the truth because he has allegedly been given a proper and incontestable place in history.
Still urgent remain today the words of the Ukrainian historian Lev Shankovsky who said in the book The Ukrainian Army in the Struggle for Statehood published in 1958 in Munich, “Shame should burn the faces of our historians because they have failed to give the Ukrainian people a comprehensive historical biography of the leader of our liberation struggle, a martyr for the freedom of the Ukrainian people, a great Ukrainian patriot, a famous political journalist who devoted, as much as nobody else, his life to serving the Ukrainian liberation.”
This notwithstanding, it is time to assess the figure of Petliura in unbiased, non-opportunist and purely scholastic terms. However, we feel that our chief governmental ideologists, as well as scholars who equally embrace conservatism and take partisan attitudes, are still exercising great political caution in reconsidering the multifaceted role Petliura played as military organizer, politician, and statesman.
One of the reasons is that, of all the main figures of the Ukrainian revolution, Petliura took, so to speak, the heaviest flak, particularly in comparison with Volodymyr Vinnychenko whose personality is being placed, not always deservedly, above his contemporaries, especially Petliura.
While it would be totally wrong to belittle the talent of Vinnychenko as a prose writer and a playwright, it is equally wrong to exaggerate his role as a politician and statesman, especially if this is aimed at downgrading Petliura.
One of the factors that brought about this situation was Vinnychenko’s three-volume book The Revival of a Nation. This opus and the conclusions it made had a tremendous impact on Soviet and foreign historiography and, later, on public consciousness because they were played up as evidence of the Central Rada’s erroneous strategies and tactics, for example, reluctance to form the armed forces. Vinnychenko’s doctrine that the Central Rada failed to pursue social policies, which prompted the Ukrainian people to topple it, was one of the most trenchant arguments of Bolshevik propaganda and, hence, historical science.
In this doctrine, personal enmity, unsettled scores and unrealized ambitions did not allow Vinnychenko the writer to overcome the inner resistance of Vinnychenko the politician and loser, which found the most eloquent expression in the scathing criticism of Petliura as well as the Ukrainian public policy as a whole. Doing this, Vinnychenko plays down his own role in and, therefore, responsibility for the course of those events.
The Ukrainian historian S. Knysh wrote about this work of Vinnychenko’s, “No wonder that The Revival of a Nation was required reading in the political education system of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, and even in Polish prisons non-Ukrainian communists were encouraged to read this book to see the assessment of the liberation struggle in Ukraine by the first chairman of its government.” It is perhaps not accidental that The Revival of a Nation was the first emigration literary opus republished by Political Literature Publishers in 1990. The contemporary historian V. Kravtsevych also shares this viewpoint, “Ambitions, differences about public policies, and attempts to be ‘leftier’ than Russian Bolsheviks by repeating their demagogic-cum-imperial slogans about ‘land,’ ‘peace,’ and ‘bread for all...’ How did it come about that Vinnychenko, a taboo until recently, has suddenly become an authoritative source for all Marxists and Stalinists, and every exalter of the past Bolshevik system keeps quoting him?”
By publishing The Revival of a Nation, Vinnychenko, one of the Ukrainian Revolution’s leaders, swung (to some extent) to a procommunist position and thus obliterated the true causes and the true role of many figures of the Ukrainian Revolution, including Petliura. In general, the discussion of Vinnychenko’s personality raises the problem of his moral right to appraise some events of which he was an architect and a Herostratus.
Vinnychenko and Petliura came to the foreground of big-time Ukrainian politics at the same time, so Vinnychenko’s claim that Petliura was a nonentity at the time sounds very tendentious. In reality, Petliura had already been a notable figure in the Ukrainian sociopolitical, cultural, and national movement before the revolution. Being a journalist, researcher, and military official shaped him as a human being, citizen, and statesman. At the First Ukrainian Military Congress he was elected chairman of the Ukrainian General Military Committee and, later, member of the Central Rada.
The well-known modern historian Stanislav Kulchytsky rightly believes that “thanks to Petliura’s persistent work, the Ukrainian movement became an irresistible force in the army, both at the front line and in the rear.” Aware that a state cannot possibly exist without an army, Petliura made painstaking efforts throughout 1917 to form a national military force to be reckoned with. National armed formations could not have been formed without Petliura’s efforts. At the end of 1917 the strength of the Ukrainian troops siding with the Central Rada was almost 400,000, including 180,000 in the Ukrainized front-line units, 150,000 in rear-based garrisons, and 60,000 in Free Cossack detachments.
Petliura repeatedly urged the Central Rada and the General Secretariat to immediately begin training the Ukrainian troops for putting up armed resistance to the Bolsheviks. Yet, these attempts did not fit in with the political principles of Ukrainian socialist leaders who continued to see this as a menace to the revolution. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks had concentrated large regular army and Red Guards forces for an offensive from south-east. However, the Central Rada leadership, especially Vinnychenko, failed to appreciate the grave danger that the Bolsheviks presented. Addressing a General Secretariat session on December 15, none other than Vinnychenko moved a paradoxical draft resolution, “Ascertain immediately whether or not the Council of People’s Commissars is at war with the Rada.” As a result, Petliura resigned from his governmental office on December 18.
Even after giving up his office, Petliura did not stop caring about the army and the defense of his Fatherland. On his own initiative, he formed and headed the Haidamaky Kish (Regiment) of Sloboda Ukraine, one of the most battle-worthy units which played the central role in the defense of Kyiv. In February 1918 Petliura saw to it that the Volyn and Podillia troops regroup and launch an offensive. Although Petliura officially was not part of the topmost leadership, the offensive was carried out under his name, which confirms his high prestige in the army.
As a member of the Directory, Petliura in fact commanded the armed forces. He formed the Supreme Command of the Republican Troops and the General Headquarters of the UNR Directory’s Troops. It was thanks to Petliura’s statist stand that the previous system of government, the Ukrainian National Republic, was restored.
Conversely, Vinnychenko favored the system of “labor councils” as the groundwork for a working people’s republic, which in fact led to a Bolshevik-type platform. That Vinnychenko failed to turn the Directory over was mainly the merit of Petliura. Later on, having lost any hope for a success in the further struggle, Vinnychenko, Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Mykyta Shapoval stood off the political stage, which signaled the “great exodus” of Ukrainian intellectuals abroad. UNR Prime Minister Isaac Mazepa, admitted in this connection, “The flight of top political figures abroad at this moment is one of the saddest pages in the Ukrainian revolutionary struggle. When revolutionary movement leaders lose their head and decamp from the battlefield at a critical moment, they thus not only deliver a political verdict onto themselves but also disastrously affect the morale of the entire army.”
Petliura made a fundamentally different decision. On February 11, 1919, he wrote in a letter to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (USDRP), “As the current situation in Ukraine is extremely complicated and grave, I consider that all intellectual forces of our country should at this moment take part in public work. I do not consider it possible for me, the son of our people, to evade my duties to the Fatherland, and I am determined to be further engaged in public work. With due account of this, I am suspending my USDRP membership.”
From that moment onwards, it was Petliura who exerted a decisive influence on the entire course of events and never dropped the role of a liberation movement leader. He had to respond to such challenges as reinforcing the governmental structure, establishing domestic peace, and defending the state from foreign enemies. High on the agenda was the problem of forming and strengthening the army, restructuring the state apparatus, etc. Further contradictions between Ukraine’s political parties, which caused chaos in public administration, as well as the necessity of centralized command over the armed forces, prompted Petliura to try to concentrate power in his hands. On May 9, 1919, Petliura was elected chairman of the Directory.
Symon Petliura played a key role in the most difficult periods of 1919, showing courage, restraint, resolution, willpower, and an unshakable statist attitude. Commenting on Petliura’s steadfastness, his contemporary, Professor of Law A. Yakovliv, said that “one must note with surprise and properly assess Petliura’s firmness and devotion to the interests of state among the chaos of ideas, advice, fantastic projects of government reconstruction, reciprocal accusations, cowardice, treacheries, etc.” Let us not forget that this is the behavior of an individual against the backdrop and in the conditions of a war.
It is this period of his activities that was maligned perhaps the most by many, including Vinnychenko. “The usurper of political power,” “dictator,” etc., were by no means the mildest labels attached to Petliura. In reality, Petlira did not usurp or seize power violently from somebody else: he took it over in a legitimate and democratic way. The legal title of supreme power was bestowed on the Directory by the Labor Congress which expressed the will of the people. Petliura was determined to adhere to the Labor Congress’s principles and ideas and retain the legitimacy of the power he wielded.
Petliura devoted most of his energy to the army which played a pivotal role in the crusade for Ukrainian statehood. Uninterrupted hostilities on all fronts throughout 1919 forced the head of state and the Chief Otaman of the UNR Army to focus on the problems of defense, army development, and organization of the armed struggle.
Lt.-Gen. V. Salsky rightly noted that “Petliura was a source of moral strength thanks to which our Army was able to hold out in so difficult and unprecedented conditions. The reason is that Petliura knew the great secret of power over the people, the secret of ruling the masses. One can say that he held the heart and soul of the Army in his hands, as well as that he himself was the heart and soul of his Army. More often than not an operational plan drawn up under his supervision seemed unrealistic, but the leader’s firm and unbending belief in final success, unexplainable stubbornness of sorts, and the desire to fight on would make up for the flagging energy of commanders and produce the required results.”
The Entente’s political circles remained committed to the idea of an undivided Russia and banked on Poland in their face-off with Bolshevism. Gen. Denikin rejected outright the idea of an independent Ukraine, saying that negotiations were only possible on the premise that there would be a “single undivided Russia.” Petliura was relentless and entertained no illusions about Bolshevik Russia. He said, among other things, in an appeal to the Ukrainian people on December 2, 1919, “The people of Ukraine and our republican army know that Bolshevism will bring no salvation. Bolshevism and communism will never sprout on the Ukrainian soil. All it can do is sow a new civil war and materially destroy Ukraine for a third time.”
We know very well today what price the Ukrainian people paid, turning a deaf ear to Petliura’s warning. At the same time, there is every reason to believe that it is this uncompromising attitude to Bolshevism that the present-day Bolshevik followers still cannot absolve Petliura of.
In the conditions that arose in late 1919 — early 1920, Petliura tried to find allies to continue the struggle. It was clear that Ukraine could only find salvation in a compromise with the Polish government. Poland was by far the only country interested in Ukraine continuing its liberation struggle and capable of providing it some tangible military aid. After a long and difficult series of talks, on April 21, 1920, the UNR and Poland signed a political convention on cooperation which went down in history as Warsaw Treaty.
One must admit that the Warsaw Treaty was and still is a subject of very contradictory assessments as well as the most compelling argument in the evaluation of Petliura’s activities. There was no alternative for the UNR at the time. To continue the struggle against Bolshevik Moscow, there was no other option but to agree to sign this unequal treaty. Petliura accepted this diktat, hoping to normalize the situation later and, once peace had been achieved, to regain all the Ukrainian lands, including Eastern Halychyna.
Guided by a pragmatic calculation, Petliura understood that Moscow’s imperialism still constituted the greatest danger to the very existence of the Ukrainian people, while the war-ravaged Poland could not represent this kind of danger. He suggested that the alliance with Poland be considered “as a tactical move to establish a link with Europe, even though this act was an act of salvation which enabled us to continue our struggle.”
Having received military and economic aid from Poland, the UNR army participated in the joint Ukrainian-Polish expedition to Kyiv, courageously defending its front line along the Zbruch and the Dnistro during the retreat. Of special importance is the defense of Zamistia, which dealt the Bolsheviks a staggering blow and allowed the Poles to throw the Red Army from the vicinities of Warsaw and launch a new offensive.
Petliura remained loyal to agreements with Poland and to the common cause of combating Bolshevism. He cherished a hope that all the Ukrainian lands would be united into one state. After Poland and Soviet Russia signed the Riga Peace Treaty under which all hostilities were to stop on October 18, the UNR army continued the armed struggle, waging battles in the most unfavorable conditions. It gave its last battle on November 21, 1920.
Symon Petliura and his staff stayed with the troops to the very end. The UNR army was not defeated: it retreated across the Zbruch in a body. Under the supervision of a Ukrainian- Polish disarmament commission, the weapons and equipment were handed over to the Polish authorities, while the personnel was interned in compliance with international law.
After crossing the border, the UNR army and government, as well as tens of thousands of nationally-conscious Ukrainians, continued their struggle in the conditions of internment. This struggle revealed the true potential of our nation, its aspiration for independence and development of its own statehood. Poland allowed establishing the UNR State Center which comprised the UNR government in exile with all ministries and agencies, including those of defense, the interior and foreign affairs. What really kept this struggle afloat was the statist position of Petliura who spearheaded the liberation movement, combining political activities with journalism. His views on the current situation and his vision of Ukraine’s prospects had a far-reaching effect on the developments in the political circles of that time.
Unlike other political figures, who had either given up politics or opted for cooperation with the Bolshevik regime, Petliura continued to struggle.
At the same time, Vinnychenko, who resided in Berlin (later in Vienna) and headed the foreign section of the Ukrainian Communist Party, wrote in his journal Nova doba (New Age), “Whoever favors the victory of counterrevolution, mobilizes and organizes forces somewhere to fight against Soviet Ukraine and the socialist revolution is the traitor of his nation, the enemy of Ukrainian statehood, the aggressor against his own people.”
Mykhailo Hrushevsky, then leader of the Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries’ foreign section, clearly aired basically the same opinion in the journal Boritesia — poborete (You Will Win if You Struggle), “We reject any overt and covert struggle against Soviet Russia and Communist Bolsheviks, as well as the tactic of armed uprisings and the policy of internal sabotage. We have learned to respect the Bolsheviks as soldiers of the worldwide revolution.” Soon after he returned to Soviet Ukraine and threw himself at the Bolsheviks’ mercy.
Vinnychenko also traveled to Moscow, where he was offered the office of deputy chairman of Soviet Ukraine’s Council of People’s Commissars and the portfolios of education and foreign affairs, but he imposed the condition that he be included into the Ukrainian Communist Party’s Politburo. This was nothing but political bargaining.
Assessing the damage inflicted by Hrushevsky and Vinnychenko, Petliura wrote in a letter to K. Maciewicz, “I think the actions of these two outstanding figures of modern Ukrainian history have smeared Ukraine more than any other thing and shaken the ability of Ukrainians to resist at the most crucial moment. Foreigners will never like a nation that has chosen such pastors, for they will never be sure of its ability to endure the quest for the ideals without which it cannot be considered as nation, not to mention the colossal harm done to the nation by this kind of irregular and contradictory national policies.”
Why then is petliurivshchyna still a more abusive word than “political bargaining,” conformism, inconsistency, backsliding, opportunism, and desertion, i.e., the terms quite applicable to Vinnychenko. Are these historical facts insufficient to catalyze reappraisal of these historical persons?
On his part, Petliura remained faithful to the idea of Ukrainian statehood until his last days. Of all his contemporaries, he was the most consistent and self-denying creator and defender of this statehood, the key figure of the national liberation struggle. In the editorial to the first issue of his weekly Tryzub (Trident) that came out on October 15, 1925, Petliura declared, “We are deliberately marching under the sign of Trident as symbol of Ukrainian statehood. We believe in and profess Ukrainian statehood, we are certain of its inevitability. We view it as sort of a living reality because we bear its idea deep in our hearts and because all our lifetime is permeated with its spirit. Our ideological work will consist in unfurling and defending the idea of Ukrainian statehood.”
It is only natural that the Soviet leadership viewed Petliura as an arch enemy, and the Bolsheviks could not have the leader speak to his people even from abroad. On May 25, 1926, Bolshevik agent Samuel Schwarzbard killed Symon Petliura, 47 at the time, with seven revolver shots on Rue Racine in the Latin Quarter of Paris.
It raises no doubts from today’s historical perspective that Petliura’s assassination was organized and perpetrated by Bolshevik agents. The murder and the ensuing Paris trial were successfully used to discredit the Ukrainian national movement for many decades to come by those who blamed it for Jewish pogroms in Ukraine during the national liberation struggle.
A well-known historian, Academician A. Zhukovsky, noted, “Today, almost three fourths of a century later, we can see how small, wrong and hypocritical were the assessments, programs and directives of once prominent statesmen! Only the path of Petliura was justified. He was followed by most contemporaries and, later, by new generations. In the wake of him were the creators of Ukraine’s revived independence. Petliura’s plan has been brought to fruition by the good initiatives of the present-day Ukrainian state.”
It is a case of political shortsightedness that the modern Ukrainian state so lifelessly and unimaginatively identifies itself with the Ukrainian National Republic, without fully using the experience of such figures as Petliura. Petliura is still to find a historical place he deserves in Ukraine. What we have is not only indifference to his name. The point is that the topmost public officials still view petliurivshchyna through the prism of one-sided interpretations of the era of communist totalitarianism, while the enemies of Ukrainian statehood are still taking an utterly negative attitude to him. It would be good if today’s politicians and statesmen knew Petliura’s ideas that became a motive force in the Ukrainian people’s renaissance and liberation struggle — this will help them understand better this nation’s problems.
There still are no monuments to Petliura in Ukraine. It is time to erect such monuments in Kyiv, Poltava, Kamyanets-Podilsky, etc., open his museums, name city streets after him, and immortalize the historical places related to him. The previous government turned a deaf are to the public demands made in 2004, on the eve of Petliura’s 125th anniversary.
Let us hope that Ukraine’s new governmental structures will at last realize their duty because it is the question of restoring historical truth and justice about the co-founder of the Ukrainian National Republic, the creator of the Ukrainian army, and the head of state to which modern Ukraine is a legal successor.
An in-depth and unbiased research of Petliura’s life and deeds will serve not only the cause of restoring the historical truth but also meet the public requirement of building a modern nation state. Building an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state today, we must not only pay tribute to our great predecessors but also use their historical experience in order to avoid new mistakes.
Back in 1919, V. Koroliv (V. Staryi) asked a somewhat rhetorical question in the introduction to his book People’s Hero Symon Petliura, “Will you, Ukrainian people, be able to appreciate what he has already done for the happiness of his native land; will you be able to thank your best son for the superhuman efforts he made for your benefit?”
This question is still on the agenda today.
