The latest Russian elections have led to various conclusions about Russia, its government and oppositions, and the condition of society. One of these conclusions is the emergence of what journalists called “Prokhorov phenomenon” and what we refer to, by way of extension, as “the Prokhorovs phenomenon.”
In spite of a traditionally cautious (or even hostile) attitude to this kind of affluent people, billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov made quite a convincing job, finishing third in the presidential race. Meanwhile, his sister, linguist Irina Prokhorova, has captivated the Russian liberal public with her erudition, thorough scholarship, and the ability to conduct a well-reasoned debate with tough opponents and Vladimir Putin’s most active trustees, such as Nikita Mikhalkov. It is not only the acceptance of her words about the necessity of educating society but, first of all, the tone and style of Prokhorova’s contacts that many have interpreted as a long-awaited alternative to the current Russian political discourse. We are among these many. Last week Den tried to study the Prokhorovs phenomenon (No. 45, March 15, 2012). So we gladly supported the initiative of the Institute of World Politics to hold a videoconference, “Elections 2012: Consequences for Russia and the Region,” with participation of Kyiv and Moscow experts, including Prokhorova. Here we offer our readers the most interesting points of the discussion.
“THERE WILL BE NO MORE TIMID AUTHORITARIANISM. A SYSTEM WITH DIFFERENT CONSEQUENCES IS BEING FORMED”
Olena HETMANCHUK:“The Russian elections 2012 are over. What consequences do you think they have for Russia itself?”
Nikolay PETROV: “There are three factors that allow us to believe that the elections were not legitimate enough. The first is Vladimir Putin’s third term – a violation of the Constitution, the second is denying opposition candidates access to the elections, and the third is the course of the election campaign, when Putin ruled supreme in all the media by in fact abusing his office. The voting itself in the election, which some experts call one of the fairest in Russia over the past few years, is also raising a number of doubts. Some facts are coming to our knowledge only now. We can so far speak about the likely mass-scale rigging. For example, on the election day, March 4, the number of voters increased by 1,250,000 against January 1, 2012. It is a colossal rise. Putin won, but the aftertaste still remains, and this is unlikely to be forgotten very fast. Unlike Ukraine, Russia has never received a new system of government as a result of elections. Russia sticks to the following pattern: first the political elites make their choice and then this choice is legitimized in a nationwide vote. It is very important for the political system because this reveals the government’s inability to take firm steps which require that the government be sure of its legitimacy.”
Irina PROKHOROVA: “It is difficult to call these elections legitimate. Mikhail Prokhorov’s headquarters is now collecting a great deal of documented evidence of election rigging. For example, there were Gogol-style ‘dead souls’ in St. Petersburg. Even if we could imagine an ideal picture: we have gathered real votes and, say, Putin emerges victorious, I would still call it a quasi-legitimate victory. I often recall Mikhail Zhvanetsky’s joke: ‘If there’s one window in your room, what’s its rating?’ Information about the other contenders was suppressed, there was an unequal distribution of the candidate’s screen time, and, therefore, we failed to put our program across to the people, especially in the regions.
“But I would also like to say about the positive impressions of these elections. The current political activity of people shows that Russian society has never fallen into lethargy. Even the past 12 years have seen a powerful inner evolution of civil society and the formation of many public movements that fight against arbitrary rule in the provinces. Human rights organizations have also worked effectively. All today’s protests are only the tip of the iceberg. The process cannot be stopped now. The main question people were asking at all rallies was: what is to be done next? The question is not how to hold rallies but how to work in reality. The country’s future depends not on reshuffles in the government but on the way society is going to self-organize and establish institutions. I do believe that, relying on these institutions, we will be able to really change something in the country. If the current mess goes on, any changes will remain unlikely. Any government wishes to be and will remain totalitarian as long as society keeps silent. I think we are entering today a new stage of a dialogue, rather than a face-off, between the government and society.”
Alexey MALASHENKO: “Firstly, Putin is not a national leader. If he had competed in a runoff and won, his victory would have looked far more prestigious. What was possible yesterday will not happen today for the simple reason that Putin will no longer live that comfortably. There will no longer be this timid authoritarianism – a system with different consequences is being formed. Secondly, what is going to happen to the post-Soviet space? All Russia’s neighbors are pondering now on who they will in fact deal with.”
“IN TODAY’S RUSSIA, THE SLOGANS OF THOSE WHO TAKE TO THE STREETS REPEAT THE SLOGANS OF THE 1960s HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES”
Iryna BEREZHNA: “I would like to raise several questions now. Do you think the protests in Moscow and other regions of Russia played for, rather than against, Putin, as they allowed him to mobilize his electorate?
“Who do you think is Putin’s think tank today? To what extent is this tank shaping Russia’s domestic and foreign policy?
“Russia is having a colossal impact on Ukraine, but this country also has a tremendous potential of influencing Russia. To what extent did the Orange Revolution affect Russia? Has Russia learned the lessons of the defeat of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine?
“To what extent is the idea of a Eurasian union popular in Russian society? Or is it just an opportunity to modernize the country? Can this union effectively develop without Ukraine?”
I.P.: “I do not know who Mr. Putin’s think tank is or whether the latter exists at all. As for Putin’s electorate, the point is we know very little about the history of the protest movement in the past six months. We have heard something about Moscow and Petersburg actions, but we do not know, for example, that there was a large-scale protest action in Krasnoyarsk (10,000-15,000 people) in early November against the construction of an industrial facility that will pollute the air. They wielded no political slogans, it was an environmental protest. A great deal of domestic discontent has not been institutionalized in society. I think it is Putin’s administrative resource, rather that his electorate, that was mobilized. All the governors were told to ensure the necessary percentage at any cost.
“We have been scared with an orange revolution in the past six months, especially before the last elections. Protests are somewhat different in Russia. Nobody wants revolutions because there have been tragic instances in history. Therefore, the prevailing opinion is that we should opt for an evolutionary way. But this does not mean that intelligent people reject the experience of Ukraine. This experience has been learned in a sense that when the government does not make necessary decisions in good time, this may trigger a revolution of this kind. Any revolution testifies to the death of a political body. In today’s Russia, the slogans of those who take to the streets repeat the slogans of the 1960s human rights advocates. Ukraine and Russia have different revolutionary vectors of development, but protest movements are similar in that the people demand respect, a fair deal, and personal security.
“The Eurasian Union is a bad mythologem which indeed eclipses the real problems in the country. Incidentally, Mikhalkov always reiterates this.”
N.P.: “In the short term, the mobilization of if not Putin’s then the conformist electorate would have a positive meaning, but in the long term it is dangerous – the government itself approves of rallies as the only form of political dialogue. Many people come across the methods the government applies. It is no secret that, in addition to those who had sincerely come out on the street, there were many people who were forced to take part in those rallies. Incidentally, Putin did not say at his last victorious rally that he would be the president of all people – his speech was of a confrontational nature.”
I.P.: “To listen to him, we have almost defended Moscow from the Nazis. It was a purely militaristic rhetoric. But who is the enemy here – his own people?”
A.M.: “As for the think tank, it may exist, but it clearly lacks brains.”
“WE ARE AT THE DAWN OF AN EPOCH WHICH WILL BEGIN TO BRING IN LEADERS IN DEFIANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT”
Roman BEZSMERTNY: “The Orange Revolution’s achievement is that people of absolutely different ideologies are sitting now in this room. Another success is the election of Viktor Yanukovych as president in 2010. Only time will show the result of his rule. But my question is: do you see an alternative to Putin (who is a generalized figure in Russia today) as a phenomenon, not an individual?”
I.P.: “If Putin had been chosen in a fair election instead of being appointed to his office, we could be speaking of a generalized figure. The situation is far more complicated. Propaganda is doing very well, and Putin is cutting a dashing figure. As for an alternative, if my brother Mikhail Prokhorov were given an opportunity to spell out his program during the election campaign, he could have shown this alternative. I do not rule out that we are at the dawn of an epoch which will begin, in defiance of the government, to bring in leaders who will have different views of Russia’s future. This will be a real alternative to Putin’s regime. This situation has been brewing in the past 20 years. I do not think this will be taking place in the elite’s narrow circle only – leaders can also emerge from civic organizations, i.e., in the lower echelons. Russia has a powerful demand for new values, and people are tired of the Soviet, semi-totalitarian, frame of references. They no longer want to tolerate this system of humiliations. I think we are now at the beginning of a mighty process that can change the correlation of forces in the government.”
A.M.: “It is unlikely that new leaders will emerge in the near future. In my view, we will see a certain analogue of the middle class. It is a prime mover that can really achieve something. If the current tendency towards the consolidation of the middle class stays on (there are good reasons to believe so), the picture will change. This class will produce the up-and-coming people whom we will perhaps call an alternative to Putin.”
N.P.: “The political system has much less time for serious changes than the middle class may have to form and consolidate its interests. Putin’s system is over: it can no longer exist the way it does now. There are two important factors that are forcing Putin to change. His chances as a leader depend on whether he will be able to do this. We can see today that Putin, Russia’s strongest politician, is no longer the ruler he used to be. He seems so far to have failed to understand the necessity of changing his behavior in accordance with the new role he must play in the political system. All his election campaign unfurled under the slogan of the absence of changes and the preservation of stability, and the relative majority that Putin managed to garner is an onerous burden for him to bear because the new government will have to take a number of painful radical steps, breaking down what helped Putin win a third term of presidency.”
A.M.: “Maybe, this is why he shed a tear at a rally?”
N.P.: “Maybe. Putin himself will be the gravedigger for the system he built.”
“BATU KHAN IS ALL TO BLAME. PUTIN IS THE HEIR TO THIS BATU”
Mykhailo POHREBYNSKY: “I have gained an impression that you are going to change the country without Putin. Yet a sober analysis says that, as Putin is already the president, nothing can be changed without him. So it seems to me that you should seek a way to have a dialogue with him. I hope protest movements in Russia will not die out, otherwise the authorities are sure not no change anything. But the protest movement should be organized in such a way that you could speak with Putin and try to change the country in a joint effort. But my question is different. In my view, what is now going on in Russia’s cultural sphere is drawing a very simple line from Herzen to People’s Will revolutionaries, the Social Democrats, and the Russian liberation movement, which once broke down autocracy and led the country to 70 years of a civilization collapse. Ms. Prokhorova, do you, a person of culture, feel that the Russian intelligentsia is also to blame for what Russia is going through today?”
I.P.: “You have shown a Soviet approach, when the intelligentsia was accused of all sins. Let us not lay the blame at somebody else’s door. The problem of the Russian revolution is not at all in Herzen, and it is the fault of the Bolsheviks that they usurped the protest movement. This reminds me of the situation when journalists were blamed for the outbreak of war in Chechnya. You see, they wrote wrong things… The anti-intellectual campaign, which periodically erupts in this country (now, for example), is a disgusting legacy of the totalitarian system. I can see no sins that the intelligentsia has ever committed – the problems are in other fields.
“About a dialogue with Putin. Undoubtedly, we should have a dialogue with the authorities. But we often begin this dialogue before we have worked with society. If the Russian intelligentsia (cultural stratum) is to be vested with some mission, it is work with society – enlightenment in other words. This is not being done today. We are absolutely ignorant of the growth potential in society.”
A.M.: “What’s that got to do with the intelligentsia if, as is known, all the blame lies with Batu Khan. Putin is the heir to this Batu, so there are many questions about how to cooperate with him. On the other hand, I fully agree that the Kremlin is no longer able to control everything. We have a civil society, but we either underestimate or fail to see or fail to understand it.”
Pavlo ZHOVNIRENKO: “What do you think about the effectiveness of international observers at the Russian elections? What conclusions has the Prokhorovs team drawn from its performance in these elections?”
I.P.: “I was greatly astonished to see so many young people who tried to be observers at the elections. We should appreciate the wishes of people. This means people are prepared for a powerful civil movement. Incidentally, the Kremlin was willingly spinning the yarn that Prokhorov was their project. This is absolutely wrong. For some reason, very few believe that the Kremlin is no more able to control everything, so it is trying just to strangle people in its embraces. I can say there is a great demand today for a new democratic party. We can conclude this on the basis of the inquiries we are receiving.
“We are constantly appealing in dialogues to your and our presidents, but, unfortunately, we are underestimating the factor of culture. It is not only a lever for economic development but also a key to excellent Ukrainian-Russian relations.”
