Last days saw, so to speak, a “sign of de-Stalinization.” What prompted some writers to focus on this was an important event in Russia’s public life — a statement by Mikhail Fedotov, the newly-appointed head of the Human Rights Council under the president of Russia, which was in many ways groundbreaking. He said that it is necessary to “de-Stalinize the social mentality of Russia’s citizens.” Ukrainians are especially interested in Russia finally opting for a democratic system. It is clear that Stalinism today is, above all, an imperial mentality that endures and rejects the Ukrainian identity, recognizing the Holodomor as genocide, and the right of Ukrainians to have their own heroes. It is a reason to impose on us their ideology in the form of the so-called common history manual.
We have already written about the Big Politics program on the Inter TV channel, which triggered a hot-heated debate. There was a particularly interesting moment in it: Sergei Uvarov, a Moscow guest and, presumably, a Ukraine expert, was outraged that his speech drew no applause. He exhibited an emotional reaction and began to suspect that he had spoken to a handpicked audience.
A young man from the audience raised his hand and replied with outstanding personal dignity. It took us quite an effort to track him down: he is a Kyivan student, Nazar Lytvyn. This program featured the very rational political scientist Vadym Karasiov, whom The Day has already interviewed, and the historian Vladyslav HRYNEVYCH, who agreed to answer The Day’s questions about the show, de-Stalinization and other topics.
THE UKRAINIAN INTELLIGENTSIA MAY ONLY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT IF IT REVERSES ITS MEMORY POLICY
Mr. Hrynevych, why do you think there is so much trickery in today’s Ukraine in regards to the topic of de-Stalinization?
“As a matter of fact, we have not heard the term ‘de-Stalinization’ since the new team came to power. Moreover, the leadership is always trying to adjust to Russia — to its canons and approaches to historical research. It is afraid of offending Russia and, in general, of saying a ‘wry’ word. Actually, speaking of de-Stalinization, we must note that this process began in full after the Orange Revolution. It is during this period that we began to depart from Soviet history and tried to create or recreate our own democratic canons, which can help us assume our own identity.
“When Putin came to power in Russia, de-Stalinization, which had begun in that country in the Yeltsin era, essentially slowed down. This signaled an overall rollback, i.e., a return to Stalinist values, because Stalin is a crucial element for Russian empire. This helps Russian leadership to attempt to recreate a powerful super-empire, for imperial values are very important for Russian mentality: everybody was afraid of us, we ruled the world, the Kremlin used to pick up a phone and tell half of Europe, Asia and Africa what to do. This really moves the Russian heart. In this case, Stalin, with all his crimes and atrocities, was the one who forced the entire world to fear and reckon with Russia. And, what is more, he is associated with winning the World War II. What he had done before is receding to the background. For modern-day Russian identity, the victory in World War II is the most significant event, which made Russia a superpower. In this sense, Stalin cannot be thrown away because we say ‘Stalin’ and mean ‘victory,’ we say ‘victory’ and mean Stalin. If you delete Stalin from this word combination, that victory will be empty. Therefore, Stalin is a butcher and a murderer on the one hand, and a great victor on the other.
“Russian school manuals published in the past five years, after Putin ordered the ‘right’ textbooks to be written (moreover, he promised to bring to justice the publishers who would produce the ‘wrong’ books), have seen a U-turn from de-Stalinization. For example, the manual by Danilov and Filippov ends in 1945. It does not explain what totalitarianism is because the authors consider it a bad word and suggest using the word ‘modernization.’ In other words, Stalinism is regarded as a period of modernization that turned a peasant Russia into a rocket-launching one. Stalin is treated as a great manager who succeeded in carrying out this modernization. The manual’s authors mainly emphasize industrialization, devoting 80 positive pages to it, while the Holodomor, owing to which the industrialization was in fact possible, takes up but one passage.
“I am not inclined to exaggerate the role of the Orange period, but, against the backdrop of economic failures, negative effects on public wellbeing, and political chaos, Yushchenko’s national memory policy, criticized, incidentally, by many historians, was about de-Stalinization. I just wonder why these historians are silent now. How are they going to criticize this policy now? As you know, there was so much mocking of Lviv’s Lontsky Prison and Bykivnia in Kyiv. The right approach was to get rid of our Soviet legacy. Even the Occupation Museum, which many people also ridiculed for lack of wisdom, was a rational project that fit in with the de-Stalinization concept.”
What is your attitude to the Russian politician Sergei Markov’s idea to write a common manual on Russian and Ukrainian history? Is this possible at all?
“Whenever we raise this question, I have another one to ask: why do the Russian, or our leaders, need this? It is very simple. The Russians are very well aware that it will be difficult to restore their empire without Ukraine. As a matter of fact, when they say we should write a common manual, it is, above all, an attempt to use identity as a means of caging Ukrainians, especially those who still find it difficult to find their identity. The Russians know only too well that ours is a split country and, hence, they take advantage of this, manipulating the awareness of the people. If you deprive people of their language, history, and identity — they will think it is normal. The Russian imperial project is in fact aimed at tying Ukraine up — intellectually, morally, and in terms of identity — to Russia as tightly as possible, and uses history as an argument.
“The European democratic rhetoric, which both Markov and Kolesnichenko resorted to, hides Russian imperial intentions. When somebody always urges us to be more democratic and tolerant, and to embrace European values, this means they are pulling wool over our eyes. Because their media is frank about the fact that [Russia] will not manage to restore an empire of sorts without Ukraine. Who guarded the Chinese border in the Soviet era? The Ukrainians. They are not there now. In other words, there is no, pardon the expression, ‘cannon fodder’ to do the dirty work.”
What about Fedotov’s statement about Russia’s intention to carry out de-Stalinization?
“Russia is as eager as Ukraine to integrate into the European space. They are motivated by a host of economic problems. So it is extremely important for Russia to have the image of a civilized country, and Stalinism is quite an uncivilized thing. This is why both Putin and Medvedev have been dissociating themselves from and condemning Stalinism in the past few years. The real situation is that, on the one hand, Stalinist methods and crimes are being condemned and, on the other, Stalin is being glorified. Frankly speaking, I would be very glad if Russia embarked on a democratic path and condemned Stalinism, among other things. The point is that deeds not always follow words. I have already mentioned Danilov’s and Filippov’s textbook. It is about not only history but also about political spin. It is teachers, rather than pupils, who must study this manual to know how to teach history. Incidentally, this book came under scathing criticism in the West for being biased.
“Besides, the State Duma of Russia passed two resolutions on the ‘right’ interpretation of Ukraine’s past. Then they set up the so-called Medvedev Commission that deals with countering the falsification of history. The Russian authorities are actively supporting this: a number of projects have been launched to study history textbooks in neighboring countries. We know there have already been some conflicts, as with the relocation of [Red Army soldiers] monuments in Tallinn and Kutaisi. Another resolution is aimed at countering the rehabilitation of Nazi war criminals and their henchmen in the former Soviet republics. Passed on the eve of Victory Day, this law prescribes punishment for attempts to revise the assessment of World War II. This virtually Stalinist document is a manifesto of sorts by which Moscow is asserting its rights and laying claim to ideological control in the post-Soviet space, first of all, in its European part. Russia is just making it clear that it will not tolerate any pluralism of views on the history of World War II. Incidentally, the institutions that promote writing a ‘true’ history of Russia are far from always considered academic.
“Therefore, de-Stalinization in Russia is a desired, rather than an actual, thing. In other words, Russia’s national memory policy is very far from its leader’s recent declarations. We will see whether Russia’s declarations on de-Stalinization will be backed up by actions or whether they are just meant to woo the West. In reality, the latest Western research shows there is no de-Stalinization going on. Russia is not waging a large-scale campaign to condemn Stalinism. All this sank into oblivion after Yeltsin because the authoritarian regime does not want any parallels to be drawn with the Stalinist regime.”
Perhaps, at least in words only, Russia is trying to snatch the de-Stalinization initiative from Ukraine?
“While in the Yushchenko era it was possible to analyze something because many institutions dealt with this issue, now we simply do not have any national memory policy. There is the Institute of National Remembrance, which has done very much in pursuing the national memory policy. We can clearly see this only now that de-Stalinization is being folded up, especially when this institute is now headed by the communist Soldatenko who is guided by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and is mulling over the publication of a book of documents on UPA atrocities. Pursuing this policy, the institute only discredits the authorities, particularly Yanukovych, instead of doing any good. I do not think it will hold out for a long time, if it continues moving in this direction. So, taking into account that fact that the government is not pursuing any national memory policy, we cannot say that Russia can overtake us. Not only are doing nothing: on the contrary, we are ruining what was done during the presidency of Yushchenko.
“The new leadership has completely lost the support of Ukrainian intellectuals who do not wish, on their part, to cooperate with the authorities. And the people who hang around Yanukovych only pretend to be intellectuals. In this case, the leadership has found itself in a blind alley by its own effort. So they ought to think of how long they will manage to stay in power without relying on the potential of Ukrainian intellectuals. The Ukrainian intelligentsia will only offer its support if the leadership reverses its current national memory policy. It is not a question of political preferences. The leadership simply does not know how to cope with what they can possess at last when nobody gives them a helping hand. Therefore, the point is not that Russia has overtaken them — the point is that they still fail to understand that de-Stalinization is a needed and civilized thing to do.”
What do you think causes the leadership to be unaware of the necessity to carry out this process?
“The cause is absolutely clear. Ukraine is a country that has a lot of identities, of which we can single out two and call them, for convenience, pro-Ukrainian and pro-Soviet. The latter is largely based on Russian patriotism. This means preference for the Russian language and culture as well as nostalgia for the Soviet Union. Yushchenko brought in an elite that endorsed the idea of pro-Ukrainian identity and considered it necessary to Ukrainize this country’s identity for the sake of development. But the current ruling elite, mostly hailing from Donetsk, was born and raised in a region, where all things Ukrainian were weak and all things Russian and Soviet were blurred. The Ukrainian language, culture, and identity are of no value for them. They thought that once they had come to power and imposed their will, all the rest would become resigned to their fate. This leadership does not understand that no social, mental, and intellectual questions can be answered by injunctions. This cannot be done by force. Stalin was once bent on physically destroying the Ukrainian elite. This is now, naturally, impossible. After all, what did Stalin manage to do? As soon as the regime foundered in the late 1980s, the Ukrainian identity immediately came to the fore.
“Power is now wielded by people whom I cannot possibly call an elite. They do not know at all whether they are Ukrainian or Russian. I once read that when non-ethnic Ukrainians were appointed to top offices in the Soviet era, they would become Ukrainian patriots within a year or two. Somebody even complained to Moscow that the rotation of cadres was too slow and people here became Ukrainian patriots too fast. In this case the Donetsk clan found itself in a similar situation. These people came to Kyiv, where they felt a certain influence and resistance, because neither Kyiv nor Lviv support them. For example, they can politically cancel an election or do something else, but this will not produce a result. Unfortunately, the Donetsk clan continues to discredit itself when it allows its inner circle to stage all kinds of provocations. Among them are Tabachnyk and Soldatenko, who are acting against, rather than for, their leaders. But even they will be unable to de-Ukrainize Ukraine.
“For this reason, the Donetsk clan will have to adapt and become Ukrainized. There is no other way out. Either they will adjust to Ukrainian rules or go nowhere. They will not draw up their own rules. Even Prof. Tolochko, who opines that Ukrainians created the Russian Empire and that it is our common heritage, will not help here, let alone Tabachnyk with his still crazier ideas. The Russian and Soviet empires are not our common heritage. The proof of this is the Holodomor, the OUN-UPA, and Chornobyl. Our historical memory is entirely different, so we will never adapt to the Russian mentality. I think the current leadership will gradually understand this and will, sooner or later, try to get rid of their most odious members — in other words, they will opt for a compromise. This is meant to attract the Ukrainian elite to ruling the state.”
There was a very interesting moment at the Inter TV channel’s latest program Big Politics, when a student from the audience raised his hand and spoke to the Russian guest Sergei Markov, responding to his passionate speech: “If we had a normal security service, you would be in no laughing mood.” Would you comment on this? What does this mean?
“Apart from being an academic historian, I am also a professor at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. This means I mingle with young people who study impartial history. A Norwegian acquaintance of mine surveyed the state of languages in Ukraine and found that Russian-speaking young people in Kharkiv believe that Ukrainian should be the official language. Kyiv-Mohyla Academy is one of the few institutions in Ukraine where Ukrainian is spoken everywhere. I think that people, who have gone to Ukrainian schools and studied Ukrainian textbooks deprived of imperial and totalitarian bombast are the foundation of Ukrainian patriotism.
“During the abovementioned talk show, young people never applauded Markov, which means they took a dim view of the idea of a common textbook. And Ganapolsky was certainly wrong to give this student a talking-to for being ‘undemocratic.’ Can you imagine that our compatriot comes to France or Germany and begins to say in a TV program what Markov said in Ukraine: ‘your textbooks are not your business and if you are undemocratic and dim-witted, we will tell you what to write?’ This is a national insult. The student spoke from the bottom of his heart. And he was right because he meant: ‘If you have come to a foreign country and want to foist your approaches on us, where is our security service, which is supposed to protect us from you?’”
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The Day got in touch with the person who responded to Markov’s “progressive” statements. He is Nazar Lytvyn, a 5th year (master’s degree) student, majoring in finance, at Kyiv National Vadym Hetman Economic University.
“WE MUST CORRECTLY ASSESS STALINISM AND CLEAR OUR CONSCIENCE OF THE SOVIET PAST”
Nazar, you could have remained silent during Markov’s speech. Why did you choose to speak?
“Firstly, I am very grateful to you for an opportunity to express my opinion. That moment on the talk show, I had prepared no special questions. I was just listening to the debate. I will tell you straightaway that Mr. Markov’s words revolted me. I could not help responding, for I was not indifferent to what he said. In general, I think any patriotically-minded person would have done the same in my place. He, a Russian State Duma member, came to us — to a Ukrainian TV channel — first of all, as a guest, so he should not have taken the liberty to lecture us on how to write Ukrainian history textbooks and, in general, to express contemptuous ideas about our history and heroes. I think the SBU should deal with this kind of people. I am not going to assess the performance of this organization under the previous president, but they really dealt with such people as Zatulin and Luzhkov, who also allowed themselves, whenever they visited Ukraine, to express doubts about Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity.”
There have been instances in Europe, when the French and the Germans wrote common history manuals. What do you think should occur in Ukraine-Russia relations to enable the two countries to write common textbooks? It is possible now, or ever?
“I do not think it is possible today. And, in general, I do not understand how we can write about a common history if we are different countries and have different histories. Naturally, there can be some common positive moments for both countries, but Russia is a conqueror, while Ukraine is a country that has always been fighting for its independence, mainly against Russia. In other words, we have a history of liberation. So there is very little in common between the two countries. And if we recall the Russian leadership’s comment about how collapse of the USSR is the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century — and we know that this ‘catastrophe’ resulted in Ukraine’s independence, what common history can we talk about? Yes, Ukraine and Russia are close in many respects, we are neighbors and, in all probability, a common textbook will be possible in the future. But, for this to happen, each side should admit its own faults and failures. History consists of black and white streaks, so one should not say that Russia has always been good for us. This is wrong. Moreover, our people do not think so. We have heroes of our own that Russia must recognize if it wants common textbooks to be written.”
Why do you think Russia has recognized the Polish tragedy in Katyn but does not want to recognize the Ukrainian Holodomor tragedy?
“Yes, Poland was at times part of the Russian imperial or Soviet sphere of influence, but Ukraine was much closer. Even Russians themselves are saying that it is impossible to reestablish a Russian empire without Ukraine. Taking into account that in the early 2000s Russia embarked on the path of the restoration of what I may call a once powerful empire, Ukraine has become the main object of pressure on the part of Russia. Moreover, they need our human and economic resources. The Polish situation is different: new world realities and, hence, new geopolitics. But the main thing is that the Poles are more unanimous in defending their interests. Poland has always been taking the same view on the Katyn tragedy, no matter who was in power. This has never been the case in Ukraine because some Ukrainian politicians do not consider the Holodomor as genocide. Russia will not recognize the Holodomor as long as there is no unity on this question in Ukrainian society and, what is more, among politicians. Only united can we resist Russian pressure.”
What do you think causes de-Stalinization to slow down in today’s Ukraine?
“I represent the younger generation that was shaped in independent Ukraine, although I was born in the USSR. My views were formed in independent Ukraine. It is perhaps the patriotic upbringing by my parents that allows me to say that de-Stalinization must be carried out to the end. Stalin was one of the greatest butchers of the Ukrainian people, so I don’t think de-Stalinization is bad. We must properly assess that period and clear our conscience of the vestiges of the Soviet past.
“You know, whenever officials and the opposition attend such TV programs as Big Politics, they try to tell the public that economic matters and people’s wellbeing is the thing to focus on. I do not think so because what is the most important is our language and history, i.e., social issues, as well as whether people abide by democratic procedures, laws, and the Constitution. I think politicians wangle public opinion when they say that earning money and, pardon, eating is the main thing. Politicians believe that ordinary people are disillusioned with politics. This may be partially true, but, as far as the younger generation is concerned (I don’t mean myself only), they are taking a keen interest in our political life, and they are concerned whether it will be worse or better.”
In your speech during the talk show, you said the phrase: “If we had a normal security service.” What is wrong with the security service and the government in general?
“I would not like to criticize the SBU for cooperating with Russia and in fact selling out our national interests. I just want to say that it is doing nothing to resist the Russian onslaught — sometimes it even encourages this onslaught. Why did it happen? Ukraine is diverse. I find it difficult to say what would have happened if another candidate had won, but the tragedy is that our democratic forces failed to unite. Nor can they, unfortunately, do so today, when the authorities are constantly pressuring them. Let us hope they will be able to unite in the future. The opposition will hardly manage to recoup its losses in the upcoming local elections, but they stand a good chance in the next parliamentary vote. They must unite by all means in order to offer at least some resistance to the government and avert any further ‘passionate love’ of Russia by way of integrating into Europe.”
I wonder why you have such a strong liberal arts background while you study exact sciences at the university. Secondly, can you tell us about the way audiences are selected for the Big Politics program? What was the audience’s reaction to Markov’s words?
“I have a good liberal arts background thanks to the school I went to. I come from Ternopil oblast. I have read and still read literature. Family upbringing is also important. My father and grandfather always take interest in politics and history, and they handed this down to me when I was still a child. Although politics is a dirty thing, I am interested in it.
“Yevgeny Kiseliov was right to say that it is mostly the students’ audience which was not ‘bribed.’ The students applauded the guests they liked and kept silent when they disagreed with somebody. In this case I managed to respond and thus express my protest. In reality, most of the Ukrainian, especially Kyivan, universities represented by their students in the audience applauded to the idea that there should be no common history textbook. The audience was patriotically-minded and did not support Markov’s theses. I know many of those who took part in this program, so I can say that most of them are opting for Ukraine’s democratic future and movement towards Europe, as well as better standards and values.”
