About two decades have already passed since the seemingly eternal “unbreakable Union” collapsed and became part of sometimes bloody, terrible, internally contradictory, and cruel history which fires imagination, inspires, and repels… But the Soviet Union is still a fact of present-day life (perhaps to a far greater extent than we can imagine) – in the sense that our current problems are rooted in the Soviet system and the Soviet way of thinking and doing has not vanished: it is still here, inside ourselves, and it is impossible just to “amputate” and erase from our memory the past, no matter what our attitude to it is.
All this means that we must make a more careful and thorough analysis of the historical processes that have unfolded since 1991 in post-Soviet countries – above all, in the two largest and most influential ones: Russia and Ukraine. The legitimate and quite natural right of the Ukrainian nation (Ukraine’s citizens of all ethnicities) to political independence is being rejected and ignored by the politicians of Russia which suffers greatly from “imperial syndrome.” Yet the sound-minded part of our society is facing a dire necessity to continue a dialogue with the like-minded Russian people who have, fortunately, always been and will be there (it is “the other Russia,” the Russia of Chaadaev, Herzen, Ryleyev, Leo Tolstoy, Chekhov, Grossman, Tsvetayeva, Pasternak, and Sakharov, which we respect and love) and, if necessary, with the not-so-hopeless opponents.
One of Den/The Day’s most respected people who have shared our views for a long time is professor Yurii AFANASIEV, People’s Deputy of the USSR in 1988-91, Doctor of History, longtime Rector of the Moscow History and Archives Institute (now Humanitarian University), one of the eminent leaders of the perestroika-era Russian democratic movement. Together with Afanasiev, Den/The Day’s experts – Yurii SHCHERBAK, a writer, political journalist, diplomat, and public figure, a permanent and favorite contributor to Den/The Day, also, like our Moscow guest, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and its oppositional Interregional Parliamentary Group in the late 1980s – early 1990s; зrofessor Myroslav Popovych, full member of Ukraine’s National Academy of Sciences, director of the Hryhorii Skovoroda Institute of Philology, longtime contributor to Den/The Day; Oxana Pachlovska, a professor at La Sapienza University of Rome, political writer, linguist, historian of culture, and brilliant contributor to Den/The Day – will be seeking out ways to comprehend the complex and extremely important issues, such as the nature of post-Soviet development, the key points in the latest history of Russia and Ukraine, the metamorphoses of Russia’s imperial paradigm, Russia after the 2011 parliamentary elections, the likely behavior patterns of the government and society, dangers to and chances of Ukraine, the cultural dialogues Russia-Ukraine, Russia-Europe, Ukraine- Russia, the worlds of values and interests.
It was decided to call the topic of the roundtable debate, the first part of which we offer to our readers, as “Post-Soviet Space 20 Years On. Where Are We Going?”
By Ihor SIUNDIUKOV, The Day
Larysa IVSHYNA:
“In a period of overall simplification, which we are going through now, it is not so easy to make an intellectual effort in a daily newspaper. We are striving to do so in spite of difficulties and are only too well aware that we would have hardly made any progress on this path had it not been for our longtime contributors and experts.
“I have recalled, in connection with the subject of our discussion, Leo Tolstoy’s words that are assuming special importance now: ‘…if vicious people are united and constitute a power, then honest folk must do the same. Now that’s simple enough.’
“Den/The Day once published a long series of expert opinions on the topic ‘What Kind of Russia Do We Love?’ What is written there convincingly refutes the widespread (but false) opinion that Ukrainian intellectual cannot get by without a face-off with Russia. It is symbolic that on Saturday, January 21, is the 142nd anniversary of the death of Aleksandr Herzen and in April – the 200th anniversary of his birth, for this person embodies in our mind the Russia we love.
“Also symbolically, the two Yurii – Afanasiev and Shcherbak, – who have met today after a 20-year pause, were once members of the same faction at the USSR Supreme Soviet – the Interregional Parliamentary Group. It is perhaps time to ask them what we have achieved in these 20 years and what factors caused things to go the way they did in both Ukraine and Russia.”
Yurii AFANASIEV:
“If I tried to identify the fundamental system-forming principles of the main events in Russia in the past 20 years, I would first of all say that the majority of Russia’s population has been totally deprived of free access, on a competitive basis, to the country’s basic resources. I mean real access to basic resources and free activity rather than access to the rent, which is now a fashionable point of discussions (a well-known formula of professor Lvov, ‘Rent for the whole people,’ in which I personally see a communist or socialist shade of sorts).
“Before we ended up with this total deprivation, we had made a really great journey on which we set out in the still Soviet era of the late 1980s. It would be a good idea, in my view, to recall a number of things. It is managers of state-run businesses (known later as ‘Red directors’) who were in fact becoming their owners. What is more, let me stress it again, this was being done in an outwardly Soviet form. A series of the USSR Communist Party and government resolutions and legislative acts (‘On Enterprise,’ ‘On Joint-Stock Companies,’ ‘On the Development of Cooperative Activity,’ ‘On the Establishment of Banks and Joint-Stock Companies,’ ‘On Mixed Enterprises’) forced, in my view, Soviet-era fully socialist enterprises to undergo the ‘primary metamorphosis’ and become not so socialist. Inside the enterprises (this process later spread to state-run farms and even ministries and agencies), budgetary and private money were being ‘mixed,’ which created a possibility to appropriate budgetary and state-owned fund in a private way.
“Cooperatives were being set up at the time ‘on the basis of state-run enterprises and organizations,’ but it was not clarified what ‘on the basis’ meant.
“It was expected that a considerable part of budgetary funds would be spent on the depreciation of fixed assets in the course of reform, but in reality this money went to the revolving assets, i.e., the wage fund. Budgetary money was in fact being pumped into private ‘pockets.’ State-owned property was in fact being privatized by administrations, the Soviet bureaucracy. Incidentally, I think it would be right to mention here Marx’s well-known dictum about ‘private property that gets on its hind legs’ (this seemingly ‘private’ property fully depends on the office, the ‘chair,’ of its owner).
“The second – also very important – stage of this long journey was Chubais’s so-called ‘voucher privatization’ (let me remind you that he promised every voucher owner nearly two Volga cars). Then, in the early 1990s, collateral auctions were held. There were several variants of the voucher privatization, including one with ‘personalized’ vouchers for a clearly fixed price, but Yeltsin chose a different way.
“As for the collateral auctions, the Russian Federation’s topmost political leadership made a deliberate (I stress it, deliberate) choice: let us appoint a narrow circle of people as big and very big owners who will be the stronghold of our power. Chubais said: ‘If we give a very wide circle of individuals access to ownership, the process will be uncontrollable.’ It is the time when oligarchs emerged and later studded the pages of Forbes with their names. I would like to emphasize again that those events were not spontaneous: it was a purposeful deed committed personally by Boris Yeltsin. The groundwork for the Yeltsin-Putin regime was laid at that very time. And it is Yeltsin who did it.
“But the essence of the development of those very important processes was also in the necessity to bring what was done into line with the constitution. This was done in December 1993, when a new Constitution of Russia was adopted, which expanded presidential power almost beyond any limits. Meanwhile, this economy was being established on an illegal basis, for citizens did not in fact have any, especially judicially-protected, rights. But laws were only passed (deliberately!) in line with this constitution.
“The political space was also made to fit in with the constitution: the grassroots of Russia were kept at bay. Concurrently, undesirable parties were being ‘cleared out’ and desirable ones were being ‘raised.’ The leadership began to gradually develop and improve the art of ‘social construction.’ The example of how this ‘art’ is being applied today is sort of a race between Medvedev and Putin – who will more raise wages, pensions, and benefits. Tellingly, those who benefit the most from this are the uniformed services and civil servants.
“In other words, a secret consensus was reached: some will get unbounded access to Russia’s resources, others to ‘decent living standards,’ and the bulk of the people just to being able to survive.”
“Naturally, Ukraine has its own specifics caused by the people’s aspiration for political independence (and whom or what could that-time Russia be independent of?), as well as by a number of particularities in our national elite. But the crucial question still remains as follows: how could we, Ukraine and Russia, come to what we have now? The speech of Yurii Afanasiev spotlighted this problem, and now the other Yurii, Shcherbak, will perhaps complement him.”
UKRAINE WAS FORMING UNDER TREMENDOUS INFLUENCE OF THE NATIONAL FACTOR
Yurii SHCHERBAK:
“Naturally, development algorithms of the Ukrainian and Russia states somewhat differed. I recall, in connection with our discussion, the words of Jozef Pilsudski: ‘I stepped down from the train called Marxism at the station named Political Independence of Poland.’ I think if Ukraine had had a statesman of the magnitude of Pilsudski at the moment the empire collapsed, all the further course of events would have been different.
“Ms. Ivshyna mentioned the perestroika-era Supreme Soviet. Mr. Afanasiev and I were members of that Supreme Soviet, and I would like to tell you about some landmarks in our joint work. In the Interregional Parliamentary Group, we discussed very little (unfortunately) the future political and national setup of the Soviet Union. When a Supreme Soviet member proposed voting on and supporting the national sovereignty declarations adopted by almost all the Soviet republics, including Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus, he came across stiff resistance on the part of Lukyanov, Gorbachev, and even some interregional democrats. But Mr. Afanasiev took an unambiguous stand – he clearly said ‘yes.’
“In the fall of 1990, we, deputies, drew up an interstate treaty between Russia (RSFSR at the time) and Ukraine (Ukrainian SSR at the time). The preamble of this draft spoke about ‘imperial development’ of Russia and the USSR. One of the deputies fiercely opposed this idea: he said the USSR had never been an empire! And I can remember Mr. Afanasiev consistently defending this very provision in the preamble. And when Ukraine proclaimed independence on August 24, 1991, Mr. Afanasiev was the only MP to send a congratulatory telegram to Kyiv, in which he expressed full support.”
L.I.: “Sincere and thunderous applause to our Moscow guest!”
Yu.Shch.: “For you to know the general political situation in Moscow at the time, I will give this example. A few days after August 24, I read out the Act on the National Independence of Ukraine at a USSR Supreme Soviet session. Pin-drop silence was the response. Gorbachev blushed and walked out, even the democrat Sobchak began to implore the Ukrainian deputies: ‘My friends, do not break away from us!’
“Ukraine undoubtedly formed, as a state, under tremendous influence of the national factor. And Yevhen Marchuk was right to say that one of things that caused the collapse of the USSR was underestimation of the national factor. In general, I would evolve sort of a political, historical, and philosophical ‘ice floe law’: when the ice in the Arctic Ocean breaks into pieces in springtime, nobody will ever manage to put it together again.
“But in the past 20 years we have built a feudal-oligarchic state: like in Russia, the bulk of the people are awfully alienated from resources, property, and power. The political situation in this country radically worsened when Yushchenko, not Yanukovych, came to power. No matter what we may say about Kuchma’s rule, there were attempts at that period to ‘maintain balance’ and play up to the nationally-oriented forces. Then the balance of forces was essentially upset. Yushchenko turned out to be a weak ruler deprived of the qualities of a state-centered politician. He made no attempts to build – in deed, not in word – a nation state in line with the principle formulated as long as 20 years ago: it is a state of all the Ukrainian citizens irrespective of their ethnicity. This is why what was going on touched off quite a powerful ‘back wave.’
“As a result, Yushchenko’s five-year presidency gave way to a regime that is absolutely alien to Ukraine, has no strategic vision of this country’s future and, what is more, does not wish to cultivate this vision in itself. This also applies to relations with Russia. No matter what attitude one may take to Yeltsin, he behaved decently towards Ukraine. It is during his presidency that the two states concluded a basic treaty in 1997 – the acme of Russia-Ukrainian relations – which comprised, incidentally, an enormously important clause on mutual official recognition of the inviolability of state borders. Why did the then president of Russia opt for signing that treaty? One of the reasons was (it is my personal presumption) that Yeltsin saw that Ukraine ‘was moving Westward’ and wanted to ‘hold it back’ at least in this way. Later, in the era of ‘late Kuchma,’ Ukrainian-Russian relations began to deteriorate steadily: when Putin came to power, the situation changed.
“Boris Nemtsov described very well the relations between Yanukovych and Putin at Savik Shuster’s talk show: ‘My friends, you don’t understand that these are two different gangs. Putin’s business is gas, it is not the business of Yanukovych; he doesn’t care about Yanukovych’s business.’
“A few words about positive processes. This country has formed a national (not political!) elite consisting of young and European-minded people. But there are no ‘social uplifts’ – they do not work, which is a really serious problem.
“A state, even though a grossly imperfect one, has been built. There is a living and free thought, cultural values, and intellectual life. And, what is more, the feeling of self-identity: 98 percent of the young people born in an independent Ukraine voted at Shuster’s talk show and said they did not believe that Russia would offer Ukraine any help (for example, cut the gas price). They understand that Ukraine should tackle its problems by itself.
“We are, naturally, closely following events in Russia, for it is very important for us. I am personally aware of Russia’s dilemma: it is going to be either an empire (in the context clearly outlined in Putin’s recent Izvestiya article or a nation state for all (really all) its citizens. We are worried about the growth of nationalism in Russia. What especially worries us is the likely breakup of Russia (to which we have no right to shut our eyes). For the disintegration of such a state with a huge stock of nuclear weapons would be a global catastrophe with unforeseen consequences.”
Yu.A.: “Speaking of the 20-year dynamics, I did not mention the two circumstances that must be taken into account. Firstly, the elites have been split lately. In other words, the societal consensus has been upset. This is evident from the fact that problems are arising in the innermost circle embodied by the so-called ‘Family’ under Yeltsin and the cooperative Ozero under Putin. This explains why such people as former finance minister Kudrin were present at the rallies on Bolotnaya Square and Sakharov Avenue. There have been publications by such oligarchs as Mamut, Lebedev, etc. They are saying: you should not, after all, behave like the cooperative Ozero, you should heed and share with us. But the most vociferous is another, supposedly carefree, group which is close to the oil and gas sector or to the organizations whose viability depends on this sector. For example, Kseniya Sobchak belongs to this group. Naturally, the somber and silent Russia was left outside the December events. What is fomenting there? How deep are they sinking into entropy and escapism?
“The other circumstance in this dynamics is criminal evolution of the current ruling regime. We can say there are several categories of crimes here. It is war crimes, such as wiping-out Grozny and deploying Grad multiple rocket launchers in Georgia, and criminal offenses as such. These are represented now by two litigations: one between Berezovsky and Abramovich in London and another between Derypaska and Potanin in Switzerland. But this is what is known as continuous crimes. Their history fits in with and determines the dynamics of Russia’s modern history. For example, the Sibneft story, now the object of a trial in London, is a really enormous story that involves mafia cover-up and illegal seizures sanctioned by the country’s topmost officials. The London trial’s record amply reveals what kind of cover-up it is and who, when and who to asked to be covered up.
“War crimes and criminal offenses belong to the Nuremberg Trial category. But this category also includes crimes against humanity. This has also showed a certain dynamics in Russia’s contemporary history. Russian society has been gradually denied access to basic resources. The main thing is that this denial was carried out in a quasi-legal way – by adopting a series of laws (perhaps hundreds) that run counter even to the current Constitution. As a result, the bulk of Russia’s population found themselves in a reservation of sorts, where they receive some leftovers to feed on but have no opportunity for creative activities. In other words, they cannot choose by themselves what to do, set up nongovernmental organizations or parties. It is the gravest crime, a crime against humanity.”
NEW POLITICAL PATTERNS ARE DEMONSTRATIVELY IMMORAL
Myroslav POPOVYCH:
“If the books and articles written by Western economists and political scientists at that borderline time are anything to go by, Ukraine, Russia, and the whole post-Soviet complex were to develop faster and more effectively than Germany, Japan, and Italy did after World War II. Everybody is still asking in anguish: why did this not happen? Indeed, the former fascists or totalitarian entities gave way to the forces that managed to carry out an economic – and not only – revolution. As for us, I think what Mr. Afanasiev said is the answer to this question: there was not a single day that the state could do without mafia protection and involvement of the uniformed services.
“In the early 1990s we, intellectuals, being aware of the danger of an immoral government, used to draw up programs and try to make a common decision. But this seemed to be a show on the theatrical stage, while real decisions were made behind the scenes. Then we tuned out to have been robbed of our state.
“It seems to me that the tragedy of the Ukrainian, Russian, and other post-Soviet peoples is not only in that we began to live poorly but also in that the new political patterns, which came in lieu of the old ones, are demonstratively immoral. When an ambulance is called several times for Lutsenko, but the judge refuses to adjourn the court, at a time when France’s Human Rights Ambassador, Francois Zimeray, is visiting, it really is demonstrative immorality. The same applies to the Tymoshenko case. I read that somebody had been imprisoned as Madagascar spy in 1937. He implored to be called, for example, Italian spy because Madagascar was not even an independent state at the time, but the local NKVD wanted to surprise its Moscow bosses. The current Lutsenko case somewhat resembles thus situation, for it is just ludicrous to accuse him of paying excessive wages to his chauffeur, when a well-known political figure wears ostrich shoes and will soon go to work by helicopter. We are thus being told to know our place.
“We were right to say that morality is a categorical imperative which one should abide by. I, a totally secular person, was pleasantly surprised and gladdened when churches urged, almost at the top of their voice, the Ukrainian intelligentsia to ethically appraise what is going on. When it comes to ethical appraisal, regimes feel endangered.”
(To be continued in the next issue)
