One should not overly dramatize the likely ratification of the Charter of Regional and National Minority Languages, for Ukraine will continue to be Russified in any case. Yet, it does not seem fair to place the Russian language under special official protection, thus ignoring that Ukrainian is in fact the tongue that belongs on the endangered species list.
A BEATEN ONE PROPS UP THE UNBEATEN ONE
The greatest paradox of the Charter’s Ukrainian interpretation is that it simultaneously protects the country’s many minority languages and Russian, which is the language they suffer from. The 2001 census showed that minorities get Russified, not Ukrainized. For example, 88.5% of Greeks, 83.% of Jews, 64.7% of Germans, 62.5% of Belarusians, 58.7% of Tatars, 30% of Bulgarians, etc., give Russian as their mother tongue rather than their national language. Only the majority of Poles consider Ukrainian their native language. What has politicized debates on the Charter is presence of Russian on the list of the 13 languages to be protected. Otherwise, the parliamentary proceedings on the Charter would be an absolutely routine matter probably ending in a constitutional majority.
The ratification of the Charter, which would have upgraded in a way the legal status of the Russian language on the regional level, might have — but has not — become a historical compromise between Ukraine’s two major language communities. The advocates of Russian will never stop and will continue to demand that it be proclaimed a second, if not the first, official language. The truth is that the Russian language has a constitutional status in Ukraine even without the Charter: Article 10 of the fundamental law not only declares the official status of Ukrainian but also lays down far-reaching rights for Russian. Still, Russian speakers want more, completely ignoring the fact that the declared juridical supremacy of Ukrainian is more than generously compensated for by the actual domination of Russian in all fields of public life.
Given the 350 years of discrimination against the Ukrainian language, awarding the Russian language legally equal status right now, rather than after a certain rehabilitation period, would mean perpetuating its dominant status, not the “harmonious functioning,” of Russian. The experience of Lukashenka’s Belarus confirms that this is the most likely prospect. Stripped even of its current meager state support, the Ukrainian language would become as dead as Latin in thirty or fifty years.
LANGUAGE WAR-MONGERS
The Charter has been signed by as few as 29 countries and ratified by a mere 17. For example, neighboring Russia is in no hurry to sign it, although most of its territory is populated by autochthonous non- Russian nations. Why then do some of our people want to put the issue high on the agenda? Many see the root cause in the government’s desire to split the opposition forces which have different visions on how to solve the language problem. It will be recalled that last fall, in the heat of the Arise, Ukraine! propaganda campaign, several southern and eastern regional councils passed resolutions — simultaneously as if on command — on the official status of the Russian language. Some time later, a campaign in defense of the Russian language was conducted by the Supreme Council of the Crimea, where it was alleged that “forced Ukrainization” had assumed such an “enormous scale” that the whole peninsula had as “many” as four (!) Ukrainian high schools (out of total 575) and one Ukrainian-language newspaper, Krymska svitlytsia, which, incidentally, is now in dire straits for lack of funds. It is also claimed that “malicious opposition languages” (never forget the peril of all those Tatar maliciously coming home after being exiled by Stalin to places where hundreds of thousands so maliciously died — Ed.) in the Crimea was a campaign in which Kyiv pulled the strings.
WHAT SOCIOLOGY SAYS
Although the government and the opposition have different visions of the truth, it is very difficult to find a non-political reason why the language question is so acute now. For, according to the Razumkov Center, 81.2% of Ukrainian citizens think that the Russian-speaking population’s ethnic and cultural needs are now satisfied fully or in part.
A Donetsk Information and Analysis Center poll shows that city residents singled out the top ten burning issues, among them, the environment, high prices, crime, economic crisis, low living standards, low wages and pensions, etc. Language is not even on the list, which perhaps prompted Viktor Yanukovych, while still governor of Donetsk oblast, to say that “the problem of the Russian language is not much of a problem.”
A similar view is taken by Luhansk Governor Oleksandr Yefremov who believes, “Now is the wrong time and place to debate about language; it would make more sense to address more pressing problems.” He’s right: can the Russian language’s status be so acute a problem in an oblast where Ukrainians account for 57.8% of the population but only 26.5% of schools, mainly in the countryside, employ Ukrainian as a medium of instruction?
During the last year’s election campaign, I had to analyze quite a large array of polling data about eastern Ukrainian regions. Nowhere were there any more or less substantial numbers of people who considered language one of the most important problems unless they were “advised” to do so. Thus, even residents of the Russified megacities of Ukraine’s east and south consider de-Russification, a.k.a. “forced Ukrainization,” as only a hypothetical danger. And even then, they apparently do it under the duress of political speculators who occasionally wield the bugbear of “bloody nationalists who will tear out your tongues if we don’t have Russian as an official language.”
WHAT STATISTICS SAY
Still more eloquent than the surveys are statistical data about the dominance of the Russian language in any sphere you like: a wealth of such facts were revealed during the March 12 parliamentary hearings on the problems of the Ukrainian language.
The only domain where the Ukrainian language seems to getting the upper hand is education: 72% of secondary school children and 65% of kindergarteners receive their education in Ukrainian. In some places, they have even overdone it: for example, there is not a single Russian-language school left in Kyiv oblast. But even here it should be borne in mind that an officially Ukrainian middle school is not in fact such because as soon as teachers and pupils down their textbooks, they switch to Russian. Of especially perfunctory nature is Ukrainian high school education in eastern and southern Ukraine.
Ukrainian is often “accused” of being the language of the government apparatus. This is not true because bureaucrats mostly communicate among themselves and with the public in Russian, and nobody should be misguided by the current fad among representatives of central authorities to switch over to what they think is Ukrainian in front of TV cameras. Besides, one can give more than one example when even Cabinet members do not speak Ukrainian. The president has even revealed publicly the names of Mykola Azarov and Yury Smirnov. In fact, the list is much longer.
Out of the six actually functioning national television channels and networks, there is not a single one that broadcasts in Ukrainian only. In addition, the state-run UT-1, halved in order to satisfy the needs of private broadcasters, also often flouts the language law. According to Prosvita, about 90% of the non-state-run channels use the Russian language exclusively, while these channels account for about 95% of the total number of such channels. Government officials, while admitting the fact of gross and large- scale violations of the language law, say they can do nothing because of the private nature of these broadcasters, as if the private sector were exempt from the law.
No better situation seems to exist in radio broadcasting and the print media. According to Oleksandr Savenko, chief of the Presidential Administration’s Department for Interaction Between the Mass Media and Public Administration Bodies, there are only seven Ukrainian-language newspaper copies per 100 Ukrainians against 54 Russian-language newspapers per 100 Russians residing in Ukraine. He also says that “practically all the FM-stations broadcast in Russian, the country is inundated with a huge amount of Russian print media, while Russian rock stars make money hand over fist in Ukraine.”
The situation is still worse on the dynamic market of thick glossy magazines: the Ukrainian-language product does not exist here at all except for Yeva (Eve) and two or three more titles. As long as one hundred years ago, Yevhen Chykalenko, publisher of the first Ukrainian-language daily Rada, said with irony that the Ukrainian press had “got into a vicious circle: to be able to develop, it needs a nationally-conscious society; however, this kind of society cannot emerge unless Ukrainian periodicals come out.” Very little has changed since then.
Ukrainian literature gets by in the background of Kyiv bookstores, to say nothing of Donetsk or Luhansk, where you will not find a Ukrainian-language book for love or money. The book market is 70% Russian in terms of the print run and 90% in terms of the number of titles. Yet, the Ukrainian-language book sales situation looks even worse if we exclude textbooks — a scarce commodity, by the way. For example, the Education Ministry claims Ukrainian middle vocational schools are supplied with a mere 23% of their textbooks in Ukrainian.
It would be also senseless to haunt retail outlets in search of such “exotica” as a Ukrainian-language video, cartoon, or audiocassettes with Ukrainian-language fairy tales for the little ones.
The past three or four years have also revealed gaping disparities in the repertory of movie theaters: the total number of Ukrainian- language films shown is three or four, i.e., one a year, with foreign movies dubbed exclusively into Russian. While it is clear that in Donetsk or Kharkiv the largely Russified audiences will — quite in the spirit of Soviet-style internationalism — boycott any Ukrainian-language film, Kyiv moviegoers would certainly accept it (the authors of The Language Situation in Kyiv: Today and Tomorrow based on the results of sociological surveys state, “Kyivans are psychologically prepared for de-Russification in the city’s linguistic and cultural life”).
In the field of business, the Ukrainian language is frowned upon even in Lviv, and many Lviv residents admit that Russification is reviving in Halychyna. The same is true of the service sector. Situations where the waiter is unable to sustain a dialog in Ukrainian is typical even of Kyiv restaurants. Moreover, there are even situations when waiters are not able to take an order given in Ukrainian (including in those bearing Ukrainian names — Ed).
There are a host of such — humiliating for Ukrainian-speaking people — facts. Yet, this situation, formed by 340 years of official policy and the wild play of the market in the past decade, is compatible with neither the ethnic pattern nor the linguistic preferences of the Ukrainian population. For example, according to the 2001 census, Ukrainians and Russians make up 76% and 17% of the population respectively. 67.5% of Ukraine’s population consider Ukrainian their mother tongue, up 2.8% from the 1989 census. Russian was named as their native language by 29.6% of the population, down 3.2% from the previous count. 85.2% of Ukrainians consider their ancestral language their mother tongue and only 14.8% say it is Russian, which dispels the myth that the overwhelming majority of ethnic Ukrainians are Russophones.
Clearly, answering the native language question, one is guided by his/her sense of national identity. Hence, even if one lists Ukrainian as mother tongue, one might not necessarily use it in everyday life. This is why, to have a true picture, sociologists research the linguistic behavior of individuals in different situations. Mykola Shulha, deputy director of the Institute of Sociology, Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, suggests analyzing language practice according to such criteria as national self-identification, idea of native language, the language of family interaction, and language preferences in working with documents.
The latter criteria especially vividly reveals the lamentable condition of the Ukrainian language in society: as a rule, only 40-45% of those polled choose to fill out Ukrainian-language questionnaires. Ukrainian seems to be mostly used in communication within the family. This must be the most objective criterion because it provides the best conditions for free choice — no pressure from higher-ups or outside Russian-speaking environment. Here family communication shows a 50:50 language ratio. This proportion means that our society consists of two approximately equal linguistic communities.
A NEW VISION OF BILINGUALISM
For many years the debate has gone on about what exactly — ethnic composition, the idea of a native language, or the actual spread of a certain language — the language policy should be based on. The most fervent Ukrainophones cling to the first two criteria, to deep-rooted genetic codes, patriotism, and moral duty.
A more rational stand seems to have been taken by those who think that the language policy should still be based on linguistic, not ethnic identification. Let it be so. But if we, Ukrainian speakers, account for 50% of the total population, then where is our other half in television, radio, newspapers, movies, pop songs, and so forth?
For example, the feeling of belonging to a national minority never escapes me, a Ukrainian faithful to my mother tongue. Moreover, now that I have lived in Kyiv for two years, this sensation remains the same as it was in the 13 years I spent in Moscow. The only difference is that when a policeman hears me speak Ukrainian, he will not immediately demand that I produce my internal passport with a domicile registration stamp. Although Kyiv is a linguistically tolerant city and the predominantly Russian-speaking community of this megalopolis displays a generally friendly attitude toward Ukrainian, it is impossible to constantly use it because every cell of your body feels the pressure of the Russian-language environment. Ukrainian dominates only in Kyiv’s marketplaces, where most of the sellers are suburban farmers. Sometimes you can hear it on a children’s playground, where kindergartners unsuccessfully try to teach Ukrainian to their 25-30-year-old parents, Ukraine’s most Russified generation.
Russification has struck such deep roots that Ukraine does not stand any earthly chance to ever become a predominantly Ukrainian-speaking state. We cannot and must not treat Russian as a foreign tongue, for it is too widespread, and we, after all, have made such a great contribution to it that we have every reason to consider it a language of our own.
And, although it is difficult not to agree with Ivan Dziuba that the term “bilingual” is quite often flaunted by “the confirmed and rabid monolinguals who do not know and do not want to know the Ukrainian language,” a true Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism would be a great step forward for the Ukrainophones compared to the now completely dominant Russian monolingualism. It will still take a great deal of time to reach even this state of affairs. The zealous critics of bilingualism erroneously interpret it as departure from some nonexistent dream of dominance of the Ukrainian-language, when in reality it means a transition from the domination of the Russian language to Ukrainian becoming equally widespread.
Moreover, emphasis on the parity of the languages, rather than the domination of one of them, is an ironclad argument in the debates with those who, under the guise of human rights slogans, intentionally or unintentionally try to preserve the current situation so full of blatant discrimination against Ukrainian speakers.
POSITIVE DISCRIMINATION
What about the authorities? Although Pavlo Movchan says they take no interest in language problems, they in fact seem to be aware of them and even speak their own variety thereof. “Everybody must speak Ukrainian in the state called Ukraine,” the head of government said recently. Incidentally, even before being appointed prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych admitted he knew “all too well that we live in Ukraine and should develop the national language as part of our identity and culture.”
However, in practice language policy is being molded by such factors as the habit of centuries, market situation, intellectual and political pressure from Russia, and the most favorable treatment of Russification. In all probability, it is too early to hope for fundamental changes in language policy — especially taking into account the recent attempts to closely integrate Ukraine into the Russian politico- cultural space (a creeping Pereyaslav) and place our powers that be under greater influence of Moscow, which in turn vigorously opposes de-Russification of the post-Soviet space.
It is only natural that the government tries to preserve political stability, but as far as the Ukrainian language is concerned, stability means comatose stagnation. This is why State Television and Radio Committee Chairman Ivan Chyzh alarmingly told the recent parliamentary hearing on the problems of the Ukrainian language that “clumsy actions” can do only harm. Yet, the fear of making mistakes should not turn into inaction in the fields where the Ukrainian-language environment can be expanded.
The state is so cautious about the propagation of Ukrainian and so afraid of jeopardizing the interests of those who cherish the vision of a Ukrainian-free Ukraine that it ignores even those already prepared for a considerable expansion of the Ukrainian language’s domain. The state is obligated to conceive, support, and develop the language environment for the 50% of individuals who admit they are Ukrainian speakers. The more so that this audience has a social basis for enlargement. For example, many of those who usually speak Russian still consider Ukrainian their mother tongue. Or take those under thirty who, paradoxically, are more Russian-speaking than the older generations but still oppose the Russian language being granted the official status.
Obviously, any policy of de- Russification must be pursued with delicacy and take regional specifics into account. From this standpoint, Ukraine can be clearly divided into several areas. The first, least favorable for the propagation of Ukrainian, includes the Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts, the cities of Kharkiv, Odesa, and perhaps Zaporizhzhia. Utmost caution should be exercised in dealing with these deeply-Russified regions. But far more favorable conditions for de- Russification exist in Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, Kherson, and Odesa oblasts, to speak nothing of Central Ukraine. A ten or twenty-year period of rehabilitation for Ukrainian could save this language from the danger of extinction even if Russian were granted official status, but at the moment the former — by force of great historical injustice — is unprepared for free competition. The Ukrainian and Russian linguistic environments are unable to compete freely, as a chronic asthmatic is unable to compete with a well-trained long-distance runner. This is why the Ukrainian-speaking community and all those interested in the preservation of our national identity, the “nationally distressed”, as our opponents call us (the newspaper Donetski kriazh even prefers the term “nationally depressed”), have a legitimate right to the so-called positive linguistic discrimination. Owing to the three hundred years of harassment of our language and centuries of Russification, we have the right to claim a compensation package, including privileged economic conditions for Ukrainian-language information products. We should not be embarrassed to make this claim. We cannot indefinitely watch our language dying and lament it quietly so that the neighbors will not hear in nooks and crannies adorned with flowers, embroidered towels, and portraits of Shevchenko.
LEND THE DROWNING A HAND
Ukrainian speakers simply do not have adequate resources to solve the problem on their own. Unlike the Russophones, they are not concentrated in big cities but widely scattered in districts and villages. Secondly, they have, for historical reasons, far lower social status and material capabilities (after all, everything depends on money, and the business elite is Russified). Thirdly, even a considerable portion of Ukrainian speakers still bows to the deeply rooted stereotypes of centuries about the lack of prestigious and non-elite nature of Ukrainian. Instead of struggling to promote this language and their own rights, they view adopting the dominant Russian language as a way to enhance their own social status.
Still, there are numerous instances of public initiative. The Ukrainian language is being propagated by the singers (pop singers Skrypka and Vakarchuk have done more than all the branches of power combined) who know they would draw far greater audiences if they sang in Russian. It is being propagated by the publishers who, despite the government policy of supporting Russian book printing, stubbornly publish books in Ukrainian and by the authors who write them. It is being done by the newspapermen who run a commercial risk every day by publishing their papers in Ukrainian under conditions of unfair competition with the Russian-language product. It is being done by those television producers who stoke the barely smoldering fire of the Ukrainian language on television against the backdrop of total domination of Russian-language products.
AND, FINALLY, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
The language problem in Ukraine is not exclusively a human rights issue. The Ukrainians will never be a completely Ukrainian-speaking nation, but, on the other hand, if this nation continues to uphold the dominant position of the Russian language, it will have no historical prospects, even though there are several English-speaking and a host of Spanish- and Arabic-speaking nations in the world, and most researchers do not consider language the main sign of a nation. This does not matter because the political elite of the Russian colossus hanging down on Ukraine believes that language plays the decisive role in the making of a nation. We should not forget that the Russian elite bandies about a theory that the Ukrainian language is an artificial dialect of Russian “corrupted” by Polish influence. Therefore, while an independent Ukraine is subconsciously viewed as a misunderstanding, a Russian-speaking (sic!) Ukraine as a double misunderstanding, removing the latter is just a matter of time. The theory of a “triune Russian nation” (of the Great, Little, and White Russias — Ed.) has merely been put on hold, not abandoned. Sooner or later, the Russians will raise the question of whether Ukraine has the right to exist as a separate national subject, taking into account dominance of the Russian language. Incidentally, the Russian leadership — by contrast with their Ukrainian counterparts — are very well aware of the cementing role the language plays in state construction. This is why the Constitution of Russia proclaims Russian as the official language. For the same reason, Russia continues to Russify the non-Russian peoples, although, like in Ukraine, this is a process largely driven by inertia. This is why the federal center resolutely intervenes in the linguistic policy of the regions and national minorities even if this intervention is a gross violation of elementary democratic norms. For example, last year the Kremlin forbade the Tatars to switch to Latin characters. To this end, the Russian Federation passed a law whereby all its constituent parts must exclusively use the Cyrillic alphabet. This would be the same if the Ukrainian government demanded now that, say, Ukraine’s Poles switched to Cyrillic.
Thus if the Ukrainian elite wants to perpetuate its status as the elite of an independent state, it must be interested not in the humanitarian unification as propagated by Russia but in the reinforcement of the tendencies that enhance Ukrainian identity and prove the necessity of our independent existence. And here spreading of the Ukrainian language plays a leading role.
The problem of de-Russification would easily be solved if one hundred richest and most influential families of Ukraine switched to Ukrainian in reality, not as just a gesture to show off. However, the Ukrainian ruling elite either does not yet understand this or has already decided, deep in its heart, to put an end to all “playing at independence” (the reference is from a Civil War communication from Stalin to Communists in Ukraine — Ed.) and complete the Russification of Ukraine to make it easier to integrate into the Russian political, linguistic, and humanitarian space.
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When the Jews created their state, they revived the dead language of Hebrew. Ukrainians, on the contrary, are so far burying the living Ukrainian language. Incidentally, the Jews would have not succeeded if the Israel project had been based on a compromise between the Zionists and the anti-Semites. But Ukraine was born in 1991 precisely as the result of such a compromise.
